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ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
A CROSS NATIONAL ANALYSIS

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
1996

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
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
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ABSTRACT

What effect does Islamic political culture have on democracy and human rights practices? It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies and, significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to "Islamic Fundamentalism" as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, however, is based primarily on analysis of Islamic political theory and ad-hoc studies of individual countries, which does not consider other factors. Through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, I suggest that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force.

I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power attributed to Islam as the driving force behind politics in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with democratization. In order to test these assertions, I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture based on the extent that Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how, Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented.

This indicator is used in statistical analysis to evaluate the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights across 23 predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of non-Muslim developing nations. The results of the quantitative analysis provide strong evidence that Islamic political culture does not have a significant influence on levels of democracy and human rights practices in predominately Muslim countries. It is also found that other factors, relating to modernization, are the primary causes of authoritarian government and the poor protection of individual rights in the Islamic world.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Charlotte Price. With out her help and support, this would not have been possible.

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A large number of people have helped me along the road to completing this dissertation. Of greatest importance has always been my mother, Charlotte Price, who always provided me with what ever support I needed. My sisters, Miriam and Rochelle also have played a strong role in helping me along the way. All three have always been my toughest critics. I am truly blessed to have such a loving and caring family.

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The American Language Center in Fez played a pivotal role in making my stay in Morocco both meaningful and productive. Daoud Casewit, the Arabic language instruction faculty, and the staff all bent over backwards to be of assistance. Dr. Abd-al Hay Labbi served as my academic mentor and guide to Moroccan politics during my year in his country. His assistance, insights, and hospitality will never be forgotten. Several Moroccan friends were also instrumental in providing both companionship and a door way into Moroccan society. I am particularly grateful to Amina Charat, whose friendship and candor will always be something that I hold dearly. I am also glad to have had the pleasure of sharing my Moroccan experience with two outstanding friends, Jerry and Latisha Kurlanski. Finally, I also owe my gratitude to the hundreds of Moroccans who talked to me about their country and society.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research Question

One of the most elusive and enduring questions in political science is if and how shared attitudes and values affect political systems. The first half of the question can be easily answered affirmatively after a researcher closely observes the politics that are associated with a particular culture. Smoking, eating, and public displays of affection are against the law in Morocco during the month of Ramadan. Of course, 12 kilometers across the sea in Spain, they are not. Consequently, the tasks at hand are to determine how political culture shapes forms of government and policies and to go beyond anecdotal evidence to the discovery of patterns that transcend time and national boundaries. I will achieve these tasks, which are the chief objective of this dissertation by focusing on the question as to why Islam, when serving as a cultural and ideological basis for government, is associated with democratization or authoritarianism and arbitrary government.

Why Islam?

I have chosen Islam as an example of a traditional political culture because its influence is felt in a large number of nations, which facilitates its use as an independent

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variable in cross-national analysis. Also, "Islamic fundamentalism" is a topic that has captured the attention of the public, policymakers, general comparativists, and Middle East specialists. In short, it is the most visible and confusing example of a resurgent traditional political culture. Islam is also an easily identifiable culture because its fundamental doctrines and precepts are written or have been passed down orally in the *Koran*, *Sunna*, and Sharia, which increases the probability that an index of Islamic political culture will be reliable. Finally, religion and politics are doctrinally and historically intertwined in Islam. Therefore, Islamic culture should influence political systems and public policy.

Significance

Liberal Development Theory.

One of the core assumptions of the liberal development paradigm has been that the withering away of traditional political culture is a necessary step in the process of development. Supposedly, traditional political cultures do not foster rationalization, modernization, bureaucratization, or participant societies. It is important to note that this assumption has been criticized by institutionalists, who argue that the ties of tradition are necessary to unite nations during difficult periods of rapid growth. Consequently, the maintenance of tradition is actually an integral element in modernization. For example it may be that Morocco has developed with a comparatively small amount of turmoil, because of the steadying continuity of Islam and the monarchy. In, this project, I follow the reasoning that tradition and modernity are not mutually exclusive and that development is not a linear process across all spheres of society.

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The most obvious evidence for this assertion, once again, comes from the observation of cultures. The city of Fez is a living laboratory of the integration of the old and the new. At the same time, one can find many modern elements in thousand year old Islamic texts and doctrines. Perhaps, Islam as Ernest Gellner (1980) suggested, is more modern than Christianity or Judaism. Since Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1962), comparativists have been trying to pinpoint a universal culture of participation. However, it is important to note that Almond and Verba (1962) wrote that tradition maintains affective bonds among members of democratic societies, which fosters trust and unity in competitive political systems. Since traditional cultures vary, so should the ideological foundations of democratic societies. Consequently an "Islamic Democracy" should take a form that differs from those of Western liberal democracies.

Islam, Modernity and Democracy.

The debate over Islam's compatibility with modernity and democracy has raged on a theoretical and anecdotal level for years. However, strong evidence based on a large sample of Muslim countries has yet to be produced by either side in this debate. This is because most research has focused on predicting the consequences of Islamic political resurgence rather than systimatically evaluating what has transpired during the last 25 years. Hopefully, the case studies and statistical analysis in this project will show that Islam and traditional political culture, in general, can serve as a foundation of modern democratic societies. At the same time, I will be testing the notion that political culture must be included in the study of comparative politics because local cultures affect politics and policies in modern states.

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Political Culture and Rational Choice.

The study of political culture has enjoyed a recent resurgence and challenged the dominant rational choice paradigm (See, Diamond, 1994). Cultural theorists claim that the assumption that individuals are self-interested utility maximizers may be correct but it cannot sufficiently explain political decisions. It might be that a Saudi Muslim and a secular American would not make the same choice regarding the allocation of state expenditures if they were operating within the same systemic structures and given the same resources. My dissertation will investigate the assertion that the inclusion of political culture in comparative political study is necessary to understanding why some political choices are unacceptable and what shapes actors' preferences.

Methodology.

This project will offer methodological innovation for the study of Islam through the development of a numerical index of Islamic political culture based on:

- The number of legal spheres where *Sharia*, Islamic law, is utilized and the extent to which it is applied.
- If and how institutions, ideas, and technologies that originated outside Muslim world are accepted.

Consequently, I will be able to utilize multiple regression, a statistical technique that will permit me to analyze my research questions across 46 countries and to determine if the level of influence of Islamic political culture on political systems has a subsequent affect on democracy and individual rights. This methodology will also demonstrate how statistical analysis can be utilized in the study of Islam without slighting the crucial aspects of Islamic political culture which make it unique.

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"Islamic Fundamentalism."

This last topic is of particular importance because of the significant amount of attention that has been given to "Islamic Fundamentalism" by academics, journalists, government officials and, of course, Muslims, across the world. Some see Islam as the next great threat to the West and Liberalism because it is inherently anti-democratic and its values clash with those of secular based societies; others see Islam as the salvation for nations that have been the victims of Western cultural and economic subjection. However, as mentioned, systematic studies which investigate whether it is Islam, other factors, or a combination of both, that is primarily responsible for forms of government and policies in Muslim countries are, to this point, rare. In short, we have ignored, or deemed irrelevant, a most basic question. In relation to determining the most important political outcomes--
does Islam really matter?

If it is concluded that the answer is no and that regimes are simply deeming a wide variety of political systems and policies "Islamic," than all the of the heated debate over whether citizens of countries with predominantly Muslim populations looking to religion as a solution to their political problems is desirable or undesirable and whether Islamic doctrines are compatible with liberalism have been wasted energy. One must not forget that Kuwait did not hesitate to leave its salvation in the hands of the United States, Iran was a dictatorship under the Shah, and that Tunisia spends a greater percentage of its annual budget on religious affairs than does Sudan (as do many European nations). It might be that religious based policy in Islamic states does not go beyond the regulation of accepted social conformities and the repression of dissent. Of course, secular

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authoritarian governments, and democratic ones for that matter, also engage in these

practices.

Chapter Outline

Developing An Argument

This dissertation will utilize four types of inquiry, political theory, field

observation, comparative case studies, and statistical analysis. Chapters Two and Three

will demonstrate why an alternative approach to the comparative study of political culture,

specifically Islam, is necessary. A review of the literature on political culture and politics,

Islam and politics in Chapter Two will show that:

- little has been done to conform or disconfirm, using cross-national samples, the notion that shared belief systems and ideologies influence policies:

- evidence supporting arguments regarding the relationship between Islam and politics has been largely anecdotal, has focused on individual countries, and has not accounted for competing variables or explanations

- most work on Islamic political resurgence has focused on predicting the consequences of this phenomenon while little attention has been given to evaluating what has already transpired.

I complete the development of my argument as to why and how Islam could have an

effect on democracy and the protection of individual rights in Chapter Three. First, I will

search for answers in Islamic political doctrine and traditions. I will then consider various

notions of politics and economics Islam's basic sources. I will also briefly examine the

work of several modern Muslim political theorists whose writings have influenced

contemporary Islamic political groups. Finally, I will add universal factors which have

been thought to play a significant role in political development and transitions to

democracy. In short, because Islam can facilitate a wide range of political systems and, by

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itself, does not determine whether countries can be democratic, an inquiry into Islamic precepts and law will not suffice. Consequently, it is necessary to identify variables which interact with Islamic political culture, such as wealth, ethnic cleavages, and the modernization process, in producing political outcomes.

It is also essential to consider how regimes respond to the challenge to a growing Islamic political opposition. Regime behavior is often an undervalued consideration, as will be seen in the differing experiences of Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco in spite of important social and economic similarities. Also, what is the nature of the ideologies offered by these opposition groups? Events in Jordan have shown that some offer programs which will allow them to participate in largely secular governments. At the same time, the foresight of King Hussein, who opened the political system to the Islamic Brotherhood was also essential. In short, I will be looking for hte type of consensus that is discussed in elite theories of democratic transition (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1992; Rustow 1967; and Dahl, 1971). The political systems that result from the challenge of political Islam are not just the results of ideology or uncontrollable social forces. As will be seen, in the Islamic world, as everywhere else, political actors are also important.

Case Studies

Chapters Four through Seven illustrate the argument developed in Chapter Three through comparative case studies. It is important to note that the eight countries, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, ,Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Iran, to be analyzed in the case studies have been included because they represent differing relationships between Islam and politics. By investigating the considerations discussed in the previous paragraph across these nations, a general theory of the relationship between Islam and democracy

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will be produced. Particular attention will be given to the Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan because, when compared with the other five nations, secular and religious cultural forces appear to coexist and interact with ease. Although all three of these nations are only marginally to somewhat democratic, the same is also, at best, true of the other five countries. Since none of these nations can serve as an example of an Islamic democracy, it important to carefully consider the combinations of factors that have produced the potential for representative government.

Egypt and Jordan will be considered in Chapter Four because modest openings of their political systems corresponded with the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, these cases suggest that Islam may be able to play a part in growth of democracy. This argument will be further supported in Chapter Five, where I will look at Syria and Tunisia. The current regime in Syria is highly authoritarian but, also, secular based. In fact, some of the worst human rights offenses committed by the Assad regime and the Bourghiba and Ben Ali regimes in Tunisia have involved the repression of religious groups. Tunisia, however. has taken a more moderate course regarding religious political groups in the past seven years and subsequently seen some improvement in its human rights record but, the ban on religious based political parties remains and these groups are still repressed.

Chapter Six will analyze two Islamic monarchies, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. King Fahd's official title includes "Guardian of the Holy Places" and King Hassan II, in addition to being head of state, is also "The Commander of the Faithful." Is it Islam that allows these and other monarchies to survive up to the approach of the twenty-first century or is

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it other factors? Finally, Chapter Eight will discuss two nations, Iran and Algeria, where the rise of political Islam has been associated with violence and turmoil. These nations are included because, at face value, their recent histories contradict that notion that Islam and democracy are compatible. However, it might be that authoritarian regimes would exist in these countries regardless of the influence of Islamic political culture. At this point, hypotheses regarding the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights will have been developed that can be tested across all countries with predominantly Muslim populations.

An Indicator of Islamic Political Culture and Statistical Tests

Chapters Eight and Nine, where I will evaluate the propositions developed in the preceding case studies, are the greatest leap into the unknown and will be the most controversial part of the dissertation. This is because I have created a numerical index of Islamic political culture that will be used in quantitative analysis. In essence, I will be concentrating an entire system of belief, legal tradition, and way of life into two dimensions that can be assumed to apply to all Muslim societies.[1] As will be seen, others have classified Islam political ideologies into categories and placed the groups that espouse these ideologies on two dimensional graphs (See Shepard, 1986). However, to my knowledge, I am the first to attach numbers to these placements. It is my belief that what is lost in detail is more than compensated by the ability to test hypotheses regarding Islam across a large sample of nations, while controlling for the affects of other variables.

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[1] It is important to note that I am only considering and attempting to capture the key dimensions of political Islam not Islam in its entirety.

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Criticism of this type of methodology has been of three general varieties. The first claims that this type of activity is simply wrong, of little value, and that such a broad and abstract notion of Islamic political culture cannot be successfully captured in two dimensions or enumerated. There is little use in responding to this type of polemic because they are rooted in disciplinary or methodological prejudices. The only way to please this group would be to abort the project. However, the classifying and placing of numbers on broad and abstract topics is widely accepted in contemporary political science as indexes of democracy, human rights, and even liberalism exist. Finally, this group of critics engages in the activity that they are condemning every time they construct and grade essay exams for their courses.

A second group of critics claims that I, as a Westerner, am imposing my own hegemonic meaning on Islam and that, furthermore, I cannot truly understand or objectively evaluate Islamic political culture. Of course, to some degree, both of these assertions are true. However, I do not believe that they invalidate the findings to be produced in this dissertation. First, I have engaged many Muslims in the coding process and have had at least one citizen of each of the countries included in the sample review my coding of their nation. Second, the two dimensions utilized in the index are ones that are the most often mentioned in the writings and speeches of contemporary Muslim political theorists. Third, as mentioned earlier, I am also building on previous literature that classifies and places Islamic political ideologies on two-dimensional scales. Fourth, my residence in Morocco, experiencing of life in and Islamic political culture, and discussions regarding religion and politics with Moroccans from all strata of society has supported my

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confidence in the index. Finally the alternative is to abandon not only this project but, also, the study of Islam by Americans and other Westerners. This, I believe, would only serve ignorance and misunderstanding.

The last group of critics has already been of great assistance in this project. That is those who disagree either with the dimensions I have chosen to represent Islamic political culture, the coding methods and procedures, or the rankings assigned to individual nations. As a result, I have rethought and reformulated basic assumptions, methods, and the assigning of numbers to various countries. A survey sent to other scholars was an attempt to gain as much input from as many sources as possible for the dissertation. The construction of the index, assigning of scores, and statistical methods for ascertaining the reliability of the index will be taken up in greater detail in Appendix I and Chapter Eight of the dissertation. I, of course, take full responsibility for all of the coding and assigning of numbers.

Chapter Eight will outline the methodology to be used for the hypothesis testing and discuss how key indicators, including the development of the scale of Islamic political culture, will be measured and test propositions regarding the relationship between Islamic political culture and democracy. Chapter Nine will take up the question of Islam's influence on individual rights. Chapter Ten will summarize the findings of the dissertation and provide the foundations of an answer to the question of the relationship between traditional political culture, form of government, and government policies. As mentioned, an appendix explaining how the indicator of Islamic political culture was developed, how

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coding was completed, and how the validity of the coding process was tested will also be included.

It is also hoped that this dissertation will serve the normative purpose of demystifying political Islam.[2] Too often Islam is viewed as a monolithic, irrational, and other worldly phenomenon that is beyond comprehension. Consequently, everything that cannot be explained or that we find disagreeable about Muslim nations or societies is simply attributed to Islam. One way to overcome this oversimplification is simply to spend a long period of time in a Muslim society. After nine months in Morocco and visits to Tunisia and Jordan, and Egypt, it is hard for me to believe that Islam is always the primary motivation for political behavior in these countries. A second method is to use the methodologies of political science to systematically compare and contrast Muslim societies with each other and non-Muslim societies to determine if the outcomes that we attribute to Islam are really caused by Islam. Having, developed an assertion using the first method, I will now proceed to test it using the second.

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[2] This is not to claim that political Islam can ever completely be understood through academic inquiry, particularly by an American non-Muslim. Also, one of the most important aspects of Islam is its rich mystical tradition.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

The mystery of Islam and politics that confronts us must be viewed as both a question of national politics as well as the influence of doctrines, beliefs, and legal codes. As the following literature review will demonstrate, inquiry that does not include both of these factors has not been successful in solving the mystery. In other words, methods that view everything as being unique, incomparable, and unclassifiable are of little value in trying to understand political phenomenon which manifest themselves across national borders. At the same time, methods that do not account for regional differences are equally problematic, especially when they have been applied to Islam and the Middle East. In short, it is important to bridge the gap between political science and area studies.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why the approach to analyzing the nature of the relationship between Islam and politics outlined in Chapter One is necessary. First, I will trace the literature regarding the role of traditional political culture, specifically religion, in developing nations. From this discussion, I will begin the development of an argument as to why a traditional political culture, in this case Islam, might have an

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influence on important political outcomes, such as democracy and the protection of the individual. I will also show how this dissertation will help fill a hole in the literature on political culture, that is the shortage of cross-national studies which investigate if and how shared attitudes, values, and beliefs affect government policies.

The second section of this literature review will consider how the relationship between Islam and politics has been studied in the past. Although, my primary focus will be on political science, I will also briefly mention the approaches of other disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and psychology. Here, I will seek to demonstrate that, although there has been a significant progress in collecting information on Islam as a political force, too much strength is automatically attributed to religion as a determinant of political outcomes in the Middle East and the Islamic world in general. I will also argue that too much effort has been exerting in trying to predict what form political Islam will take in the future, while little has been done to systematically analyze its consequences.

Political Culture and Development

Weber.

Since Weber (1958) argued that reformation Protestantism was conducive to the growth of the spirit of capitalist productivity and accumulation, a controversy has raged over whether political culture has a significant influence on political and economic systems. Weber's critics have claimed that other factors such as geography, wealth, and historical circumstance are of greater importance (Eisenstadt, 1968). Hence, the beginning

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of the debate between advocates of cultural, structural, and rational choice theories.

Advocates of the importance of political culture have been left with the difficult tasks of:

1. showing that political culture is not simply a concept that is used to account for everything that remains an anomaly in a given society,

2. showing that differences in political culture can explain differences in political behavior across governments and changes in political culture across time result in changes in political behavior,

3. codifying and identifying different variants of political culture.

Because Weber argued that only capitalist societies were modernized, rationalized, and bureaucratized, the first generation of development theorists placed great emphasis on the third task and focused on the division between tradition and modernity. According to Weber (1958), it was the influence of certain tenets of Protestantism, which helped facilitate a transformation in the shared beliefs and attitudes of a society. This new ideological foundation, subsequently, led to new modes of economic production. Consequently, the transformation from religious based ideology to "secular-rational" ideology became a cornerstone of the liberal theories of the late 1950's and early 1960's. At the same time, it also appeared that the role of religion in politics, was declining across the world, just as it did in the United States and Europe (Jurgensmeyer, 1993).

Liberal Theory.

One of the first comparativists who emphasized the importance of the change from traditional to modern political culture, Daniel Lerner (1958), focused on the Middle East, which is heavily influenced by Islamic political culture. Lerner, using the example of a Turkish village and then a cross-national sample, identified a number of factors, such as urbanization, literacy, and communication, which break down traditional society and

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stimulate political and economic development. According to Lerner (1958), all of these factors permanently destroy the old relationships and world-views that supported these societies. Once communities become connected to the modern world and all that it has to offer, patterns of thought, (in this case, those if Islam) which contradict the enjoyment of the benefits of modernity cannot survive.

Lerner's work was followed by seminal works by Lipset (1958), Deutsch (1961), and Inkeles (1974), who identified factors that were associated with the process of social mobilization and democratization. The general theme of these works was that as people moved to the city, learned more about the outside world, and came in contact with a wider variety of people, they would develop the skills necessary to take part in a participatory society. Concurrently, the belief that people, not the uncontrollable forces of nature or God, for that matter, controlled human destiny resulted from rising levels of education and technological progress. As a result, religion's role as the set of principles and the value system that ordered societies was bound to decline (Smith, 1970).

W. W. Rostow's (1958) *Stages of Economic Growth* outlined a series of four stages through which nations proceed as they modernize. The catalyst for the process is the introduction of an "outside force" into a traditionally based society that begins to breakdown the primordial ties that were the foundation of the social and political order. It is important to note that Rostow emphasizes that these bonds are regressive and work against development and modernity. This line of thought become dominant in comparative politics and was emphasized in the textbooks of the late sixties such as

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Almond and Powell's *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (1966). In short, development was to take place at the expense of traditional forces such as religion.

This process is largely what had transpired in Christian dominated Europe and North America. Of course, there is no better example than Weber's Puritans. It was the spirit of capitalism and its associated behaviors, which were inherent in the Protestant ethic, that, ironically, weakened religion's hold on the Puritan communities (Weber, 1958). These same values, when introduced into an Islamic society should have had the same affect. However, Weber never finished a volume on Islam in his sociology of religions and his writings suggest that Islam was anti-modern and that its value system might not facilitate modern capitalism (Turner, 1978). The work of Orientalist scholars and Marx's Asiatic Mode of Production also suggest that Islam was different from Puritan Protestantism and repressed, rather than facilitated, modern vales (See, Said, 1978 and Binder, 1988).

Religion and Development.

Liberal Theory

These proposed differences between Islam and Protestantism were smoothed over in Donald Smith's (1970, 1974) two works on religion and development, which both strongly echo the liberal paradigm in that the spiritual will eventually become separated from the temporal. Smith (1970) wrote that religion's influence on politics in developing states goes through a four step process similar to Rostow's stages of economic growth, separation of religion and politics, the expansion of the secularized polity into areas previously dominated by religion, secularization of political culture, and, finally, polity

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domination of religion. In another volume, Smith (1974) predicted that Egypt's political system was in the midst of a transformation that would take it from traditional Islam to socialism. This prediction, however, was soon to be proved wrong by the events of the late 1970's.

Marxist Theory.

The subordination or adaptation of religion to economic and political theme is also prevalent in Marxist and dependency theory (e.g., Cordoso and Faleto, 1979). For example, in *Islam and Capitalism* (1966), Maxime Rodinson wrote that even in purely traditional Muslim societies, religious belief did not significantly affect economic practice. According to Rodinson (1966), when religious doctrine stood in the way of gain and profit, it was either ignored or liberally interpreted. The theme of the irrelevance of Islamic doctrine in regulating economic practice is also reflected in the works of Peter Gran (1979) and Samir Amin (1982). This line of thought saw the importance of political culture as primarily being its growing irrelevance. Had this been true, the cross-national and regional study of political culture would not be necessary because all modern political cultures would be similar. However, the study of political culture would remain important because modernity was not necessarily the final stage in the temporal progression of political cultures.

Post-Modernism.

The continued relevance of political culture is evident in the recent growing body of literature on post-modernism. The Kaas and Barnes (1979) project showed that a new culture of political activity might be developing in Western democracies. Aaron

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Wildvasky's (1988) article in the American Political Science Review outlines how changes in the nature of political cultures within nations might affect institutions. However, Inglehart's *Culture Shift* (1988), which proposes a change from modern to post-modern political culture in Western Europe has been the most significant development in the field of political culture. Identifying the values that are post-modern, how they are manifesting themselves across generations, and how this transformation will affect political systems and policies will provide a full-plate for the temporal analysis of political culture for years.

This line of research helps fulfill the fourth previously mentioned objective of political culture research, the codification and identification of different variants of political cultures, such as modern, post-modern, and traditional. This can also lead to the examination of the question of whether variances in political culture across nations and sub-national units results in different public policies. Recent studies (Hofferbert and Budge, 1990) have shown that political parties follow the planks of the platforms they submit to the public before elections. At the same time, research is placing the political parties of democratic nations on the traditional-modern-post-modern continuum (Klingemann and Hofferbert, 1994). Consequently, it may be seen if differences in spending across nations or sub-national units are related to the political cultural orientation of ruling parties.

Conservative Theory.

The Developing Nations of the Muslim World

An important limitation of the temporal evolution of political culture and post-modernism literature is its irrelevance to many developing nations, particularly those in the

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Islamic world. The study of Islamic political culture and the political culture of the Middle East has and will not be able to achieve this fundamental task of identifying and codifying political culture among populations because of the impossibility of survey research in most Islamic and Middle Eastern countries (Binder 1976). As will be seen, this has caused serious problems in research on Islam and politics. At the same, the lack of true electoral competition and the presence of one party states prohibits the use of political parties as indicators of political culture. As my own experience in Morocco demonstrated, it is difficult to systematically study political culture in authoritarian political systems.

Another limitation on the study of Islam's influence on politics is that the traditional-modern dichotomy does not appear to fit the political cultures of Islamic countries (Gellner, 1981). This is largely a result of the current, and possibly never ending, conflict between things deemed "traditional" and those deemed "modern" in many of these nations. Of equal importance, in some nations, particularly Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, a coexistence and integration of these two forces appears to be coalescing. Consequently, the traditional-modern dichotomy may not be relevant to Islamic nations, which would signify the existence of a unique variant of political culture which should influence politics and policies. This is the crucial assumption that is accepted at face value but that has not been placed under rigorous examination.

The Resilience of Tradition

The notion of a universal culture of modernity actually came under attack in the late 1960's from a group labeled by Leonard Binder (1988) as conservative development theorists. It must be remembered that the liberal theorists, themselves, (Pye, 1965) cautioned that tradition would never completely be eliminated from the realms of politics

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and economics. This thinking was represented in what are still the seminal works on political culture, Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963) and *The Civic Culture Revisited* (1980), where it is claimed that tradition plays an important role and strengthening bonds and allegiance to participatory political systems. As mentioned earlier, this raises the possibility that the ideological foundations of democracies may vary beyond those found in the West.

The concept of traditional political culture playing an important role in developing political systems can be found in the work of Huntington (1967), who wrote that traditional forces are important stabilizing elements in countries which are undergoing rapid political, economic, and social change. The use of tradition, according to Huntington, can maintain loyalty to the regime during these trying and turbulent times. Consequently, Huntington, along with Apter (1968) and Wiener (1973), called for the strengthening of traditional institutions, such as religious based monarchies. The liberal development paradigm has also been criticized for its assumption that there are universal starting and ending points for all nations. Reinhard Bendix (1967) argued that modernization could take place in some spheres of life in some countries but not in others. This leaves open the possibility that religion may be one of the "traditional" forces that affects politics in some modern nations. Hofferbert and Sharkansky (1973), in conjunction, found that it may be that, in some segments of society, industrialization proceeds separately from another developmental process, integration. In other words, some geographical locations remain isolated from the development that is taking place in neighboring areas.

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These works all suggest that political culture not only varies significantly along the temporal domain but also the spatial domain. This is the other half of the Weber thesis. Capitalist practice, developed much faster in predominantly Protestant areas than in Catholic ones because of the different dogmas of the two churches. However, the Catholic dominated areas eventually caught to those of the Protestants. Thus, the question becomes whether differences in political culture can endure. Research on specific countries has provided evidence that these partitions might be long term or even permanent. The Rudolphs (1967) found that the traditional caste system in India is actually a factor that has aided the social and economic mobilization of the lower castes, which has facilitated the growth of democracy

There is also evidence to suggest that political culture continues to affect policy in developed nations. Anthony King (1973) concluded that a uniquely American political culture is a cause of the small amount that country spends on social programs. Also, Robert Fried (1971) found that, within Italy, the existence of two political cultures may be a factor that affects variation in spending across cities. A basic assumption for many years in research on politics and public policy across American states was that a fundamental difference existed between Southern and Northern states (de Tocqueville, 1956; Key, 1984; Dye, 1990). If various countries are unique and political cultures have been shown to vary within nations, it is essential that we investigate variance across a number of countries.

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The Resurgence of Political Culture.

The relationship between political culture, form of government and public policy, as mentioned in Chapter One, has resurfaced in comparative politics. In addition to the post-modernism research previously discussed, there have been efforts to evaluate political culture in developing nations. One of the most noteworthy is Pye's work on China (1988). Several of the articles in a recent edited volume on the state of comparative politics (Rustow, 1992) focus on political culture in the third world. Also, another recently published collection of essays (Diamond, 1993) focuses specifically on the relationship between traditional political culture and democracy. However, with the exception of the theme of political culture, the authors' focuses and methodologies vary greatly. Hence, the production of cross- national studies investigating the influence of a specific political culture while controlling for other factors is the next logical next step.

Recent events in international politics have also strengthened the arguments of those who advocate the importance of political culture. At the end of the Cold War, many of the enduring conflicts are rooted in religious, ethnic, or linguistic partitions (Mazrui, 1990). At face value, the conflicts in Bosnia, Israel/Palestine, the former republics of the Soviet Union, Kashmir, and elsewhere suggest that culture is important enough to cause wars between nations and destroy existing states. Huntington (1993) has gone as far as to argue that clashes between "civilizations" with conflicting value and belief systems might be the cause of the great wars of the twenty-first century. Huntington specifically points to the incompatibility of Islam and the West as a potential cause of conflict. This same concern with Islam and the West, although to a less extreme extent, can also be found in the work of Bernard Lewis (1993).

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Islam: Traditional Or Modern

Early Works

The previously discussed literature raises the question whether Islam-- specifically-
- hinders modernization and democracy. Can we find differences in levels of democracy
and public policies between Islamic and non-Islamic developing nations? Also, do
differences in the level of influence of Islamic political culture result in differing forms of
governments and policies? Early works in comparative politics that focused on the
Middle East were strongly influenced by the liberal paradigm (Rustow, 1971). Manfred
Halpern (1967) wrote that a modern middle class was emerging in the Middle East that
would lead the process of modernization in that region. Halpern went on to argue that
Islam was an irrational and very dangerous threat to this process. Various studies, during
this period, of the political systems of various Middle Eastern nations reach the same
conclusion.[1] Generally, the mobilization of a middle class that had received Western style
education would lead to the modernization and the secularization of political culture.
However, events such as the Iranian Revolution, the Lebanese Civil War, and the murder
of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat soon proved otherwise. Consequently, political
scientists and other area specialists were forced to reconsider Islam's role in politics and
society. The results can be placed into four categories.

1. The study of Islam in the West is distorted by its relationship to Islamic societies.
   The West has always approached the study of Islam from a position of power and
   dominance, the colonizer and the hegemon. This has prevented Western scholars
   from gaining an accurate understanding of Islam and Islamic societies.

2. Islam is a very mysterious and irrational force that overwhelms societies. This
   trend attributes almost all behavior in Islamic societies to Islam. In other words,

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[1] For examples, see, Lewis (1961), Safran (1964), Cottam (1964), Newton (1976), Henry (1965), and Rustow (1961).

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Islam is used to explain everything and is the most important variable in understanding these societies. Changes in behavior are attributed to cyclical fluctuation in the influence of Islam.

3. This most basic approach has been an effort to collect information on Islamic political groups, the chains of events which were associated with the rise of political Islam, and the nature of the ideologies being offered.

4. Realizing that Islam's role in society was not weakened as much as originally claimed by the writers of the 1960's and 1970's, this strain of literature attempts to understand the relationship between Islam and politics by applying the methods of the social sciences while, at the same time, recognizing that Islam might produce a political culture that varies from the West.

Post-Modernism-Deconstructionism.

The first response was important as it threw a red flag at American Middle East specialists and caused them to rethink their methods. Most noteworthy in this body of literature are the two works of Edward Said. The first, *Orientalism* (1978), takes scholars to task for the reasons discussed above. The second, *Covering Islam* (1982) documents unfair treatment of Islam in the media and government funding of Middle East research. Of interest to this project, Said (1982) suggests that innovative methods, such as quantitative studies and those that emphasize similarities between the Western and Islamic worlds, would be of value. This appears to match my earlier stated goal of demystifying Islam and going beyond attributing all that is unknown about the politics and societies of the Muslim world to Islam.

Islam is Everything-Orientalism.

The work of Said and other deconstructionists, although important as a criticisms of methodology, does not attempt to produce new knowledge, specifically, evidence that political culture affects important political outcomes. We are told that political culture is important but that we, as Western analysts may not be able to discover how (Binder,

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1988). This view is, in part, a response to the second type of explanation of Islamic political resurgence, "Islam is everything." This approach predates the most recent rise of "Islamic Fundamentalism" and is associated with Orientalism. In short, Orientalist research is based on the premise that Islamic societies can be understood through the deciphering of Islamic texts. A major shortcoming of this approach is that many of the fundamentals precepts of Islamic societies are not contained in texts or are not even related to texts (Gellner, 1981).

The second problem with recent versions of this orientation, and more central to this dissertation, is that they can only explain temporal variances in Islam's influence on politics but not spatial ones. For example, Bernard Lewis (1976), the most esteemed of modern Orientalists, writes that periods of Islamic revival are based on a sense of decline and decay in Islamic societies. This feeling is caused by the realization that the Islamic world is not keeping pace with rival civilizations, such as the West, which leads to a turning inward and, very often, irrational and self destructive behavior. Islam, in short, can be viewed as a dark storm cloud that periodically overwhelms societies (Lewis 1976).

The "Islam is Everything" explanation is also prevalent among journalists, commentators, and non-area specialists. Huntington's polemics (1991, 1993) are very prominent samples from the last group. Theda Skocpol (1994), in her analysis of social revolutions resorts to attributing the Iranian revolution to Shia extremism. As for the first two groups, one need only look as far as titles. Journalist Robin Wright's (1986) book on Islamic political resurgence is titled *Sacred Rage*. Dillip Hiro (1989) attributes conflict in the Middle East to *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*. Newspaper

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headlines have warned unsuspecting Americans that "The Muslims are Coming" and to be aware of "The Sweeping Tide of Islamic Fundamentalism." In short, a monolithic, irrational, and inherently dangerous Islam is presented to the public.

The "Islam is Everything" explanation, both in its popular and Orientalist forms, is problematic for several reasons. First, this theory only explains temporal changes in Islam's influence on society but not cross-societal differences. If the period from the late 1970's to the present is a period of societal decline in the Muslim world and subsequent Islamic resurgence, how does one explain the variance in the influence of Islam across countries with large Muslim populations? What about those which where religiously oriented prior to 1970 and those which have been less affected by the current resurgence of Islamic sentiment? This leads to a second shortcoming, the lack of consideration of other factors such as economic and social structures. Perhaps behavior that is being attributed to Islam is really being caused by something else. Islamic countries, of course, are not the only developing states experiencing turmoil and authoritarian rule.

A third problem results from the impossibility of survey research and other difficulties involving social science research in most Muslim countries.[2] We do not really know if people have become more religious in the past twenty years or if their opinions regarding the proper relationship between religion and politics have changed. Perhaps as Eisentstadt (1979) argues, they simply have begun to articulate long held beliefs. It might also be that a small segment of society is attracting a lot of attention through acts of

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[2] My own experience in Morocco is a goof example of this problem. First, my request to do survey research was refused by the Moroccan government. Second, people, even on an informal basis were reluctant to express their opinions regarding political matters. Third, it is impossible to obtain random sample where nobody is exactly sure how many people there are.

violence and sabotage. Finally, this argument is based on the assumption that all Islamic

political ideologies are irrational and cannot be successfully merged with those from the

outside, which simply is not true (Shepard, 1986).

Information Collecting.

The third group of literature, and by far the largest, has been largely an information

collecting exercise. First, there are numerous monographs detailing the rise of political

Islam in a number of nations. The chapters on various countries are usually contributed by

different authors and describe the events that led to Islamic political resurgence and the

nature of important Islamic political groups (e.g. Hunter, 1986; Piscatori, 1982). I counted

over 50 of these works in the library at Binghamton University. A second variant

examines the thought of prominent Islamic political theorists (e.g. Esposito, 1983, and

Donohue, 1982 and Esposito). The third and final category in this groups is in-depth

studies of specific Islamic political groups (e.g. Keppel, 1986). In short, most of these

works have provided a significant amount of important information on political Islam and

factors associated with its increasing strength and have served to refute the "Islam is

everything" explanation. However, few have rigorously analyzed the consequences of

Islam's influence on politics across a large number of countries.

New Approaches.

The fourth group of literature has used the theories and methods of academic

disciplines to understand the relationship between Islam and politics. However, at the

same time, acknowledging that analysis must precede with caution because Islam may,

indeed, cause unique political outcomes. A good example of this type of research is

Leonard Binder's (1978) analysis of the origins of regional elites in Egypt under the Nasser

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regime. Of interest, one of the central themes of *In a Moment of Enthusiasm* (1978) is that a traditionally oriented class, the rural nobility, played a crucial role in Nasser's campaign to modernize. Thus, the conclusions of both Daniel Crecelius (1970) and P.J. Vatikiotis (1982) that the rapid modernization and secularization of the Nasser era did not severely weaken the influence of Muslim political culture in Egypt is not surprising.

Perhaps their conclusion is based on the fact that the classifying of political cultures as tradition, modern or transitional leaves out a very diverse middle ground. S.N. Eisentadt (1973) has warned that Islam cannot accurately be deemed traditional or modern. Gellner (1981), using anthropological case studies from North Africa, has argued that, of the three monotheisms, Islam best facilitates modernization and democracy. These works suggest that Islam's role in society, in practice, differs from Christianity's and that governments based on Islam and anchored in Islamic societies may produce outcomes which are significantly different from those of secular governments. However, this does not mean that the methods of comparative politics and other social sciences are irrelevant to Islamic studies because of the uniqueness of Islam and Muslim societies.

Jerrold Green's (1983) analysis of the Iranian revolution discusses universal processes such as social mobilization, political mobilization, and pseudo-participation while accounting for the particularities of Iran. The same methodology has also been successfully used by A. Richard Norton (1984) in his book on the growth of the Shia militia, Amal, in Lebanon during the early 1980's. Both of these works utilized the previously discussed liberal development theories to discover why modernization led to authoritarianism or anarchy rather than democracy. Leonard Binder's Islamic Liberalism

(1988) used deconstructionist techniques to evaluate the compatibility of Islam with liberal democracy. However, in regard to the relationship between Islam and politics, most recent works have been largely descriptive and few have tested theories through comparative case studies or quantitative analysis.

An interesting and very useful body of literature, based on the realization that it is impossible to classify Islam as a traditional or modern force, has focused on developing typologies of Islamic political ideology (Shepard, 1986). This type of research is invaluable to the study of the relationship between Islam and politics. First, it goes beyond claiming that Islamic political culture is different and identifies important aspects of Islam which might cause the policies produced by Islamic governments to be unique. Second, it helps provide a better understanding of Islamic society than the orientalist approach because it encompasses ideas and beliefs which are found outside of core texts. Finally, the categorizing and placing of ideologies on continuums in relationship to each other facilitates the rigorous cross- national analysis that is absent in political science research on Islam.

One of the most sophisticated of these typologies is that of William Shepard (1986), who collapses Islamic political thought into two dimensions, "totalism" and acceptance of outside ideas, institutions, and technologies. Totalism represents the extent to which strict adherence to Islamic law, "Sharia," is required. The second realm, acceptance of outside ideas, institutions, and technologies can be succinctly labeled "authenticity." These two indicators, in my opinion, provide a reliable tool to measure the "Islamicness" of the types of political cultures advocated by Islamic political groups and

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governments which claim to rule in the name of Islam. I will discuss the appropriateness of these two indicators and the quantification of Shepard's typology in Chapter Eight.

The Current State of the Study of Islam and Politics.

The quantity of literature being produced on Islam and politics has continued to increase exponentially in the late 1980s and early 1990's. Approaches to this problem have ranged from psychoanalytical (Mernissi, 1992) deconstruction of deconstructionism (Binder, 1988), analyses of civil society (Norton, 1995), and Orientalism research also continues (Sivan, 1990). However, most work continues to debate whether "Islamic Fundamentalism" is a threat, is going to spread to more moderate countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, and whether Islam is compatibility with democracy. As the recent resurgence of political Islam has endured for twenty five years, scholars, journalists, and commentators are still fixated on trying to predict what shape this phenomenon will take in the future.

It can be concluded that political science has yet to provide a sufficient answer to the question of the relationship between Islam and political outcomes. It has been found that Islam may not be traditional or modern and, most likely, represents a unique political culture. It is now a given fact that Islam is a fundamental element of political discourse in Muslim countries to which all political actors must pay credence. However, we cannot be quite sure of what this political culture and social system are it is because of the impossibility of survey research. These unknown factors and the continued tension between Islam and things Western in some countries has led to the previously mentioned cottage industry of speculating about the future of political Islam.

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The last twenty five years have also provided a large enough data base and storehouse of information to systematically examine the consequences of the political resurgence of Islam. As mentioned earlier, much information has been gathered regarding the role of Islam in politics in individual countries, various Islam political groups, and different variants of Islamic ideologies. At the same time, we have the speeches and statements of political officials as well as legal systems and constitutions. Finally, the basic principles and values of Islamic society are recorded in core texts, such as the Koran and Sharia, and have been passed down orally through the Sunna and Hadith (examples of the behavior of the prophets and his oral statements).

These sources will allow me to see if the differing influence of Islamic political culture on governments is subsequently represented in the form of government and public policy. Are Islamic countries more or less democratic than non-Islamic developing nations? Have Islamic based governments treated their citizens any better or any worse than secular based governments? Rather than speculating, I will evaluate 25 years of performance. At the same time, I will be helping to fill a gap in the literature of comparative politics and policy analysis by providing evidence that either supports or dsconfirms the significance of political culture as a determinant of major political outcomes.

The next step is to determine how and why Islam should affect forms of government, public policies, and the protection of the rights of citizens. First I will look at what the *Koran*, *Sunna*, and *Sharia* say about the political. In this discussion I will be highlighting the obtuse and amorphous nature of references to politics and policy in

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Islamic textual sources and traditions. A look at the ideas of some of the influential

modern Islamic political theorists will show that contemporary variants of political Islam

reflect the practical objectives of the writers. Based on these sources and work on

transitions to democracy in comparative politics, I will then produce may own theory of

the conditions under which Islam can facilitate transitions to democracy and, subsequently,

influence public policies. Of course, I will also consider the current social, political and

economic realities in several Islamic countries.

CHAPTER 3

HOW AND WHY ISLAM SHOULD INFLUENCE POLITICS

The first step in rigorously evaluating the consequences of Islamic political resurgence is the development of an explanation as to how and why Islam should influence forms of government and public policies which will lead to the development of testable hypotheses. Otherwise, I run the risk of falling into the trap of attributing all political outcomes, behaviors, and policies in predominantly Muslim countries to Islam. In developing such hypotheses, I will first look to the basic sources of Islam, the *Koran*, the *Hadith*, the *Suuna* (words and deeds of the prophet), and the *Sharia* (Islamic law). A brief discussion of Islamic economics and notions of democracy will illustrate the lack of a clear and readily usable political program in the previously mentioned sources. I will than proceed to examine the works of four twentieth century political theorists who have had a strong influence on current Islamic political movements. Finally, given the obtuse and contradictory nature of these sources, I will develop propositions regarding Islam and democracy based on both Islamic doctrine and tradition and research in political development, specifically, transitions to democracy.

The notion that political Islam can be the dominant influence on political systems and public policies in late twentieth century nation-states is based on the problematic

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assumption that there is a defined set of principles, ideas, beliefs, and rules that are accepted by most Muslims as the basis of political Islam. All Muslims do, at base, accept the sanctity of the *Koran* as the word of God, the *Hadith* and the *Sunna* as being infallible, and the *Sharia* as the regulator of society and daily life. However, this is where uniformity in the realm of political Islam stops. Indeed, the diverse and amorphous nature of political Islam is rooted in the lack of a defined and readily usable political program in these sources. Instead, they primarily provide a vague set of guidelines for a society that existed over 1000 years ago.

The Fundamental Texts and Traditions

Only about 270 of the 65,000 *Sura* (verses) in the *Koran* discuss matters of governance or public policy (most of which deal with economic transactions and criminal punishments). The examples of the prophet also cannot serve as concrete prescriptions for matters of governance in the twentieth century as the dilemmas arising from his small community of believers bear little resemblance to those confronted by the leaders of modern nation states. Finally, Islamic law (*Sharia*), which must serve as the foundation of an Islamic state, was finalized over 800 years ago and has not been altered since. Consequently, as will be discussed later, the application of *Sharia* is usually dependent on the interpretations and, subsequently, political purposes, of individual *'alim* (religious judges/scholars), Even if the *Koran* did include lengthy discussions of political practice, contemporary Muslim rulers did reign over nomadic tribes rather than modern nation-states, and *Sharia* had been updated over the years, a unified Islamic political program would still remain an illusive concept.

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Those who give the entire Muslim world a set of political characteristics or deem it inherently hostile to democracy also ignore the fact that Islam is in no way a monolithic religion. First, practice, tradition and doctrine vary between *Sunni* and *Shia*. Second, within both *Sunni* and *Shake,* there are various sects which also maintain different interpretations of Islam. Third, within the *Sunni* tradition, the existance of four different legal approaches also affects matters related to public policy (See, Enayat, 1982). Fourth, theorists and *Ulama* representing the government and opposition forces are also bound to interpret Islam according to their objective of either maintaining power or bringing down a political order. Finally, within opposition forces, both traditional and radical solutions are offered for societies ills.[1]

It is not surprising, given the preceding, that interpretations of the *Koran, Sunna, Hadith*, and *Sharia* vary widely. This is best represented in the *fatwah* (edicts) that the *Ulama* issue on a regular basis. During the 1960's, the rector of the Al-Azhar University, in Cairo issued a *fatwah* which ascertained that socialism was compatible with Islam (Shaltut, 1981).[2] Under Anwar Sadat, a different head imam declared that the new President's *Infitah* (opening of the economy) policy was, sanctioned by Islam. In 1979, Al-Azhar declared that the Camp David Accords were also in accordance with Islam (See Keppel 1986). At the same time, clerics in other Muslim countries were issuing *fatwah* declaring Anwar Sadat an apostate (Ajami, 1981). These conflicting *fatwah*, of course are possible because of the previously mentioned amorphous and diverse nature of Islamic

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[1] Gilles Keppel's *Prophet and Pharaoh* (1986), which discusses the political programs of Islamic political groups in Egypt during the mid-1980's, provides a good example of the variance in ideology between Islamic political groups.

[2] Al-Azhar is the state sponsored and supervised Islamic university in Egypt. Consequently the *fatwah* issued from the universities *Ulama* almost always support government policies.

texts which deal with politics. To further illustrate this point and the absence of a singular

widely accepted Islamic political program, I will briefly consider Islamic notions of

economics and democracy.

An Islamic Economic System

One of the apparent threats of government based on Islam is that it would not

facilitate capitalism. If Islamic governments do not respect free trade, open markets, and

the sanctity of private property, than they are unlikely to integrate into the current

international order.[3] Islamic economics might be best be summarized as a capital mode of

production and a socialist mode of distribution (Mazrui, 1990). Because Mohammed's

second wife was a merchant, the prophet was strongly in favor of an open market and fair

competition (Mazrui, 1990). Private property is also part of the foundation of an Islamic

economic system. Market competition is supported because individuals who work hard

should enjoy the fruits of their labor. Labor is an important aspect-- but only one

component-- of self development and, those who are not willing to work or are lazy are

not entitled to the benefits of the Islamic state. These capitalism tendencies are

strengthened by the writings of the most renowned Islamic sociologists and thinkers, Ibn

Khaldun. Khaldun's (1958) theory of economic practice represents Mazrui's capitalist

mode of production, as he emphasizes the importance of an atmosphere in which business

and economic activity can thrive. He also writes that the primary duty of a political leader

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[3] This concern is reflected in scholarly work where a whole body of literature has developed surrounding the relationship between Islam and capitalism (See Binder, 1988 for a review). Journalists have also frequently pondered this question in their assessments of the treat of "Islamic Fundamentalism" (For example, see the pullout section of *The Economist* on political Islam.

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is maintaining order, which should be achieved at almost any expense. At the same time, government is to avoid over taxation and stay off the back of citizens.

Islam, however places more stringent restrictions on market competition and how labor may be utilized than Western capitalism does. Natural resources that are vital to the functioning of state and society are to be controlled by the government so that they will be equally available to all citizens. Also, private property must be used in a manner that will provide some benefit to the society as a whole, not just its owner. Finally, land or other essential property that is not being exploited is to be transferred to the community (Abd al- Kadr, 1983). This harkens back to the communitarian nature of Islam, where the rights of the community have priority over those of the individual. This easily could lead to an interventionist state that would define the economic good of the community is and protect (or enforce) that public good.

Profits, along these lines, are also to be regulated by the Islamic state (Abd al-Kadr, 1983). Eventually, government would determine and regulate these excess profits. Possible methods of implementing this policy could include high income and property taxes or a rigid system of price control. The state might also have the authority to certify that both parties benefited from a business transaction. Another restriction on profit is the stipulation that they must be reinvested to provide more goods for the community. In short, a successful merchant would have to charge a fair price for his or her goods and would be able to keep enough of his or her earnings to lead a comfortable, but not extravagant lifestyle. A final restriction is that goods produced or sold should be useful for the betterment of society and not purely for enjoyment (Abd al-Kadr, 1983). .

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In addition to regulating the accumulation of profit, the Islamic state would also redistribute excess wealth to needy members of society who cannot earn a living. In an Islamic state, the *Waqf* (charitable foundation) is to be administered by the government and could levy a tax to provide alms (*Zakat*) for the poor. Also, Islamic law calls for an equal distribution of inheritance among male dependents. Finally, there is also a form of property tax from which the proceeds are also to be used for the poor (al-Maamiry, 1983). In short, all citizens of Islamic states, who are willing or unable to work are to be provided with the basic necessities for basic subsistence. Given the strong redistributive ethic, a high level of taxation to support an extensive welfare system might be expected in an Islamic state (al- Maamiry, 1983).

Other economic regulations in a Muslim state would prevent *ribah* transactions, the charging of interest. Also, workers are not to be exploited in order to make a profit and are to be treated humanely, forgiven for stealing, and paid a fair wage. On one hand, the Islamic economic system is designed to encourage hard work, competition , and the quest for profit. An uneven distribution of wealth is not only tolerated but, rather, expected. However, after profit has be made, the state has the right to garner whatever it believes is necessary to provide for the community as a whole (Abd al-Kadr, 1983). The state could also determine what are moral and ethical business practices. In short, there is nothing, except the ban on interest, in Islamic economics that is foreign to the economic systems of Western nations. At the same time, the "capitalist Mode of production" and "socialist mode of distribution" appear to contradict each other Consequently, it is

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reasonable to predict that individual regimes, according to their needs, would determine whether to emphasize the socialist or capitalist elements of Islamic economics.

It is important to note that it is the ban on interest that is particularly troublesome to non-Muslim commentators (See Turner, 1974). However works by Peter Gran (1979) and Maxim Rodinson (1978) have found that this ban, historically, have not been an impediment to economic growth in Muslim societies. Rodinson (1978) argues that when religion has stood of the way of profit in Muslim societies, it has either been ignored or liberally interpreted. Grann's (1979) study of 18th century Egypt reaches roughly the same conclusion. Today, nations such as Saudi Arabia, which ban *Ribah* transactions are, of course, active participants in the global economy. A common method of circumventing the ban on interests is the use of joint development schemes between banks and developers rather than loans (Springborg, 1988). The development of a strong banking network that adheres to *Sharia* is illustrated in Clement Henry's (1991) study of the growth of Islamic banks in Turkey and the Middle East.

Islam And Democracy

Many works, as mentioned earlier, have focused on how democracy has been represented in Islamic political doctrine, how it has been viewed by Islamic political theorists, and whether Islamic civil societies can facilitate democracy.[4] Rather than rehash the particulars of this debate, I will briefly mention factors within Islam that work for and against democracy. A notion of democracy, *Shura*, which translates into consultation, is

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[4] Some recent examples can be found in the collection of essays in the Fall 1994 edition of *PS*. Of course a full listing of such works produced in the last five years alone would go on for a countless number of pages. For a listing, see the bibliography in Peretz (1994)

found in the *Koran*. In short, Islamic leaders must consult with the citizens before instituting policies or taking major action. Consultation, however, does not necessarily translate into representative government and free elections as it could mean anything from direct democracy to consulting with a small group of elites selected by the regime to represent the citizenry

A second democratic principle inherent in Islam is *ijma*, consensus, meaning that important policies should have the support of a significant segment of society. Once again, consensus could translate into the support of a majority of the populous through referendum or monarchs who claim that because their rule is ordained by God, the people naturally agree with their policies. This possibility that leaders or regimes can use the communitarian tendencies of Islam to rule in the name of the community is a possible hindrance to truly representative government because democracy is impossible without a degree of individual autonomy from the state. Islam, **does** have such a provision, *ijtihad.*, *Ijtihad* means that Muslims, have the right to make personal interpretations of Islam when there is no clear precedent from the *Koran, Sunna,* or *Hadith*. The gates of *ijtihad*, however still remain closed for Sunni Muslims (Piscatori, 1984).[5]

Other important components of democracy such as equality and participation are also inherent in Islam as all Muslims are partners in the community of believers and are equal before God. Earnest Gellner writes:

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[5] In the course of the past 100 years, several reformers, most notably Mohammed Abduh and Jamal al-Afghani, have called for the reinstitution of *ijtihad*. Also, *Shia* Muslims have always been free to practice *ijtihad*.

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By various obvious criteria-universalism, scripturalism, spiritual egalitarianism, the

extent of full participation in the sacred community not to one, or some, but to all, and

the rational system of social life-Islam is, of the three great Western monotheisms, the

one closest to modernity and best facilitates democracy (Gellner, 1981, p. 7). ***Error!***

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Finally, the *Koran*, especially many of the early verses, contains many favorable references

to democracy, individual autonomy, and the desirability of universal participation by all

members of the community in matters of governance and policy. However, because the

Koran like the *Torah* is often vaguely worded and uses poetic language, verses can be

interpreted to suit one's political objectives (Rosenblatt, 1962)

The primary factor that is inherent in Islam, which might hinder democracy, is the

primacy of the holy law, *Sharia*. Consequently, many of the political groups which are

currently calling for an Islamic state claim that the nature of the state is of secondary

importance to the implementation of *Sharia*.[6] Consequently, authoritarian government

would be acceptable if it results in the application of *Sharia*. This is the case because many

of the groups and individuals which call for Islamic based government believe that the

implementation and following of *Sharia* will lead to a just society (al-Banah, 1981).

Islamic law, itself, may be problematic as it extends into spheres of life that liberalism

dictates as being left to individual discretion. Most notable are the restrictions on women

relating to dress and personal conduct and religious control of matters of personal status

such as marriage and divorce (Mayer, 1991).

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[6] For example, see the writings of Sayyid Qutb (1981) and Hassan al Bannah (1981). Qutb's works are particularly
influential with militant Islamic groups in Egypt. Al-Bannah was the founder of the Muslin Brethren, the largest
Islamic political group in the world

Another area of concern is the role of non-Muslims in Islamic democracy. Traditionally, Jews and Christians were given protected status (*dhiminni*) and allowed to regulate the social and religious affairs of their communities. However, they were forced to pay tribute and were usually denied political rights (An-Naim, 1987). Also, the Koranicaly justified fulminations against Jews and Christians by some spokesman of political Islam are quite unsettling.[7] The lack of a historical tradition of democracy is also a factor that works against the establishment of representative government in today's Muslim nations. During, the two Islamic empires (*Abasaid* and *Ummayid*) and the Ottoman empire which covered much of the Muslim world, a tendency developed among the '*Ulama* to support authoritarian rule. Religious scholars and judges, generally, claimed that order and security were preferable over the disorder that might follow a revolt against authoritarian rule (Hourani, 1992). Hence, the religious establishment became the defenders of authoritarianism.

The preceding discussions of Islamic economics and Islam and democracy have briefly explained how Islamic texts and traditions do not provide a clear political program, concrete guide for governance, or a public policy that can be labeled authentically Islamic. I, of course, have only scratched the surface but that was purely intentional. As mentioned, others have investigated these topics in a more in-depth manner and have reached the same conclusion. Before moving on to discuss influences that shape the various manifestations of political Islam in modern nation states, I will detail the ideas of four contemporary Muslim political theorists. It might be that, we can find some common

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[7] See the essay by the late Ayatollah Khomeini in Esposito (1983).

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themes and similar interpretations of Islamic texts and tradition in their responses to the

problems that face contemporary Muslim nations and communities

Notions Of Governance And Public Policy In The Works of Contemporary Muslim Political Theorists

Sayid Qutb

Qutb's (1981) political thought is marked with socialist and humanist themes. His

goal is for all individuals to feel that they are integral parts of society and humanity. He, at

the same time, criticizes communism for its denial of any spiritual component to human

self-fulfillment and capitalism for its acceptance of great disparities in wealth and

exploitation. Although Qutb supports the use of modern science and it achievements in

God's service and has no qualms about incorporating technology from the West, he argues

against the desirability of unrestricted progress as a societal goal (Qutb, 1974). This

notion is very similar to the post-materialist values that have surfaced in the politics of

Western nations in the last 25 years. However, we do see the state being responsible for

the possible contradicting goals for the state of advancement and development versus

spiritual and personal fulfillment (Qutb, 1975).

Qutb's (1974) economic theory is based on a equitable distribution of wealth. All

citizens should be guaranteed employment and crucial natural resources that are essential

for human subsistence are to be controlled by the state. Although private ownership and

an open market are tolerated, methods of accumulating wealth must be justified to society

and private property must be used for the common good. Finally, the state must provide

for those who cannot work. However, the lazy and those who are not willing to

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contribute their labor to the state are to receive nothing (Qutb, 1981). Qutb, it appears, favors a large state apparatus because of the strong redistributive ethic and broad definition of what is to be shared by the community. Although, the market and private property are protected, the moral component of Qutb's (1974) political program also points to a strong and possibly coercive state apparatus. How would it be interpreted as to which uses of science and technology are in the service of God? What standards would be used to justify the accumulation of wealth? According to Qutb (1981), following the principles of the *Koran* and adherence to *Sharia* would lead to the answers to these questions. However, given the vague nature of the former and the need for constant interpretation of the latter, political expediency would also have a strong influence.

Mawdudi

Mawlana Mawdudi (1983) feared that Indian Muslims, much to their own detriment, were being seduced by secularism. Because Muslims are a minority in India, he was concerned that a secular democracy would result in a tyranny of the majority that would discriminate against Muslims. He wrote that Indian Muslims should turn their primary allegiance toward the Muslim community rather than the secular nation, which would foster increased self-fulfillment (Mawdudi, 1983). Once again, this is because the precepts of Islamic law, which are designed to provide self-development, extend into all areas of life. Mawdudi (1967) does not discuss public policy at length but, rather, the end result, his ideal society that would be based on equality and social justice. This would be achieved through the election of scholar-rulers who, in addition to forming legislation, would regulate religious and moral behavior (Mawdudi, 1967).

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As was true for Qutb, it appears that a powerful governing apparatus would be necessary to formulate and implement proper conduct. However, Mawdudi (1967) does add the qualifications that matters not covered in the *Sharia* would be left to the individual and that private property would be protected. It is also important to note that Mawdudi (1983) writes of the need for strong leadership that would properly guide society. However, based on Mawdudi's (1983, 1967) writing, it might be that he is advocating a system similar to that of the United States, where trustees are elected to represent the people and, for the most part, formulate policy while only periodically consulting the populous. Pragmatically, Mawdudi was scornful of wealthy Indian Muslims and the power they wielded in local communities. It might be that he simply wanted to replace an economic ruling class with a theocratic one.

Shariati

The concept of the ideal society, once again, is the prevalent theme in the writing of Ali Shariati (1978), "The Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution." The work of Shariati is of interest because it is an amalgamation of Islam and concepts taken from the Western social sciences. His primary concern was eliminating the exploitation of the Muslim world by the West through its ideas and institutions. However, his replacement is couched in the secular and Western terms of liberation, social justice, and a classless society in order to reach the secularized Iranian students. Once again, the spiritual component of Islam would provide the fulfillment for the soul that is absent in communism, which contends that satisfaction can be achieved through the proper relations of production.

Shariati (1979), as was the case with Qutb and Mawdudi, does not concern himself with the formal structure of the Islamic state or matters of public policy. A the same time,

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there is the desire for social justice and the release of the individual from an oppressive political system. The new order will bring about equality and self-fulfillment simply because it will be based on Islam. Once again, there is the notion that public policy will be just in an Islamic state because that policy is rooted in *Sharia*. Given that the purpose of Shariati's writing was to motivate Iranians to rebel against the Shah, it is understandable that he makes his appeals based on a complete restructuring of society. Perhaps those who analyze the prospects for government in Islamic state based on the works of these theorists forget that after the revolution lofty ideals are discarded for the nuts and bolts of day to day governing. This is exactly what is happening in Shariati's Iran today following the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini. (Esposito and Piscatori, 1993).

Iqbal

The final theorist under consideration, the Indian poet Mohammed Iqbal (1920), presents a moving vision of God's will for mankind. This includes the intertwining of religion and state, which will lead to democracy with a spiritual component. According to Iqbal (1964), an Islamic democracy, in contrast to secular democracies which encourage individuals to exploit others for their own purposes, would further freedom, equality, and brotherhood. Why? Simply because citizens would be acting according to Islamic precepts, which call for them to work for the betterment of the whole community. At the same time, the individual's sense of self worth would also be elevated. As with the other three theorists, we see a natural convergence between the happiness of the individual and the overall welfare of the community. However, unlike the other theorists, Iqbal (1964) specifically mentions democracy as the preferred form of government.

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Iqbal (1964) also does not discuss the kinds of public policies that would bring about this transformation of society. He does write that the interpretation of the *Sharia* should change with the times and that tradition should be adapted to accommodate modern conditions. However, he does not state whether the individual should be able to perform this task through *ijtihad*. On the other hand, the importance of a strong leader to interpret and implement the law is emphasized. This supports the notion of a legislator or executive chosen by the people, based on his knowledge of the *Sharia*, to rule on their behalf. Iqbal (1920), like the other writers, seems to be perplexed as to the role of the individual. All call for the individual to have some part in the political process and decisionmaking. However, it is assumed that individuals will agree on most important matters and think of the community first because the precepts of Islam guide their actions and, it is also agreed that a strong scholar/ruler is needed to guide the community.

Multiple Political Islams

This discussion of the works of four contemporary Muslim political theorists has strengthened the earlier reached conclusion that Islamic doctrine can facilitate a variety of political systems and public policies. In the writings of each ideologue, there have been ideas that would appear to support both democratic and authoritarian government as well as both market and state centered economies. The one area where they are consistent is the need for a spiritual component in government and politics. However, this spiritual component is not the **result** of a specific type political system or set of policies but, rather, their **cause**. People behaving according to Islamic principles would bring about spirituality and morality which would naturally produce Islamic governments and policies. Since this final product had not actually occurred since the time of the prophet, it is

impossible for the theorists to be specific about the results. Consequently, they, like the sources their works are based upon, must be vague and amorphic.

The preceding conclusion contradicts the notion that government based on the framework of the *Koran*, *Hadith* and *Sunna* in conjunction with adherence to *Sharia* will lead to a predetermined outcome known as political Islam. Of course, as we see today, the government and politics of countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan which claim that their polities are founded on Islamic principles and, to a significant extent, utilize Islamic law are, indeed, quite different. This leads to the question of what, if not the influence of Islamic political culture, causes these differences? Both previous studies and my own preliminary investigation have led to factors related to politics, economics, society, and foreign relations. The cases studies in the four chapters to follow will provide the beginnings of an answer to this inquiry. However, first it is necessary to discuss the variables to be analyzed in these case studies, which is the focus of the final section of this chapter.

Case Study Research Design

Overview

The purpose of the case studies is to identify factors that influence:

- whether political Islam gains a foothold in political systems.
- whether a rise in the influence of political Islam leads to an opening of the political system.

Once these factors are identified, they will be operationalized and tested in the statistical analysis section of the dissertation. As mentioned, I will be looking at variables which the literature in comparative politics relating to transitions to democracy has found to be

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significant. In general, these factors can be put into four groups political, historical, societal, and economic. I have chosen eight Middle East and North African countries which have all seen a rise in political Islam in the last twenty years to compare and contrast across these four groups of variables.

Cases

The eight countries selected for the case studies have been chosen because they represent different relationships between Islam and politics. The inclusion of a variety of countries and relationships is essential because I am seeking to identify variables that influence the form in which political Islam manifests itself and the type of affect it has on political systems. Consequently, it is important to know how the four groups of factors discussed in the previous paragraph vary across states with varying relationships between Islam and politics. For example, if I were to examine only Algeria, I would conclude that opening the political system to Islamic groups leads to anarchy. However, if I add Jordan to the analysis, this conclusion is challenged as the same process in that country helped maintain political order. Subsequently, I would compare and contrast the two countries in regard to other variables.

The eight countries I have selected are Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia. They can be categorized into the following four relationships between Islam and politics:

1. **Egypt** and **Jordan,** where a growing Islamic influence was facilitated by regimes and accompanied by modest pluralization.
2. **Syria** and **Tunisia,** where Islamic opposition has been suppressed by secular based government, which has resulted, to varying extents, in continued authoritarianism.

3. **Saudi Arabia** and **Morocco**, where Islam has continuously influenced government and politics and government has remained, to varying extents, authoritarian.

4. **Iran** and **Algeria,** where the rise of political Islam has strengthened authoritarian tendencies.

The analysis in the case studies will generally focus on the period following the Six Day War because that event is often credited with stimulating the rise of political Islam (Ajami, 1981). However, for the most part, I will concentrate on the years, in each nation, which saw the greatest amount of activity by Islamic political groups and a growing influence of political Islam. These periods, of course, will be vary from nation to nation with the exceptions being Morocco and Saudi Arabia, where secularizing regimes have never ruled. For those two countries, my inquiry will center on the past 15 years. Each case will begin with a brief history of political Islam following 1967, proceed to an analysis of the factors that will be detailed in the remainder of this chapter, and then briefly consider what has transpired since the critical period when political Islam challenged secular based authority.[8]

Political Leadership

Many discussions of the resurgence of political Islam have focused on economic and cultural dependency on the West, inequalities caused by modernization, and ineffective government.[9] Although these factors are all important, they deal with processes and relationships that are relevant to almost all developing countries, both Muslim and

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[8] All the cases I have selected are from the Middle East and North Africa. I made this choice because the relationship between Islam and politics has been best documented in these countries, my own expertise is greatest in this region, and the process of Islamic political reassertion began the earliest in these nations. In the future, it certainly would be interesting to do an analysis of the predominantly Muslim nations in Asia located outside of the Middle East and North Africa.

[9] For examples see Green (1982), Lewis (1976), Norton (1987), and Ajami (1982).

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non-Muslim. Morocco's government probably has been just as ineffective as Algeria's and has gone through the same process of modernization yet, political Islam has taken a much less virulent form in the later. All of these countries, except Saudi Arabia, were penetrated by Western colonialism and all, today, are influenced by Western culture.

These explanations, in short, only account for increases in the demand for a more influential role for Islam in politics. Of course, because Islam does not play an active role in the politics in all nations with predominantly Muslim populations, other factors must account for the varying results of this demand. The three previously mentioned explanations may have labeled **some** of the necessary conditions for an increase in the influence of Islam on political systems but not the sufficient ones. The factor that has yet to be adequately explored is the role of political leadership and the nature of its interaction with Islamic political groups. In the last 15 years, most leaders of secular based regimes in countries with large Muslim populations, particularly those in the Middle East and North Africa, have been faced with the growth of an Islamic opposition.

This challenge should not be looked at as an extraordinary event or a step backward, as implied by Liberal and Marxist theory. The demand for Islam playing a role in politics did not disappear, as liberal theory predicted but, rather, it declined or was repressed.[10] As stated earlier, because religion and politics are intertwined in Islamic law and doctrine, Islam **should**, as a majority of Muslims still believe, play a significant role in the politics of Muslim countries. It is also important to note that most nations with large Muslim populations have gone through a long period of interaction with the West and its secular ideas. Naturally, many of these ideas have taken hold with the elite, which has had

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[10] This will be illustrated further when individual nations are discussed in the cases studies.

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the most exposure to the West. As has been discussed, the Muslim world has often easily and freely adapted Western ideas, institutions, and technologies for over 500 years (Piscatori, 1986).

It might be expected, given the preceding, that healthy competition between Islamic and secular oriented political ideas forces would take place if democracy was achieved in predominantly Muslim countries. Perhaps, as is the case of Israel, some spheres of public life would be controlled by religious law and others by secular law or a "modernist" Islam similar to that proposed by Abduh (1966) and Afghani (1969) 100 years ago would develop into the dominant political culture. This "mixed" political culture is supported by history as much of the Islamic world was only penetrated but not dominated by the colonial powers. England and France, without full control of government and administration, were forced to rule in concert with local leadership (Brown, 1984).[11] Consequently, local traditions endured. However, the question still remains as to whether this Islamic component can tolerate and coexist with the secular component. At this point, the evidence is mixed.

One reason for the tension between these two forces is that the reassertion of political Islam, naturally, comes at the expense of the existent, and usually reluctant secular-- **authoritarian**-- regimes. Consequently, their reaction to the Islamic challenge is crucial. The important but often overlooked part of the equation is that these leaders do have viable options and the choices they make do matter. They, as those who warn against about the sweeping tide of "Islamic Fundamentalism" claim, are not simply

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[11] For an interesting case study of the resistance of indigenous political culture in Morocco, see Waterbury (1972).

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overrun by an uncontrollable force. Leaders decide whether they have no choice but to provide entry for the Islamists into legitimate politics and attempt to form coalitions with them or whether resistance is the best option. They consider whether there is a significant convergence of interests to facilitate a deal and whether ideology and other cleavages leave them no choice but to resist. These interactions, the options chosen, and their consequences will be the focus of the case studies and are of great significance to the process of democratization in the Islamic world.[12]

Factor Affecting Regime Choice

The regime's grip on power. It is not surprise that Islamic opposition groups usually rise at a time when regimes appear to be losing their grip on power. Consequently, I will be looking to determine whether there is control over key segments of the state apparatus such the leadership's inner circle of confidants, the bureaucracy, the military, and the internal security forces. Also, has there been a significant amount of rioting, demonstrations, or other events which would demonstrate that the regime is losing its hold on power? Another concern is loss in a war or other military embarrassment, which is another sign that a regime is enervated.

The strength and ideological orientation of the Islamic opposition. A regime, naturally, has little reason to believe that it needs to accommodate an Islamic opposition that does not appear to pose a significant threat. Consequently, it would opt for forcible oppression. It can be expected that the regime would take into consideration the approximate size of the Islamic groups and whether it is based in social groups (i.e. the

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[12.] Here I am following the logic of the "elite theory" model of democratic transition. See Dahl (1971), Rustow (1970), and O'Donnell (1986).

military, rural landholders or industrialists) whose support is essential for regime maintenance. Also, is the opposition geographically isolated where it can be contained or is it a presence in central areas and major cities? It is important to note that the regime can miscalculate, as the case in Iran, both in evaluating its own strength and the power of the opposition.

The nature of the Islamic groups is also a factor the regime takes into consideration. Obviously, compromise is more likely to be reached with moderate than extremist groups? For example, no government is likely to seek accommodation for a group that calls for the immediate implementation of *Sharia*. It is also unrealistic to expect that the hand of reconciliation to a group that calls for a violent *jihad* to install and Islamic government. Shepard's (1986) two dimensions of Islamic political ideology are very relevant here. If Islamic political groups are not adamant about the immediate implementation of *Sharia*, are somewhat acceptant of ideas that originate in the West, and do not use violence as a means of increasing Islam's role in government, than cooperation is possible.

The Regime's Islamic Credentials. The ideological orientation of the regime and its "Islamic credibility" are also important. A regime with a strong Islamic orientation may be less likely to negotiate with Islamic opposition because that would weaken its legitimacy. In short, an Islamic regime cannot recognize the authenticity of another group that claims to represent "true Islam." On the other hand, a regime seeking to enhance its "authenticity" may try to bring moderate Islamic groups into legitimate politics. Finally,

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regimes and oppositions at complete opposite ends of the secular/Islamic continuum are likely to clash.

Supporting Cleavages. There are often factors relating to societal divisions, in addition to the secular-religious divide, that shape political Islam's effect on political systems. When these cleavages support the breach between Islamic based opposition and regimes, the possibility increases that political Islam will take a more virulent form. First, the supporting cleavages usually heighten the animosity between the regime and the opposition. Second, this animosity, which has usually developed over a long period of time, weakens the trust and good faith which are necessary for accommodation. These cleavages include:

1. **Sectarian.** The divide between the regime and the Islamic based opposition often falls along sectarian lines, usually, *Sunni/Shia*. The differing interpretations of Islam and historical tensions between the two sects makes accommodation less likely.

2. **Class.** Large disparities in wealth and class divisions, as was the case in the Islamic communities of Mawdudi's India, often fuel the growth of Islamic political opposition. Once again, this is a factor that could lead political Islam to take a more virulent form.

3. **Geography.** The physical location of the Islamic political groups is also a significant consideration. Animosity can result when a regime favors a particular region of the country or the cities over the countryside (or vice versa). Also, the isolation of the opposition in rural areas or away from important cities and population areas affects the extent to which it is seen as a threat.

4. **Ethnicity.** A final cleavage that can widen the gap between regimes and Islamic political groups is ethnicity. For example, the populations of three of the nations to be discusses, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria are divided between Berber and Arab.

Contextual Factors

These, of course, are not the only factors which are related to the growth and consolidation of democracy. Other contextual variables such as wealth, social

development, and modernization, which have been shown to influence levels of democracy in past studies, will be considered in the case studies and added as control variables in the statistical analysis in Chapters Eight and Nine. It is precisely these processes and variables, which are cited as causes of political Islam, but which are not used to explain political outcomes in Islamic countries. This point is important to emphasize because, as will be determined in Chapter Eight, these countries might well be authoritarian regardless of the presence of Islamic political culture. Another contextual consideration is the legacy of Western colonialism and the nature of contact with the non-Islamic world. This factor is important because the countries in the case studies have had different experiences with Western colonialism and cultural penetration. It is not logical to expect countries that had little contact with the outside world to readily accept Western culture and ideas. At the same time, one would expect the same hostility from societies that were most adversely affected by colonialism.

Government performance is also a factor that affects the nature of political Islam. Of interest, the government to be considered in the case studies that, historically, has best provided for its citizens is Saudi Arabia, which also maintains the least democratic political system. At the same time, the strong influence of Islamic political culture is often listed as a cause of Saudi Arabia's authoritarian government. Although, even with the high level of services and standard of living in Saudi Arabia, Islamic based opposition still exists, the Saud family has been successful in fighting off challenges from radical Islamic groups. All of the governments to be considered have been accused of corruption, favoritism, not providing equally for all of the people, abusing human rights, and not being able to deal

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with social and economic problems. However, poor government performance is not a complete constant across the eight countries in the case studies. It might be that the popularity of Islamic groups seeking to radically alter systems of governance is dependent on the extent to which people are satisfied with their politicians. With that in mind, I will now proceed to analyze the interactions between these groups and the governments which they seek to alter or replace. The result will be an idea as to what shapes the nature of political Islam.

CHAPTER 4

EGYPT AND JORDAN

Governments on the Brink?

The political systems of Egypt and Jordan, since the Six Day War, have shared an important characteristic -- **a constant appearance that their regimes are hanging on to power by the slimmest of margins**. However, the only changes of power that have occurred in either country have been in Egypt following the death of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and the assassination of Anwar Sadat. At the same time, the strength of Islamic political groups has increased in both these countries. Finally, in correspondence with these processes, there has been modest pluralization of the political system. This chapter will focus on Egypt and Jordan as cases where a rise in the influence of political Islam and Islamic political culture on government may have facilitated the growth of democracy. Of equal importance, they are also important examples of a way in which regimes respond to their own weakness and the appeal of political Islam as an opposition force.

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The analysis for each country will begin with a history of Islam's role in politics and the course political Islam's resurgence has taken. I will then proceed to discuss the variables relating to regimes, oppositions, and contextual factors, which were detailed in the previous chapter. After discussing Egypt and then Jordan, I will compare and contrast the two cases in the concluding section of the chapter. For Egypt, I will focus on the Mubarak regime because, by the time of Sadat's assassination, Islamic political groups had become a significant force in Egyptian politics and it was clear that Islamic political culture, in some fashion, was going to influence government and politics. For Jordan, I will primarily be considering the 1980's as that is when Islamic political groups posed the greatest challenge to King Hussein's regime and when he was forced to take action. Finally, in the conclusion, I will also look at the 1990's to see whether the gains of the 1980's were maintained.

Egypt

Islam and Politics Under Nasser

During the period following the Officer's Coup in Egypt up to the Six Day War, it appeared that the predicted course of modernization was taking place in Egypt in regard to the role of religion in government and politics. First, Egypt was undergoing polity secularization and the religious authorities, such as *Al-Azhar*, were brought under the control of the state. Second, religious law was relegated to the area of personal status.[1] Third, the power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was harnessed by the Egyptian government (Dekmejian, 1971). These processes were facilitated by Nasser's tight grip on the army, security apparatus, and

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[1] Personal status reform (secularization) was also later instituted

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state bureaucracy. Neither of his successors enjoyed this luxury and were forced to rely on the cooperation of outside forces to remain in power (Springborg, 1989). After the Officer's Coup, Nasser was slowly able to eliminate all competitors for power within the Free Officers group. At the same time, he replaced the senior personnel in the army from the previous regime with lower ranking officers who were loyal to him and filled the top levels of the bureaucracy with his supporters. Both Mubarak and Sadat had to deal with officers and bureaucrats whose loyalties remained with the previous leader or who had created their own semi-autonomous fiefdoms (Hinnebush, 1988).

Nasser, with the government and army firmly under his control, was able to eradicate his external opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood. When the Free Officers came to power, they had received assistance and cooperation from the Brotherhood. As a result, it was the only independent, political organization allowed to exist after the coup. However, the Brotherhood continued to agitate for an Islamic government, the implementation of *Sharia*, and criticize the socialist policies of Nasser's government. After a failed assassination attempt by a Brotherhood member, the organization was outlawed and many of its activists were either executed or imprisoned. This process of Brotherhood agitation followed by regime repression was to continue throughout Nasser's rule (Israeli, 1987).

A factor that supported Nasser's near eradication of the Brotherhood was his tremendous popularity. According to P. J. Vatikiotis (1987), the Egyptians adulated Nasser and viewed him as their savior. At the beginning of his reign, he appeared to be wiping out the corruption of the previous regimes and mild agrarian reform gave the populous the impression that he was a man of the people. Finally, the fact that he had been shot at six times by an

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assassin and survived further enhanced his larger than life persona. This combination of power

and charisma enabled him to denounce the previously popular Muslim Brotherhood as anti-

Egyptian traitors and Saudi lackeys (Vatikiotis, 1978). Nasser's popularity was further

strengthened by successes in the international arena. First, he forced the British out of Egypt

and nationalized the Suez Canal. Then, in 1956, he turned the military defeat in the Sinai into a

victory over the French and British imperialists and the hated Israelis when the occupying

forces were compelled to withdraw by the superpowers. Finally, Nasser moved Egypt back to

the leadership position in the Arab world and to the forefront of the non-aligned movement. R.

Hrair Dekemejian (1971) writes that Nasser was able to take these victories in international

crises and use them to gain support for the new Pan-Arab and Arab-Socialist ideologies that he

was installing at the expense of Islam.

It is important to note that Islam did not disappear while Nasser was in power. Rather,

it was under his control and utilized for his purposes. Students continued to be instructed in

Islamic practice and history in the public schools and the state religious institutions continued

to function (Crecelius, 1974). However, the *'ulama* were aware of the consequences of falling

from Nasser's favor and continued to act in their traditional role of regime legitimizers

(Hopwood, 1985). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the sheik of *Al-Azhar* could be

counted on to produce a Koranic verse to justify Arab Socialism (Shaltut, 1982). Nasser also

frequently pointed to the Islamic character of his reforms. After all, they were based on

equality, social justice, and the spirit of cooperation, all of which are at the heart of Islamic

doctrine (Israeli, 1984). During this period, there was no Brotherhood, or any other viable

Islamic opposition, to contend this position.

Islamic Resurgence Under Sadat

The temporary and incomplete nature of Egypt's secularization became apparent

after the disastrous Six Day War. P.J. Vatikiotis writes:

> *Despite all the economic and social changes that had taken place in the
> past 15 years of continuos development, religion had not yet been rejected
> by a vast section of the population and the vast majority of Egyptians still
> identified with religion and not the secular nation. (Vatikiotis. 1982. p.
> 68).*

Raphael Israeli (1984, p. 64) calls this a period of "elites pursuing massive modernization

while the masses still maintained faith in tradition and religion." Finally, Leonard Binder's

(1978) study of Nasser's Egypt found that the regime was built on the foundation of a

traditionally oriented stratum of society, the rural landholders. Consequently, it is not

surprising that following the rout by the Israelis and the exposure of all the other failures

of the Nasser regime, a large number of Egyptians turned to religion for the solution to

their country's problems.[2]

Nasser, following the war, tried to strengthen his own Islamic credentials through

the frequent use of Islamic terminology and the framing of policies in Islamic themes when

addressing the people. He portrayed himself as a believing Muslim, made the pilgrimage to

Mecca, and often gave the sermon during Friday prayers at the *Al-Azhar* mosque. The age long

conflict between Muslim and Jews often appeared in his diatribes against Israel, the loss in

1967 was attributed to the will of *Allah*, and the government press frequently used anti-

Semitic terminology in its descriptions of Israel (Harkabi, 1971). However, at this point, a

competing Islamic perspective surfaced in the writings of members of the Muslim Brotherhood

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[2] These failures include continued poverty, corruption, murder and torture of opposition, and the continued existence
of a privileged small circle of power-holders.

such as Sheik Kiskh who blamed the results of the war on the regime (Kiskh, 1969).

Given the Islamic sentiments that prevailed in society, it was no longer expedient to

imprison the Brotherhood. Political Islam now had to be accommodated.

Kiskh wrote that Egypt had lost the war because it had worshipped a false God,

Nasser. The soldiers, lacking the spiritual inspiration of Islam, had fought poorly and God

did not come to their rescue because they had ceased to follow his law (Kiskh 1969).

Kiskh also criticized the regime for selling out to the Godless Soviets, who turned their

back on the Egyptian Muslims in their time of need. The same type of criticism was also

reflected in Sayyid Qutb's *Signposts* (1966), which railed against Nasser for abandoning

Islam and portraying himself as a deity. The corruption and inequality in Egyptian society

had resulted from the abandonment of *Sharia*. As was the case with Kiskh, Qutb's

prescription for reforming Egyptian society was a the implementation of *Sharia* and

ridding the country of corrupting Western influences (Qutb, 1966). The works of both

men became popular with educated Egyptians

Islamic Resurgence Under Sadat

Anwar Sadat, who ascended to the presidency following Nasser's death in 1970,

was faced with the task of replacing a popular leader who had left a government, military,

and bureaucracy filled with loyalists and protégés. In addition, the nation was still reeling

from the Six Day War and the population was generally disgruntled over the lack of social

and economic development. In short, Sadat was a weak leader in a fragmenting polity.

Consequently, he was in search of allies, legitimacy, and national unity and Islam had the

potential to provide all three. Accordingly, in Egypt, it was **the regime** that helped give

rise to political Islam. At the same time, it was inviting new actors and ideologies into the

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political arena, which, leads to a more competitive political system. The ensuing discussion of the choices made by Sadat and his successor, Hosni Mubarak, will help explain how political Islam has manifested itself in Egypt.

Sadat's first objective was the separate himself from the legacy of the secular-socialist Nasser regime.[3] First he emphasized his own personal piety and traditional village upbringing. Second, he frequently denounced socialism and eventually threw the Soviets out of Egypt. Finally, he framed the 1973 war with Israel in a religious context by labeling it a *jihad* to regain Islamic lands by launching the war during Ramadan, and comparing Egypt's success with Islamic military victories of the past (Heikal, 1983). He also appealed to religious passions by frequently clashing with the Coptic pope, who was concerned about the growing Islamic overtones in Egyptian politics (Ansari, 1984). Sadat, by these actions and his frequent statements about building a society based on faith, religion, and cultural solidarity, was clearly trying to appear to be leading the resurfacing of Islamic sensibilities that had actually preceded his rise to power.

Another strategy for consolidating power, the active mobilization and support of religious political groups, produced consequences that still affect the Egyptian political system today. First, Sadat granted amnesty to the imprisoned members of the Islamic Brotherhood, he allowed the group to legally reorganize, and he gave it permission to resume publishing its newspaper, *Al-Dawa* (The Call). He also gave financial support to the growing Islamic *Ga'amat* (cells) on Egyptian university campuses and fixed student union elections so that the Islamic Student Associations would win.[4] These groups were

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[3] Sadat had been Nasser's vice-president but he was largely an unknown when he ascended to the presidency.

[4] Student politics in Egypt, as in most of the Middle East, focus primarily on national political concerns and issues as much as those relating to the university.

encouraged to hold public prayers in university facilities and to spread their activities to the neighborhoods near the universities (Keppel, 1986).

Sadat was hoping that the new Brotherhood, which had renounced violence and served as an ally in his battle against the Nasserists and the Communists. The university graduates, who had belonged to the *Ga'amat*, would provide a pool of loyal future state employees, who shared his desire to move away from Nasserism (Heikal, 1983). At the same time, the Egyptian populous was constantly being reminded that Egypt was an "Islamic" country and that *Sharia* would soon be the basis of the country's government and legal system (Heikal, 1983). However, actual policies soon caused the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups to believe otherwise. Of greatest importance, Sadat never went any further than making symbolic gestures when it came to implementing Islamic law, such as banning alcohol in some public places and calling on judges to take *Sharia* into account when making rulings (Hinnebusch, 1983).

Committees were formed to codify *Sharia* into a modern legal code but they never produced a finished product However, at the same time, personal status laws were being liberalized through Sadat's personal directive. Also, the peace treaty with Israel was signed and American culture and money began to permeate Egyptian society. As was the case with his predecessor, Sadat could count on a *fatwah* from the state *'ulama* to support his policies. The peace treaty with Israel was justified by the example of the prophet entering into treaties with his defeated enemies and by a ruling that the *Koran* states that *jihad* is only to be used for defensive purposes (Rahman, 1982). However, both Sadat and his *'ulama* had lost credibility with the leaders of the Brotherhood, the neighborhood

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preachers, the students, and, of course, extremist Islamic political factions. The growing

inequality in the distribution of wealth, increasing American influence, Egypt's

marginalization in the Arab world following the Camp David Accords, and the regime's

hedging on Islamic government drove a wedge between Sadat and his former allies. When

they began to criticize and protest, he responded with repression and imprisonment

(Heikal, 1983).

Mubarak's Dilemma

Hosni Mubarak was left with the predicament caused by the increasing strength of

political Islam as Sadat was assassinated before decisive action was taken. Given that

Sadat's killer was a member of the military and from a radical Islamic group that had also

instigated insurrection in the city of Asyuit, Egypt appeared, once again, to be "on the

brink."[5] Mubarak's grip on power was even more tenuous then that of his predecessor.

Consequently he had to develop an approach for dealing with the Islamic political groups

and sentiments that had been encouraged by his predecessor. His strategy, as discussed by

Robert Springborg (1988) was threefold.

1. A low key leadership, a less extravagant lifestyle (than Sadat), and a conservative approach toward the peace process with Israel made him less of a target of personal resentment than the maverick and opulent Sadat.

2. Mubarak attempted to marginalize the radical groups such, as the *Jihad* (the group responsible for Sadat's murder) *Takfir wa Al-Hijra*, and the violent *Ga 'amat*. This was done through infiltration by the state security forces and imprisonment. At the same time, Mubarak, starting with the trial of Sadat's murder, waged a propaganda battle to discredit the radicals as not being "true Muslims."

3. This campaign involved sanctioning the Muslim Brotherhood and other moderate Islamic groups as voices of authentic Islam. Because the regime and the state religious apparatus had lost credibility, these groups were used to speak out

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[5] The group was hoping that the assassination and insurrection would lead to the overthrow of the Egyptian government. Also, the members of the team that carried out the assassination were all from the military. For an account of the assassination and the its plotters, see Youseff (1986).

against violence in the name of Islam and the need for a gradual approach toward Islamic government. In turn, the Brotherhood was allowed to join with other political parties in the 1984 and 1987 elections and field a list of candidates.

I will now consider the factors that led to this decision.

Contextual Factors: Perpetual Social and Economic Malaise

It is important to emphasize that economic and social problems are important causes of Mubarak's precarious position. First, Egypt remains a poor and overpopulated country. Consequently, the government is strained to provide basic services (e.g., housing, health care, and education), subsistence level existence, and maintain the country's infrastructure. In addition, much of the government's revenue is eaten up by the tremendously oversized bureaucracy, which is infamous for its ineffectiveness. These problems are compounded by high population concentrations in urban areas, particularly Cairo, and recent declines in three important sources of Egypt's revenues, tourism, remittances from workers in the Gulf countries, and oil (See Springborg, 1988).

Egypt's high illiteracy rate, which would usually be considered undesirable, is actually beneficial to the regime. This is because this indicator symbolizes the large segment of Egypt's population, which is primarily located in rural areas and the poorest quarters of Egypt's cities, that is politically irrelevant because it is too concerned with the struggle to survive to pay attention to politics. Its lack of a formal education also facilitates the belief that politics is something that they cannot influence and that their condition is the will of a higher power (Keppel 1986). However this economic and social malaise does influence the relationship between the government and political Islam, as groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have stepped in to provide social services (health care, welfare, and education) that the government has not. The provision of such services

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has bolstered the popularity of the Islamic groups at the expense of the government (Sadowski, 1989).

Regime Strength

It should be apparent, by this point, that Egypt, under Mubarak, was (and continues to be) a fragmented polity.[6] In addition to inefficiency, corruption and the inability to provide for a majority of citizens that have characterized all Egyptian regimes, Mubarak suffers from additional weaknesses. As mentioned, the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups have surfaced as credible rivals in providing social services. At the same time, the Egyptian government is under constant pressure from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United States to cut subsidies, reduce the size of the bureaucracy, and privatize. The flip-side of these reforms is that they took power from the regime because:

1. Subsidies permit even the poorest Egyptians to eat. When Sadat cut the wheat subsidy in 1979, three days of riots took place. In short, these subsides are a means of keeping a lid on discontent.

2. Higher education in Egypt is free and admissions, for the most part, are open. As a result, the universities produce far more graduates than the economy can absorb. The government bureaucracies serve as a safety valve by providing employment. Of course, a large number of unemployed college graduates is a threat to stability.

3. State agencies and industries provide positions that can be given as rewards to political supporters.

Mubarak, like Sadat, faced the task of distancing himself from the legacy of his predecessor. Although Sadat was held in high esteem in the West, his popularity had plummeted in Egypt. In short, he was viewed as being arrogant, extravagant, and a tool of

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[6] In fact, a study of Mubarak's Egypt in the late 1980's is titled, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Springborg, 1989). Since then, a number of books and articles have been produced, which have focused on this theme. Springborg's is particularly well done.

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the Americans. Sadat was also criticized for the growing U.S. role in Egypt and the appearance that a small group had become wealthy at the expense of the rest of the country. Many Egyptians were also angered by the peace with Israel, which had led to Egypt's pariah status in the Arab and Islamic worlds (Heikal, 1983). Finally, Sadat had resorted to imprisoning and torturing his critics. Consequently, Mubarak faced a very disgruntled country when he took power. As mentioned, a low-key, moderate, and low visibility leadership style was used to alleviate this national discontent.

Another legacy of the Sadat era that weakened the Mubarak regime was the *infitah* (opening of the economy) policy because this created a powerful new interest, owners and capitalists, that had to be contended with. This group's autonomy increased as it grew to control a large amount of wealth and exert influence over the Egyptian economy. It also grew at the expense of the state sponsored sectors, which, naturally, were easier to control. In addition, much of the important state apparatus that had been firmly controlled by Nasser, such as the military, the rural landholders, and the bureaucracy, had also developed independent power bases and patronage networks. Finally, the international financial organizations and donor countries that were helping to support Egypt's economy were another independent force to be appeased from time to time. (Springborg, 1989). Consequently, although Mubarak was clearly at the top of Egypt's power hierarchy and the political system remained, for the most part, authoritarian, his control was limited.

The Islamic Opposition

This precarious situation led Mubarak to the same group as his predecessor, the Islamists. However, because the Islamic political groups were already established and

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their popularity was growing, a more cautious approach was necessary. Before going on to discuss Mubarak's strategy, I will briefly detail the major Egyptian Islamic political groups during the mid-1980s. The groups will be categorized according to the scheme developed by Shepard (1986).[7]

Modernists. This tendency is best represented by the Egyptian Brotherhood, which renounced violence and accepted the legitimacy of the government after Sadat released its activists from prison. They now claim the Islam should be spread through preaching, education, and "setting an example". Their activities have included publishing a newspaper, *Al-Dawah*, setting up educational, social, and health institutions, and joining forces with secular parties to run for the People's Assembly in 1984 and 1987. The new Brotherhood approach has often been described as legalist. They do not believe that government institutions should be avoided because they are controlled by secular forces. Rather, they should be used to transmit the Islamic message, which explains the frequent appearance of Brotherhood spokesmen (and women) on government controlled television. (Sadowski, 1987). Some, within this camp, have argued that Islamic law, indeed, must be updated before it can be implemented. Others claim that Islam and modernity are compatibility because Western science and ideology were predated in Islam (Sadowski, 1987). Even Islamic garb has been updated to correspond wit the latest fashion trends.

The modernist constituency is predominantly located in the middle class and upward. Many have benefited greatly form the secular state's free-market oriented economic system. A good example of this tendency is Egypt's "Islamic banks," which

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[7] I have provided a short description of each of Sheppard's types of Islamic political ideology in **Appendix III**. For a more comprehensive discussion see Sheppard (1986).

claim to follow *Sharia* while participating in international financial markets (Springborg, 1988). This group fears the takeover of a radical Islam because it would threaten the already shaky foundations of Egypt's economic system. Consequently, the goal of the modernists is not a violent overthrow of government that would lead to the immediate institution of *Sharia* but rather to "redress the existing structures and institutions in Islamic garb" (Binder, 1988, p. 388).

Radicals. A variety of radical groups have been active in Egypt for the past 15 years. During the mid-1980s, the most prominent were *Takfir-w-Al Hijra*, Islamic *Jihad* (also referred to as "The Video Group" and *Tanzim)*, and various university *Ga'amat*. All trace their roots to the writings of Hassan Al Bannah (1981) and Sayyid Qutb (1966), who both wrote that, for a true Muslim, *Shahada* (professing to Islam) and following Islamic precepts are insufficient. Rather, one must fight (violently, if necessary) to create an Islamic state with the *Koran* as its constitution and *Sharia* as its legal system. No compromises may be made with outside forces (e.g. the U.S. or Israel) or domestic secular governments. These ideas were reiterated by *Jihad* and *Takfir* members when they were interviewed in prison. They viewed Sadat as an apostate because he had not implemented *Sharia* and permitted the U.S. to spread its anti-Islamic culture. Consequently, it was their duty to bring down the regime that was transforming Egypt into a *Jahiliyah* (pagan) society (Ibrahim, 1982).

These groups, with the exception of *Takfir*, are of further danger to the regime because they move freely within society and use modern media and technology. Supposedly, under their rule, science, technology and progress would all be desirable if

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they were in the service of *Allah* (Ibrahim, 1982). It is important to note that the radical groups are not unified and that there are major differences in their ideologies, tactics, and interests (Keppel, 1986). The university cells maintain *Jihad's* "*Sharia* now" objective but are less likely to use violence. They are also concerned with university issues such as overcrowding, banning the mixing of the sexes in classrooms, and the showing of Western films (Keppel, 1986). Gilles Keppel's (1986) study of these groups also found a greater emphasis on universal themes such as social justice, freedom, and democracy than in the non-university groups. Finally, *Takfir* prefers to isolate itself from society so that they may remain pure until the time for revolt and Islamic government is know. A majority of the members of these groups are newcomers to the city who have degrees in engineering and the sciences. In general, they are alienated by the foreign influences in the city and the large gap between the wealthy and the rest of society. These poorly prepared graduates work at low paying government jobs with no opportunity for advancement. In short, they were thrown into modern society but still maintain traditional values (Ibrahim, 1982). Despair, which is the common element in these groups, turns people to radical solutions for society's ills.

Neo-Tradationals. This orientation is held by wide segments of Egypt's lower-middle class and lower classes, which, as discussed, do not participate in politics. An overwhelming majority shun the organized violence of the radical cells but have turned to rioting when their immediate interests appear to be threatened by cuts in subsidies, inadequate salaries, or rumors that Copts have been trying to convert Muslims (Ansari, 1984). Sometimes these riots have taken religious overtones but they are not a sustained

campaigned for the imposition of *Sharia* or Islamic government. Neo-Traditionalist Islam, in Egypt, is best represented by the television preacher, Mohammed Shah-Rawi, and the National Democratic Party's **(the government party)** newspaper, *Al-Liwa*. A review of letters to the editor found that a majority dealt with traditions and superstitions such as protocol for visiting the dead and the nature of the *jinn* (spirits) (Sivan, 1987).

The review also found that the newspaper advocated a rigid interpretation of Islam regarding matters such as women's rights, the treatment of minorities, and foreign cultural influences. As would be expected, the paper supported the government's call for a gradual switch to *Sharia* and other government policies such as the continuation of privatizing the economy (Sivan, 1987). An analysis of Sha-Rawi's sermons found the same theme, a disdain for the West and its culture but a call for patience. According to Sha-Rawi, the West was in decline and Egypt, if it held to Islamic values, would, once again, become the center of civilization. He also turned folklore into pseudo-science by saying that it could be proven that angels built the *Kaba*. As was the case with *Al-Liwa*, he preached a conservative Islam and called for the implementation of Islamic punishment (Sivan, 1987.)

Mubarak's choice of action should now be clear. There was a clear union of interests, primarily economic, between the regime and the Modernist groups. At the same time, the Modernist's ideology could coexist with the secular state, while a radical takeover would threaten their growing wealth. Thus, they were willing to participate in elections and strengthen Mubarak's Islamic legitimacy. The radicals were a clear threat to the regime and had to be weakened and marginalized. In this endeavor, the regime has been uncompromising. Finally, the largest group, the Neo-Traditionals were not politically

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active. It must also be pointed out that Neo-Traditionals generally hold that the change to

Islamic government will be the work of God, not man. They also would accept secular

government over an Islamic government that altered *Sharia* and they prefer the strict

implementation of Islamic law in some areas rather than the rapid leap proposed by the

radicals. Finally, Mubarak appeased both the Modernists and Neo-Traditionalists by

allowing them to freely criticize the United States, Israel, and Western culture.

Supporting Cleavages

The accommodation between the regime and Islamic opposition in Egypt during

the mid-1980's was also facilitated by a lack of supporting cleavages. First, Egypt's

Muslim population is almost entirely *Sunni*. Thus, the historical animosity between *Sunni*

and *Shia* and their different interpretations of Islam did not come into play. This rift, as is

the case in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Syria, can be a strong barrier between regime

and opposition. Second, the Islamic group with the most political and economic power,

the Modernists are primarily in the middle and upper-classes and share the regime's desire

for an open economy. At the same time, a majority of the lower classes adhere to an Islam

that calls for political passiveness.

Geography is also a factor that forced Mubarak's hand in reaching out to the

Muslim Brotherhood. Given their strength in Cairo and other major cities, he had no

choice. Ethnicity works both for and against a moderate political Islam and

accommodation. On one hand, Egypt is entirely Arab. However, as discussed, the

presence of the Copts and their disproportionate political and economic power has served

to fuel the power of the radical groups and the xenophobia of the Neo-Traditionals.

However, these conditions helped facilitate Sadat's opening of Egypt's political space to

include an active Islamic component and Mubarak's opening of the political system to Islamic groups. At the same time, Egypt's politics became more competitive, democratic, and open. I will take up the durability of these gains in the closing section of this chapter. Now, I will move on to Jordan.

Jordan

A Traditional Monarchy

The recent history of religion and politics in Jordan differs from that of Egypt. The most important divergence being that Jordan did not experience a period of Arab Socialism and rapid polity secularization. Instead, Jordan has always maintained a traditional monarchy with a ruling family that claims that its roots can be traced back to one of the prophet Mohammed's daughters, Fatimah, and has emphasized its past role as guardian of the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem (Robbins, 1991). Islam has always been Jordan's official state religion and the prime minister must be a Muslim. In fact, the traditional nature of the Jordanian regime kept it at constant odds with Egypt and its allies up to the Six Day War. Thus, Jordan's defeat in this war did not induce a rethinking of religion's role in society and politics as the regime had never tried to relegate Islam to a secondary role and had used Islam to help provide a sense of national identity in a country that had none. Unlike Egypt, it was difficult for political movements to organize on the claim that the regime had turned away from Islam. In addition, another cleavage, **ethnicity** was soon to push the Hashemite monarchy to the brink.

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The Bedouin Hashemites are a minority (6-10%) in their own country as a majority (60%) of Jordan's population is Palestinian.[8] The first wave of refugees came in 1948 after Israel was established in West Palestine and many Arabs fled or were forced to depart. This group was primarily well educated and of primarily middle class so it was easily absorbed and integrated. The second wave, which came from the West Bank after Israel captured that area during the Six Day War, was much larger and poorer. This group was put in refugee camps where it has since lagged in economic and social development (Day, 1986). Subsequently, the Palestinian nationalist movement established itself in these camps and began to use Jordan as a base for raids into Israel, which brought swift retaliation. These raids and brazen Palestinians brazen challenges to the regime led to a civil war in September 1970, which resulted in the PLO's leadership fleeing to Lebanon.

The defeat of the Palestinians in "Black September" finally entrenched Hussein's regime in power, however, the Palestinian issue remained at the forefront of Jordanian politics throughout the decade. Consequently, ethnicity, integration, and the creation of national identity pushed religion to the background (Sayigh, 1991). Also, King Hussein still faced a strong threat from communist and other secular-radical groups as the Palestinians nationalist movement did not take on Islamic overtones until the 1980's. Among the non-Palestinian population, Islam was a regime supporting function because it was intertwined with the traditional bonds of clan and tribe (Sayigh, 1991). Ultimately, almost all of these groups were tied to the monarchy and their members filled the top positions in the government and the military. Hussein, at the same time, provided ample

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[8] King Hussein's grandfather Abdullah was given the Eastern half of Britain's Palestine mandate after he was forced out of the Arabian Peninsula by the Saudis. This was a reward for supporting the allies during the world wars.

financial support for the clergy and the state religious institutions to insure their loyalty. He has also publicized his personal piety and was often seen on television at prayer or performing other rituals (Sayigh, 1991).

The king, like Mubarak, also made efforts to co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood. This was particularly important during the 1960's and 1970's when he needed a unifying force to counter the pro-Nasser Pan-Arabists and the Palestinian nationalists. The Brotherhood was also of use in attempts to destabilize the Syrian Ba'athist regime, which had supported the Palestinians during Black September. Hussein permitted the training of activists who were sent to Syria to stimulate Islamic based opposition to the Assad regime (Satloff, 1986). The government's support of the Brotherhood has included funding, facilities, and permission to propagate the message of Islam on behalf of the government. At the same time, the Brotherhood has influenced the operation of the country's mosques, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and religious education (Morris, 1984).

The Brotherhood, in turn, has supported the government and has called for a gradualist approach to the implementation of Islamic law. Thus, with the exception of an attempt to assassinate Hussein in 1969 by a member of *Tahrir*, a more extreme Islamic group, political Islam, up to the late 1970's, was largely government controlled or manipulated. However, it has been a relationship of mutual dependence because Islam is an important source of the regime's legitimacy and authority. Consequently, the support of this independent Islamic voice is essential. Hussein's desire to co-opt the Brotherhood is best illustrated by the fact that it was the only legal political party in Jordan from 1955 up

to the most recent elections (Pappe, 1994).[9] Thus, in a sense, Hussein made the same deal as Sadat. However, as will be seen, he made the choice to go further as political Islam in Jordan began to develop independently of the regime.

The Growth of Political Islam as an Opposition Force

The growth of an Islamic political opposition in Jordan was, to some extent, stimulated by the Iranian revolution. First, many Jordanians were angry that the king had supported the Shah up the Iranian revolution. Second, the decision to favor secular oriented Iraq in the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq was also troublesome. Third, Khomeini's polemics against Israel and his linking of the Iranian revolution with the liberation of Jerusalem appealed to the Palestinian population. Finally, Jordan was affected by events in neighboring countries such as the murder of Sadat, the violent eradication of Syria's Islamic opposition by Haffez Al-Assad, and the rise of radical Islamic groups in Lebanon such as *Hizb-Allah* (Satloff, 1986) . All three events served as examples of Islam serving as a rallying point for opposition to unfair government. Given that fact that the Jordanian parliament had been closed 1971 and that an advisory council was dismissed every time it disagreed with the monarchy, the king felt the need to appeal to Islamic sentiments.

Hussein, like Sadat, took actions to give the impression that the monarchy was not only in tune with the growing appeal of political Islam but, also, its leader. As a result, the amount of religious programming on state run television and radio increased. The government also encouraging payment of *Zakat* (charity) and enforced bans on

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[9] It is important to point out that there were no real elections for the Brotherhood to take part in from 1971-1987.

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smoking and alcohol during Ramadan (Day, 1984). Another response was the creation of The Jordanian Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment , which does not charge interest. The bank also offers clients the opportunity to participate in building of low and middle income housing and to invest in small businesses (Wilson, 1991). However, *imams* (preachers) and Islamists who were too outspoken in their criticism of the regime, such as those who vocally supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War and continued to agitate against the Assad regime while the King was attempting reconciliation, were imprisoned (Day, 1984).

The Brotherhood, despite the king's efforts, became more independent during the early 1980's and began to challenges the regime's commitment to Islam. The group's leader Mohammed Al-Khifa commented:

> *"This is an Islamic government but it is not wholly Islamic. We would like to see the teachings of the Qu'ran followed much more closely. This government can stop us from publishing, but they cannot stop our tongues. If they try to close our offices we would go to the mosques. They cannot shut those. (The Sunday Times, December 8, 1980).*

During this period, the strength of Islamic student groups surpassed that of Palestinian and nationalist organizations as they gained control of student government at Jordan's two largest universities, Yarmuk and Jordan University in Amman. Once again, as in Egypt, they began to expand their influence into the neighborhoods surrounding the campuses. Many of the people joining these groups were Palestinians who were frustrated by the PLO's defeat in Lebanon in 1982 and its failure to make any real progress toward achieving a state (Satloff, 1989).

The increasing appeal and independence of Islamic political groups was only one of several forces that were squeezing the monarchy. First, the economic growth and subsequent social development that had taken place in the 1970's and early 1980's began

to slow. Also, economic development and modernization led to the decline of tribal and clan identity, which, as mentioned earlier, had tied the rural population to the regime (Wilson, 1991). Second, three foreign policy decisions, the re-establishment of relations with Egypt, the reconciliation with Syria, and the tacit acceptance of the Reagan Plan were all unpopular (Garfinkle, 1993). Third, the government was frequently criticized for its poor human rights record, repression of dissent, and its failure to democratize. The last consideration also served to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood because, it was the only legal political organization in the kingdom. Consequently, it gained many new members who did not necessarily agree with its ultimate objective (Islamic government) but were looking for a venue to express their opposition to the monarchy (Robbins, 1991).

The Decision to Democratize

The regime continued to try to manipulate Islamic sentiments by playing up its role as the defender of Jerusalem, by claiming the Iranians had to be defeated because they were "idolaters and fanatics," and by the frequent use of Islamic rhetoric (Satloff, 1986). However, as economic conditions continued to worsen, it became apparent that the king's balancing act could no longer be achieved through words and patronage. Consequently, in 1984, he decided to reconvene the parliament. The first step was to hold runoff elections to replace the eight deputies who had died since the parliament was closed in 1971. Islamic candidates won three of eight seats and also swept municipal elections in the city of Irbid. As Jordan's economic situation continued to decline and the demand for government reform increased during the late 1980's, the regime seemed vulnerable. The breaking point was three days of riots in South Jordan, an area that has few Palestinians and historically has supported the monarchy, in April, 1989 in response to an IMF

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prescribed austerity program. Hussein then called for national parliamentary elections, which took place in November. The Islamic block of candidates took 34 of 80 seats and became the largest faction in the parliament. As is par for the course, the pundits were warning that Jordan was about to be overrun by Islamic fundamentalism.[10]

King Hussein's decision to let the Islamists participate in legitimate politics paid off as the group served as a loyal opposition. First, the Islamist MPs went to great lengths to emphasize their support for the regime during the campaign and after they were elected. Second, they did not actively protest when they were not given any portfolios despite being the largest block in the parliament. Third, in 1990 they signed an annex to the constitution accepting the legitimacy of the monarchy (Robbins, 1991). In return, the Islamists and other opposition groups were permitted to criticize the country's foreign policy, human rights record, and responsiveness to the needs of the Palestinians in the refugee camps. The Islamists were also free to call for the implementation of Sharia and were almost successful in passing a law that would have segregated schools and government offices by sex (Pappe and Nevo, 1994). Finally, the king permitted the organization of political parties. The most significant sign that the Brotherhood and other Islamists were going to play by the rules was their acceptance of electoral defeat in the 1993 elections. I will further detail the results of the entry of the Islamists into legitimate politics in the conclusion of this chapter, where the experiences of Egypt and Jordan will be compared. Now, I will analyze the factors that facilitated this strategy.

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[10] *New York Times* coverage of the elections provides a good example of this type of concern.

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Contextual Factors: Vulnerability to Events in Neighboring Countries

Jordan's economic woes, although significant, are not nearly as crippling as Egypt's because of Jordan's small population (roughly 4 million). Although Jordan is not blessed with natural resources and does not have a well developed industrial base, it does have one of the best educated populations in the Arab world. Consequently, many Jordanian university graduates found employment in the Persian Gulf states during the oil boom.[11] The remittances sent home by these workers and the aid given by the Gulf states stimulated the economic growth of the 1970's and early 1980's. Subsequently, the government spent heavily on constructing housing, expanding education, and developing social welfare programs (Gubser, 1988). Thus, the regime, although authoritarian and plagued with corruption, alleviated discontent by taking care of its population. Consequently, the despair syndrome that was detailed in the discussion of Egypt was not as devastating in Jordan.

It was Jordan's vulnerability to events in neighboring countries that caused a downturn in the economy and social unrest. First, the decline of the world oil market during the mid-1980's led to the repatriation of many Jordanians and a decline in aid from the Gulf states. Then, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the king's decision to severe legal, administrative, and financial links with the occupied areas instigated criticism and reminded the Palestinian population of its dual loyalties. At the same time, the end of the Iran-Iraq War hurt Jordan's economy as much of the supplies being sent to Iraq had passed through the port of Aqaba. Finally, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent

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[11] It is estimated that as many as 400,00 Jordanians (10% of the country's) populations lived abroad during this period.

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Gulf War of 1991 provided the most crippling blow. The king's decision to take a conciliatory posture toward Saddam Hussein and not join the coalition against Iraq led to the termination of aid from the Saudis and other benefactors. Those countries also expelled most of their Jordanian and Palestinian workers, which caused Jordan's population to increase by 300,000 in six months (Morris, 1993). However, the Gulf War followed Jordan's 1989 parliamentary elections and the conciliatory stance toward the Iraqis further bolstered the king's popularity.

Regime Strength

The Hussein regime, despite its historical vulnerability to the it neighbors, remains stronger than its Egyptian counterpart. Several factors, in addition to the country's small, well educated population and developed infrastructure contribute to the stability of the monarchy.

Longevity. The Hashemites have ruled Jordan since its birth and King Hussein has reigned since 1952. This has led to a psychological mind-set that Jordan should be under the guidance of King Hussein. As several Jordanians told me during a recent visit (July 1995), the nation and the ruler are one and the same. His long reign is also interpreted as a sign of God's favor (*Baraka*). Of greatest important, it has allowed the king to co-opt important segments of the population to the regime through patronage and the development of long-standing personal relationships with tribal leaderships (Jureidini, 1984).

Affection. Most Jordanians, especially the non-Palestinians, feel a genuine affection for the king. This phenomenon is emphasized in most of the literature on Jordan. Not many Egyptians feel the same emotional attachment to Hosni Mubarak. Of course,

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few Jordanians would take the risk of publicly stating their opposition to the king, but most of the favorable remarks made to me about the king appear to be genuine.

A Solid Base of Support. King Hussein's grip on power is strengthened by a solid base of support among the Bedouin and Hashemite populations. The "minority" status of the native Jordanians and members of the king's clan in their own country has closely tied these groups to the regime. Of course, they all, especially up to 1970, have feared a Palestinian takeover. Consequently, the king staffed the military, internal security forces, and key positions in the state apparatus with members of these loyal tribes and clans. As mentioned earlier, almost 40 years of patronage have solidified this support. It is also important to emphasize that the military is highly alliegant to the monarchy (Sayigh, 1991). However, urbanization and modernization have begun to weaken these primordial bonds.

Skillful Leadership. A final factor that has allowed King Hussein to remain a ruling monarch at the turn of the twenty first century is his political adroitness. Some examples of his acumen are:

- A conciliatory stance towards Iraq in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, which helped maintained domestic stability. Subsequently, he quickly returned to America's favor by supporting the peace process and ultimately signing a peace agreement with Israel.

- Investing heavily in Jordan's infrastructure, education system, and social welfare programs during the boom years of the 1970's and early 1980's.

- Making efforts to integrate the Palestinian population into the nation by encouraging them to take a prominent role in business, industry, and the economy yet keeping them out of sensitive government positions.

- Opening legitimate channels for political participation to those with grievances through parliamentary elections. This move also created another target for citizens to blame for Jordan's declining economy. Finally, the opportunity to participate in running the government led the Islamists to moderate their ideology.

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One needs only to look at neighboring countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Egypt to see what has happened to kings who lack skill in governing.

The Islamic Opposition

Modernists. The modernists, as in Egypt, are best represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the Islamic Action Front.[12] The Brotherhood, as discussed, has long accepted the legitimacy of the monarchy. The IAF's platform calls for the implementation of *Sharia* but under the monarchy (cited in Robbins, 1991). It was also pointed out that the Brotherhood has had access to government institutions and influenced their operations. Thus, their approach, like that of the Egyptian Brotherhood can be labeled "legalist."

> *"A middle approach between the extremes that embrace most Arab states*
> *today is characterized by less overt hostility and an orientation towards*
> *learning form the West and adopting the tools of the West so the Islamic*
> *world might triumph. They are not pro-western but, rather acculturated*
> *to the West as cooperation is sometimes necessary for the success of*
> *Islam (Jureidini. 1984, p. 25)*

Consequently, moderate Islamists have used parliament, chambers of commerce, and professional associations to push for Islamic law. When in control of the parliament from 1989-1993, they, indeed, attempted to ban alcohol, segregate the schools by sex, and pass laws requiring Islamic dress for females (Robbins, 1991).[13]

The modernist trend in Jordan also has taken a hard line regarding foreign policy in its attempts to destabilize Syria, its support for Iraq in the Gulf War, and its opposition to any compromise with the Israelis. However, the king has imprisoned leaders and preachers

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[12] The IAF was created by the Muslim Brotherhood for the 1993 elections after political parties were legalized in 1991.

[13] An interesting development has been that women's groups in Jordan have worked with the Brotherhood to develop a clear set of guidelines regarding women's rights.

who actively **interfere** (not oppose) with government foreign policy (Pappe, 1994). The leadership of the Brotherhood is predominately middle and upper class and non-Palestinian. Like the Egyptian moderates they have an interest in stability. However, a growing percentage of the rank and file are Palestinians looking for a channel to vent their frustrations with the regime and see Islam as the best hope for regaining Palestine (Garfinkle, 1993). However, the Brotherhood and the IAF continue to be a loyal, if vocal, opposition to the king. Although the king most likely did not anticipate the Islamist candidates' strong showing in 1989, they are a group whose participation in government has strengthened the monarchy rather than threatened it.

      Radicals. The radical tendency is not nearly as significant a force in Jordan as is the case in Egypt. A small radical group, *Tahrir*, existed from 1967 through the early 1980s. However, outside of the attempt on the king's life by one of it's members in 1969, it caused little disruption (Day, 1986). In recent years, two new radical groups have appeared. The first is centered in the Palestinian refugee camps and combines militant Islam with Palestinian nationalism. However, the group's primary objective is the destruction of Israel rather than the Hashemite regime. The other is similar to the Egyptian *Takfir W-al Hijra* in that it seeks to isolate itself from corrupt secular society until the time arrives for the creation of the Islamic state (Pappe, 1994). This group also does not pose a threat to domestic peace. As mentioned earlier, the conditions of despair which have fueled the popularity of radical groups in Egypt are not nearly as severe in Jordan. However, many of the 300,000 Palestinians who entered the country during the Gulf War

remain unemployed. Also, the strength of militant Islam in the West Bank could influence the politics of the Palestinian community in Jordan.

Neo-Traditional. The Bedouin and other rural tribes are the primary Neo-Traditional groups in Jordan. As discussed, these groups are the primary support base for the monarchy. These societies are hierarchically organized with the tip of the triangle being the king. Clearly, tribe and clan are the primary consideration factor which influence voting, not which party will make the country more Islamic (Robbins, 1991). As is the case in Egypt, this population is more concerned with ritual and practice than politics.

Supporting Cleavage

It should now be quite clear that ethnic cleavage is a crucial influence on Jordanian politics but, the Palestinian-Jordanian divide has not translated into a secular-religious division. If anything, the Palestinian issue has served as a moderating influence.

- The Palestinian threat put Islam, as a political factor, in the background until the late 1970's.

- Jordan's ethnic fractionalization led the king to use Islam to unify the country and create a Jordanian identity.

- Hussein's search for allies led him to the Muslim Brotherhood, which resulted in their legal status and its subsequent co-optation and moderation. As mentioned earlier, the Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front are composed of both native Jordanians and Palestinians.

The potential, however, for a radical Islamic movement to develop within the Palestinian community, as has been the case in the West Bank, exists and is dependent, once again, on the behavior of a neighboring country, Israel.

No other cleavages separate the regime from its Islamic based opposition. Almost all of Jordan's Muslim population is Sunni. The country does have a small Christian minority (6%) but, the Christian-Muslim cleavage has not been politicized as is the case in

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Egypt. Even the decision to reserve 12% of the seats in the parliament only produced a

mild letter of protest from the IAF (Robins, 1993). Class and geography, as discussed,

also do not affect the relationship between the regime and the Islamic opposition. In all,

despite the external forces and economic woes that squeezed the monarchy in the late

1980's, it was strong enough to relieve some of these pressures by taking real steps

toward democracy. Because of his own Islamic credentials and its history of cooperation

with the Brotherhood, the king was able to bring the Islamists into the forefront of

legitimate politics in Jordan. In the conclusion, I will discuss what has taken place in Egypt

and Jordan since the process of pluralization began.

The Future of Islam and Democracy in Egypt and Jordan

Divergent Paths

The move made toward a more democratic political system in Egypt slowed during

the 1990s. First, the results of the 1987 parliamentary election were voided by the

supreme court because of improper restrictions on opposition and independent candidates.

In the subsequent elections to replenish the assembly, the Muslim Brotherhood boycotted

because they could not organize as an independent political party and because of alleged

harassment by government officials. Clearly, Mubarak had set a limit on how much

influence the Islamists could wield. This was partly due to the increased activity of the

radical groups, particularly the *Ga'amat*, which Mubarak claimed were receiving support

from the Brotherhood (*Al-Ahram*, December 2, 1992). These activities include a massacre

in a Coptic village, an assassination of the Speaker of the Assembly, and attacks on

tourists. The regime has responded with summary arrests, execution, and human rights

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violations. At the same time, the Islamification of society continues as more women wear Islamic garb, "improper" entertainment is decreasing, and mosque attendance remains high (Page, 1994).

The transformation, in contrast, that took place in Jordan has been enduring. Following the 1989 elections, political parties were legalized, the government loosened its reign on the press, and human rights practices improved. Also, in 1990, three Islamists were named to the cabinet. Then, in the 1993 elections, the Islamic Action Front only won 16 seats but accepted the results as legitimate and continued to participate in the parliament. One of the reasons for their failure was the redrawing of districts to over-present rural area, where the monarchy is most popular, and Christians who are weary of the increased influence of the Islamists (Robbins, 1991). Another cause was the poor performance and corruption of the ministries given to the Islamists. Many Jordanians also blamed the Brotherhood for the regime's support of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War and Jordan's subsequent fall from favor with the West and the Gulf states (Garfinkle, 1993). It may be that the appeal of political Islam is weakened when Islamists are permitted to run the government.

The Importance of Regime Strength and Contextual Factors

It should now be clear that, in Egypt and Jordan, weakening authoritarian regimes were in search of allies to bring into the political system to buttress their grip on power. In both countries, the search led to the Muslim Brotherhood because Islam is the most comprehensible and popular way for Muslims to express their discontent regarding politics and government. The intertwining of the sacred and the temporal in Islamic doctrine, texts, and tradition is more extensive than that of Christianity. The enduring strength of

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Islam as a political force was made evident by its resurgence in Egypt following the secular socialist period in Egypt and its constant role in Jordanian politics. However, the **degree** to which Hosni Mubarak and King Hussein were willing to open their political systems to Islamists was related to the differing extents of their weaknesses, which were strongly influenced by factors over which they had little control.

Egypt, under Mubarak, was a more fragmented polity than Jordan under Hussein as Mubarak took over a country where the authority of government was weakening. As discussed, the military, the state security apparatus, the middle and upper classes, and the bureaucracy were becoming more autonomous. He was also left to deal with the increasing strength of political Islam, which had been unleashed by his predecessor. Also, because of Sadat, the Egyptian population was skeptical and distrustful of government. At the same time, rapid population growth in an already overpopulated nation made it harder for the country to provide for its citizens. Declines in important sources of revenue hurt an weak economy that has always been on the brink. At the same time, the universities continued to produce far more graduates than the economy could absorb, which forced the state to underemploy them in the bureaucracy. This state of despair fostered the growth of the radical groups. In short, Mubarak's very tenuous grip on power caused him to be reluctant to release too much authority out of fear that his regime would fall.

King Hussein of Jordan, although constantly at the mercy of events in neighboring countries and mindful of the potential threat from the Palestinian majority, had far more control over his government and country. This is due to a long reign, personal popularity, a solid base of support in the rural areas and military, and skillful political leadership. At

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the same time, Jordan has a small, educated population and well developed educational and social welfare systems. In short, Jordan is far more manageable than Egypt. Finally, moderate Islamic political groups in Jordan have a long history of cooperation with the regime. In Egypt, the relationship was first hostile and thenquickly turned suspicious following a brief honeymoon at the beginning of the Sadat era. Given these advantages, Hussein's rule is far more secure and, subsequently, he, along with the Islamists, took a much bigger step toward democracy

This chapter on Egypt and Jordan has demonstrated that political Islam is not inherently antithetical to democracy. Rather, the increasing influence of Islamic political groups has coincided with democratization. It was also shown that the relationship between Islam and democracy is highly dependent on other factors relating to regime strength, demographics, economic development, social development, and a country's neighbors. In the next chapter I will put this assertion to further exploration in my discussion of Syria and Tunisia, two countries where the rise of political Islam was accompanied by continued authoritarian rule. However, both governments are secular oriented and Islamic political groups have been shut out of legitimate politics. Thus, it might be that countries with predominately Muslim population **cannot** be democratic if Islam is not allowed to influence the political system.

CHAPTER 5

SYRIA AND TUNISIA

Secular Authoritarianism

The governments of Syria and Tunisia, like those of Egypt and Jordan, have faced

significant challenges from Islamic opposition groups. However, the current regimes in

both of the countries chose a different strategy for meeting these challenges, **repression**.

Islamic political groups in both Syria and Tunisia have not been allowed to participate in

legitimate politics and Islamic political culture has not been as important an influence on

politics as in Egypt and Jordan. At the same time, both countries maintain, to varying

extents, authoritarian, one-party political systems. Syria and Tunisia also appear to

support the assertion that the increasing strength of political Islam and Islamic political

culture on political systems does not impede democratization as both countries are secular

based polities yet they are not democratic. Perhaps a cause of the lack of democracy in

these countries is that authoritarianism is necessary to shut Islam out of the system. In

other words repression is keeping the political systems of these countries out of balance

with their political cultures.

This chapter is organized along the same format as Chapter Four. For both

nations, I will provide brief histories of the rise of political Islam, analyze the variables

relating to regime strength and contextual factors, and compare and contrast the two

cases to gain a better understand Islam's role in politics in Syria and Tunisia. Once again,

I will demonstrate that Islam is only one of many forces that shapes political systems in

predominately Muslim countries. For Syria, my analysis will center on the period between

1978 and 1982, as that is when the Muslim Brotherhood rose to threaten the Assad regime

and then was destroyed in the Hama massacre. For Tunisia, I will focus on the period

from 1985 to 1990 as that is when it became apparent that Bourghiba's years were

numbered and, concurrently, the strength of the Islamic Tendency Movement increased.

From 1987 to 1990, following Ben Ali's ascendancy to the presidency, the regime decided

how to meet the MTI's challenge. Once again, the consequences of both regimes'

decisions will be considered in the conclusion.

Syria

The Ascendancy of Ba'ath Secular Arab Socialism

The marginalization of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria took a

course similar to that in Egypt. During Syria's first 16 years of existence (1946-1963), the

Muslim Brotherhood operated legally and took part in the country's periodic elections.[1]

However, in 1963, the *Ba'ath* (Arab Socialist Renaissance) Party took power through a

military coup. When a new secular oriented constitution was unveiled in 1965 that did not

make Islam the religion of state, the Brotherhood protested and instigated disturbances.

The organization, subsequently, was outlawed and its leaders were jailed or executed but,

it continued to be a serious threat to the government until 1982 (Olson, 1982). However,

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[1] During this period Syria alternated between civilian government, military regimes, and a three year merger with Egypt from 1958-1961.

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in contrast to Egypt and Jordan, Islam has remained at the margins of government and politics and the Islamic opposition has been repressed rather than invited into the political system

One crucial difference contrasts the recent history of Islam and politics in Syria to those of Egypt and Jordan, a regime that successfully consolidated power and then tightened its hold on the organs of government and society. A look at the choices made by the Assad regime and the factors that helped produce them will show that the marginalization of political Islam was necessary for the survival of his reign. Assad came to power in 1970 after he led a coup by the military wing of the *Ba'ath* party over the Marxist oriented progressive faction in 1970. It is important to note that Assad took over a country with a legacy of instability, which was still reeling from its devastating loss of the Golan Hts. in the 1967 War. However, unlike Sadat who took power in the same year, Assad was not as desperate in his need for allies. Assad already was a faction leader within his party and was not replacing a legend. At the same time, the Syrians' expectations had not been raised and dashed like the Egyptians. When Assad took power, his regime was seemingly was just another in a long line of regimes as the country had already experienced 12 *coups d'etat* and six constitutions (Olson, 1982).

The Importance of the Military and Sect in Assad's Rise
Haffez Al-Assad, like King Hussein, also assumed power with an important power base, the military. Since the period of French colonial rule between the two world wars, the army had been the only means of advancement for Assad's *Alawi* sect. The *Alawis* were primarily a poor and rural group that had been dominated by urban *Sunni* landlords in the colonial period and the first 15 years of independence (Batutu, 1981). During this

period, middle and upper class Syrians were able to buy their way out of military service if they could find a replacement. Consequently, a large number of *Alawi* were paid to enter the military (Batatu, 1981). Many *Alawi*, as they rose through the ranks, helped their relatives and clan members obtain non-commissioned officer positions and entrance to the officer academies.

Eventually, following the *Ba'ath* party's rise to power and subsequent purges of *Sunni* officers, most of the key positions in the army were held by *Alawi*. After Assad took control of the government, he further closed the circle of power by placing only members of his specific tribe, the *Qamari*, in high ranking positions. Finally, he created a praetorian guard, which is responsible for protecting the regime, that was almost entirely *Alawi* and placed it under the command of his brother Rifaat (Batatu, 1981). Consequently, the Assad regime has always rested on the solid foundation of a large and loyal military. Assad further consolidated his hold on power by appeasing the traditionally oriented *Sunni* merchants of Damascus by loosening state control of the economy and through improving the infrastructure and standard of living in Damascus. Consequently, the Islamic opposition was limited to outlying urban areas such as Homs, Hama, and Aleppo (Roberts, 1986). Also, Assad's popularity was bolstered by the army's improved performance in the first week of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

The Islamic Challenge

The use of force, in spite of the Assad's consolidation of power, was still needed to control the Islamists. In 1973, the Brotherhood rioted, once again, because Islam was not designated the religion of state in a new constitution. Several hundred demonstrators were killed and many Brotherhood leaders were executed, exiled, or imprisoned

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(Hinnebusch, 1990). A Brotherhood campaign of assassinations of *Ba'ath* leaders was followed by the dragging of the corps of executed conspirators through the streets of Hama (Drysdale, 1982). This cycle of agitation and violence by the Muslim Brotherhood followed by regime repression continued until 1982. Here, there was no union of interests as Islamic government was unacceptable to a secular socialist regime and, as will be seen, additional cleavages furthered the divide between the regime and the Islamic opposition. Assad, like Nasser, frequently paid lip service to Islam and used Islamic terminology by claiming that he was leading the Muslim world's campaign to rid Jerusalem of its Jewish occupiers (Seale, 1986).

Assad, in order to enhance his own status as a Muslim, obtained *fatwah* from Iranian and Lebanese religious scholar ruling that *Alawi* are, indeed Muslims.[2] He also went on the *Hajj* during his first year in office and even went as far as having an edition of the *Koran* printed with his picture on the cover (Olson, 1982). Like Nasser, Assad found a number of *Sunni 'ulama* who were willing to claim that Arab Socialism was compatible with Islam and to denounce the Brotherhood as "criminals who were using the name of Islam to corrupt the youth, instigate sectarian conflict, and murder innocent civilians (Drysdale, 1982, p. 6). However, according to *Ba'ath* ideology, the Islamic culture, spirit, and call for unity-- **but not faith**-- are pillars of Arab society (Roberts, 1983.) In short, Islam could serve as a guide for society but not politics, government or economics which, of course, was unacceptable to the Muslim Brotherhood.

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[2] Many Syrian *Sunni* Muslims view the *Alawi* as heretics. In short, the *Alawi* tradition and practice of Islam is closer to that of the *Shia*. For a more elaborate discussion on the *Alawi*, see Guillaume (1956) and Enayat (1982).

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The battle between the Assad regime and the Islamic political groups continued through the 1970s. Outside of the army, the *Ba'ath* party, and the *Alawi* (7-10% of Syria's population), Assad remained unpopular as he lacked the charismatic personality of Nasser and the majestic aura of King Hussein. As mentioned earlier, he, because of his rural *Alawi* background, was always viewed suspiciously by *Sunnis* and residents of urban areas (Humphreys, 1979). The regime came under further attack from the Islamists in 1975-1976 when it intervened on the side of the Christian Phalange in the Lebanese Civil War. Syria's refusal to allow Palestinian forces to relieve the Maronite siege of Tel-al Zatar, which resulted in the death of between two and three thousand Palestinians, opened his regime to charges of being a tool of Israeli, Maronite, American, and Saudi interests (Dekmejjian, 1985)

This was a considerable blow given the crucial issues in Syrian politics:

> *...among the most important in Syrian political culture are internal stability, social justice, government consistent with Islam, Arab unity, Palestine, economic development, and political participation. Syria's government must deliver on all of these issues with special emphasis on its fidelity to the Palestine and Arab causes (Hudson, 1983, p. 84).*

The support of the Christians and the subsequent retreat when the Israelis advanced to Lebanon's Litani River in 1982 was evidence, for many, that Assad failed in all of these areas.

1. The secular nature of the regime, its refusal to implement Islamic government, and its repression of the Brotherhood was obvious.

2. Social justice and political participation were non-existent.

3. Support of the Lebanese Christians over the Muslims and their Palestinian allies was evidence that the *Alawi* were, indeed, non Muslims

4. Obviously, the claim to be the defender of the Palestinians was now deflated.

5. The continued occupation of Lebanon damaged Assad's Pan-Arab credentials.

The Muslim Brotherhood, in the late 1970s, began a *jihad* of assassination against

Ba'ath party officials, institutions, and Assad, himself, that was designed to instigate and

embolden opposition to the regime (Von Dam, 1981) . This included the murder of 63

Alawi cadets at a military academy in Aleppo in June of 1979 and almost daily bombings

in Damascus. It is important to note that the literature produced by the Syrian Islamic

opposition was aimed more at arousing opposition to Assad than the reformation of

society that was called for in Egypt (Syrian Islamic Action Front, 1977). The primary goal

was not a *Sharia* based polity but the toppling of the regime. Consequently, a variety of

oppressed groups, *Sunni*, urban lower and lower middle classes, and clerics came together

under the ideological force that could lead the widest segment of the Syrian population to

action, Islam. The program of the Islamic Revolutionary Front stated:

> *This is the beginning of a long journey in the way of establishing the*
> *desired Islamic society and demolishing the despicable rule of*
> *governance... The Ba'ath Party is a total disaster. It squashed freedom.*
> *abolished political parties, nationalized the press, threw people in prison.*
> *and hanged those who voiced their disapproval. We hope that followers of*
> *the Alawi sect-- to which the people's affliction. Haffez Assad and his*
> *brother, belong--will positively participated in preventing the tragedy*
> *from reaching its end (SIAF,1981, pp 83-84).*

They further demanded that Assad honor the International Human Rights Charter, end the

state of emergency, and hold free elections (SIAF, 1977).

Assad's Response: The Destruction of the Brotherhood

The near civil war intensified as the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate

President Assad in June of 1980. The regime responded by killing between 600 and 1000

Brotherhood prisoners and conducting weekly roundups in the Brotherhood strongholds

in Hama, Aleppo, and Homs. Finally, in February of 1982, Assad decided to end the

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Brotherhood opposition by literally attacking the city of Hama with his army. After a three week battle, in which the city was literally destroyed and between 10,000, and 30,000 were killed, the Islamic threat to the Assad regime was finally ended. Thus, the question surfaces as to what factors caused Assad to believe that accommodation with the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups was impossible and that their destruction was necessary for the maintenance of his regime? Before going on to answer this question using the variables related to contextual factors, regime strength, and supporting cleavages, it is necessary to briefly consider another explanation.

This explanation, offered by Thomas Friedman (1989)and Charles Glass (1990), argues the Middle East politics are inherently brutal because of their tribal nature. In short, the artificial boundaries erected by the colonial powers put hostile tribes and clans in the same state. Also, Middle East history, according to Friedman (1989), is marked by authoritarianism. Consequently, the battle between Assad and the Islamists was, in reality, a traditional *Sunni/Alawi* feud with modern weapons. In such battles, it is winner take all and the loser is obliterated or dominated by the winner. Hence, accommodation is not possible but, rather, a strong ruler must impose order. The accommodation in Jordan and Egypt that was discussed in the last chapter disconfirms this theory. Jordan is especially relevant is it is a multiethnic and tribal society. Another problem is that Islam does not fit into the picture. Many Sunni and other non-*Alawi* support the regime. Therefore, the situation is more complex than an ethnic bloodletting in an authoritarian culture.

Contextual Factors

Syria has faced, to a lesser extent, many of the same economic, social, and demographic challenges as Egypt. The first is a rapidly growing population as the

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country's population has tripled from 4.5 million in 1960 to 13 million in 1992. This has

strained the government to provide for the basic needs of the population as it has

constantly been constructing housing, schools, and health facilities. As usual,

infrastructure is worse in the rural areas, which has led to migration to the cities. As is the

case elsewhere, many of the new arrivals are undereducated and have difficulty finding

employment. Many in this group, as is the case in most of the countries being considered,

are drawn to political Islam as a means of taking action on their grievances. Ironically,

Syria has an abundance of land for farming but the only option for peasants available, in

most of the country, is tenant farming. The subsistence level existence that accompanies

tenant farming, however, drives peasants to the cities. Also, the government's inability to

provide irrigation facilities causes farmers to be dependent on unreliable rainfall (Perthes,

1995).

Syria's economic woes were exacerbated by several factors. First, the various

regimes have never decided on a clear economic strategy. Throughout the country's

history, there has been a vacillation between nationalization and privatization, modest land

reforms which have often been rescinded, and an ambivalent posture towards foreign

investment. Second, the state controlled sectors are plagued by corruption and largely

inefficient. Third, the country earmarks a large amount of its GNP (25%) for defense,

which was particularly problematic during the late 1970s and early 1980s for three

reasons.

1. The intervention in Lebanon and the subsequent cost of occupation of that
   country. The Lebanese Civil War also brought about the return of 500,000
   Syrians who had worked as unskilled laborers in Lebanon. They all, of course,
   needed housing and employment.

2. The damage from the 1973 war was estimated at two billion dollars with most of the country's ports, key industries, refineries, and power plants being incapacitated by Israeli bombing. Syria spent most of the 1970s recouping from these losses.

3. After Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1978 and Jordan effectively removed itself from the Arab Israeli conflict, Syria was left alone to face Israel, which served to further increase Syria's defense burden (Perthes, 1995).

However, Syria's need for a large army has helped to alleviate unemployment and provided an important group of supporters for the president.

Assad's response to Syria's economic malaise was to decisively liberalize and open the economy in order to encourage foreign investment. The result of this move was the same as in Egypt, a widening gap between the rich and the poor. First, the high defense spending and privatization of the economy led to inflation. Second, as was the case in Egypt, a small group of Syrians, capitalists, importers, and owners benefited the most from the open economy. It is important to note that many of these beneficiaries were supporters of the regime or employees in the public sector who used connections to their advantage in the private sector. The new affluent neighborhoods sprouting up in Damascus furthered the impression that a small elite was making it at the expense of the rest of society (Perthes, 1995). Of course, this all flew in the face of the regime's Socialist and egalitarian slogans, which helped to lead many of the disenfranchised to a competing ideology that is also centered around social justice, Islam. Once again, the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups attracted many of the first generation migrants to the cities and others left behind by the privatization of the economy.

Regime Strength

A principal cause of Assad's decision to violently resist the challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian Islamic Action Front was his belief that his regime

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was strong enough to resist. As mentioned, Assad's regime was built on the solid foundations of tribal loyalty and a military stacked with supporters. By 1982, Assad had installed supporters in all of the top military positions and members of his *Alawi* sect also dominated the officer corps and the elite units. In addition, the praetorian guard and two divisions guarding the capitol from internal threats were from his specific tribe. Of course, a *Sunni* or Islamic Action Front takeover would mean an end to their lofty and lucrative status. The same is true of the *Mukhabarat*, the intelligence agency, and the internal security apparatus, both of which are predominately staffed with *Alawi* and other loyal supporters.

The regime's sectarian roots are equally important. As discussed, the *Alawi* are a small minority (10-12%) in Syria. They are widely distrusted by the middle and upper classes because of their rural impoverished roots. Their unorthodox practice of Islam which blends *Shia*, *Ismaili*, and Christian traditions is viewed by many Sunni as being heretical (Batatu, 1981). This spiritual uniqueness, their rural backgrounds and their impoverished status, historically, have alienated them from the rest of Syria. Also, the mountainous terrain in which they reside has enabled them to resist being conquered and preserved their distinctive characteristics (Devlin, 1983). This isolation and alienation has resulted in a tightly knit community that has benefited greatly from Assad being in power. Naturally, they have an incentive to defend it against an Islamist, *Sunni* revolution that called for representative government. In short, the intertwining of the *Alawi, the Ba'ath Party*, the military, and the internal security has provided a solid foundation for the regime.

A third source of stability, as in Jordan, is the longevity of the Assad regime. However, this factor was not as significant in Syria, psychologically, because it was not until after Assad had squashed the Islamic based opposition that the mind-set that the regime was firmly entrenched was established. However, Voelker Perthes comments that during the first 10 years of the Assad regime:

> *institutions were developed, the bureaucracy expanded, and corporatist structures bringing large parts of society under the umbrella of the state were consolidated. Though flawed in some respects, a comparatively stable authoritarian, or authoritarian-bureaucratic state came into being (Perthes, 1995, p.4)*

In short, the expansion of the bureaucracy and state industries created a large group of workers that were dependent on the regime for their position and status and, in contrast to Egypt, they were relatively well compensated. Most believed that they would not fare as well following an Islamist takeover (Olson, 1982).

It is also important to note that Assad made efforts to expand the regime's base of support. As mentioned, he appeased many in Damascus by spending heavily on improving the city's infrastructure and raising its standard of living. The opening of the economy and pursuit of foreign investment appealed to the capital's traditional class of traders and merchant class (Perthes 1995). Thus, a large segment of the country, rural poor, urban industrial workers, government employees, and most residents of the capitol were supportive of the regime. As will be seen, the various constituencies of the Syrian Islamic Front were not essential for the survival of the regime. Finally, Assad kept a tight hold on the university campuses, which, in other countries, are hotbeds of radical Islam (Olson, 1982). Thus, despite a declining economy, another military embarrassment at the hands of

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the Israelis in 1982, corruption, abuse of human rights, and harsh authoritarian rule, Assad correctly concluded that he still had a firm grip on the reigns of power.

The Islamic Opposition

The crucial difference between the Islamic opposition in Syria and those in Egypt and Jordan is that the regimes in the later two countries created and, to varying extents, controlled them while, in Syria, their primary function was bringing down the regime. After, a brief honeymoon when Assad took power, the relationship between Assad and the Muslim Brotherhood and, later, the Syrian Islamic Action Front became confrontational and increasingly violent.[3] Therefore, from the beginning, Assad made the decision that Islamic political groups had to be controlled and, ultimately, destroyed. After the Islamic opposition united to form the Syrian Islamic Front in 1975-1977, it became the only viable Islamic political group in Syria. Hence, it will be the only one discussed here. However, as was the case in Egypt and Jordan, there is a large Neo-Traditional constituency that does not engage in politics.

The ideology of the Islamic Action Front was pragmatic because it was an umbrella for a variety of individuals and it's primary objective was to bring down the Assad regime. The creation of an Islamic state was of secondary importance. As a result, their program was an amalgamation of concepts taken from Islam, Liberalism, and Capitalism. Included in their manifesto are calls for:

- the separation of powers,
- individual dignity and human freedom,

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[3] There was a brief period when there was a split in the Brotherhood caused by what course to take with the Assad regime. A moderate faction supported Assad after he disposed of a more doctrinaire socialist regime. A radical faction called for the continuation of violent opposition to a government that was still secular and socialist. Following the intervention against the Palestinians in Lebanon, the Brotherhood reunited and joined with several smaller groups to form the Syrian Islamic Front (Batutu, 1982).

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- a government that respects all of Syria's religious and ethnic communities
- free trade, private ownership of land and industry, and economic justice
- immediate *jihad* against the Syrian government

Missing from the program is a call for the immediate installment of *Sharia* as the law of the land (SIAF, 1977).

The program is also void of the abstract idealism that marks the ideology of the radical groups in Egypt and Jordan. There are also few references to Islam's glorious past or calls to dislodge *jahiliyah* from Syrian society (SIAF, 1977, 1981). Given the preceding, the Syrian Islamic opposition can hardly be labeled as inherently anti-Western. Here, we begin to gain a clear picture of one the important functions of Islam in politics, mobilization. It is important to reiterate that orthodox *Sunni* Islam was the thing that the various groups that opposed the Assad regime had in common. Thus, Islamic terminology and themes are common in the Front's Manifesto and the eventual implementation of *Sharia* was mentioned in order to appeal to the more religious factions (SIAF, 1977. However, their goal, as Islamists, was more democracy--**not less**. It was Assad that was defending authoritarianism. Consequently, it is hard to argue that political Islam and Islamic political culture are monolithic or anti-democratic.

It has already been stated that the minority status of the *Alawi* and the anti-regime orientation of the Islamic Action Front made accommodation that would lead to more representative government impossible. Indeed the Front was composed of groups that have been hurt the most by Assad and the *Ba'ath* socialist party.

- *Sunni* Islamic scholars and clergy
- Large land holders who were hurt through redistribution schemes

- Petty artisans and merchants, especially outside of Damascus, who, traditionally, are more religious and have suffered from *Ba 'ath* policies that have favored industrial workers and peasants.
- University trained professionals who advocated democracy, railed against corruption, and took the regime to task for its poor human rights practices.

Assad's decision to combat the Islamists was supported by the regime's ability to survive without the support of these groups. The large landholders were a small group that could not stop the state's modest land distributions. Also, the regime was popular with the peasants because their lot had improved. None of these opposition groups had a strong influence on the nation's economy either. Finally, the active number of participants in the Islamic Action Front was never greater than 50,000 areas and it never gained a foothold in Damascus (Dekmejjian, 1987). Now I will consider the final determinant of Assad's choice, the deep supporting cleavages that strengthened the divide between the regime and the Islamic Action Front.

Supporting Cleavages

The crucial role of supporting cleavages in causing the irreconcilable division between the Assad regime and the Syrian Islamic Action Front should now be evident. A review of these divides will help illustrate this factor.

Sectarian. Assad's *Alawi* origins make him a non-Muslim in the eyes of many *Sunni*, which intensified the predominately *Sunni* opposition's desire to depose him. As discussed, the predominately *Alawi* composition of the regime was frequently mentioned in the Islamic opposition's manifestos. At the same time, Assad knew that his minority *Alawi* would lose their privileged position in a democratic Syria or in a government controlled by the Islamic Action Front. These considerations combined with the historical

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animosities between the groups that resulted from years of *Sunni* domination of the *Alawi* followed by a reversing of the tables under the *Ba'ath* rule made accommodation impossible.

Rural-Urban. Assad's rural origins also strengthened the breach between Assad and the Islamists. As mentioned, the Islamic opposition was centered in various urban areas in Syria, with the importance exception of Damascus. This was, in part, a result of the land reform policies which had given land that had formerly belonged to urban landlords to rural peasants. Consequently, many rural *Sunni* also supported the regime. Finally, there was a widespread perception among many urban *Sunni* that the rural *Alawi* were using power to gain revenge on the cities.

Class/Profession. Part of the animosity between Assad and the Islamic opposition was a result of class. The *Alawi/Ba'ath* ruling clique was primarily of peasant and lower class origins, which explains their attraction to Arab-Socialism. As mentioned, the Islamists were predominately from the middle class. Consequently, the regime was also accused of exacting class based revenge. The middle class interests of the Islamic Action Front were seen in their call for an open market and the protection of private property.[4] Finally, as discussed in the sections on regime strength and the Islamic opposition, the members of the Islamic Action Front represented, for the most part, professions that had suffered from Assad's policies. In short, the estrangement between Assad and the Islamic Action Front was far greater than a disagreement over whether Islam should have a more influential role in politics and government.

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[4]Ironically, Assad began to open the economy and facilitate the growth of the private sector following the eradication of the Islamic opposition.

Bourghiba: The Royal President

Tunisia, of the countries being considered, is probably the nation that went the furthest in marginalizing Islam's role in society, politics and government (Hudson, 1982). This is primarily a result of the efforts and policies of Habib Bourghiba, who ruled Tunisia from its independence in 1956 until 1987. However, in spite of 20 years of government legislated and propagated secularization and Westernization, Islamic opposition arose to challenge Bourghiba in the late 1970's and continues pressure the current Ben Ali regime. Both Bourghiba and Ben-Ali, like Assad, have resisted, often with force and repression, the Islamists. However, as was the case in Egypt and Jordan, the rise of political Islam corresponded with an opening of the political system. Yet, the government's refusal to recognize the major Islamic political group in Tunisia, *Al-Nahda*, was the beginning of the end of the period of hope for a more democratic Tunisia. Once again, authoritarianism is necessary to keep a political system out of balance with a nation's political culture and it is the Islamists who call for democracy.

Bourghiba emerged as the clear dominant power in the country after Tunisia won its independence from France. Tunisia's traditional monarch, the *Bey*, had been forced to abdicate and Bourghiba was in complete control of the Neo-Destour party, which had led the struggle against French colonial rule. After the Communist party was banned in 1961, Tunisia became a one party state with the ruling party serving as a tool to implement Bourghiba's policies. His control over the country was so complete that his regime was labeled a "presidential monarchy" (Henry, 1965). Subsequently, Bourghiba was named "President for Life" in 1974. As did Nasser, Bourghiba used his power to marginalize

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Islam's role in politics and to Westernize Tunisian society. Many, however, have claimed that Bourghiba's campaign to limit Islam's influence to the personal sphere was based on personal disdain rather than on political expediency (Hopwood, 1994).

The marginalization of Islam, as in Egypt, was facilitated by popular charismatic leadership. For most Tunisians, Bourghiba symbolized the struggle for independence and its ultimate success (Hopwood, 1994). At the same time, he was in control of a party organization that had been in existence for over 30 years and which, eventually, controlled the government, the bureaucracies, the state agencies, the trade unions, and the state owned industries. Bourghiba, throughout his reign, tolerated little dissent both from within the Neo-Destour party and from external sources. Finally, because Tunisia is a small country and the Neo-Destour Party's influence on all national institutions was strong, his reign was of a "personalized" nature (Henry, 1965). Through his numerous addresses to the nation and his subordinates, Bourghiba seemed to have a direct influence on everything that took place in Tunisia (Hopwood, 1984). He was particularly merciless in fighting both Islamic political culture and political groups, which he viewed as his most dangerous opponent in the creation of a modern, secularized, and Westernized Tunisia (Waltz, 1995).

Bourghiba's mission to marginalize Islam was a result of his French education and his long-term residence in France (Hopwood, 1994). He, in short, wanted to guide Tunisia on a course of modernization and development that would allow it to achieve the standard of living of many Western nations. For this goal to be achieved, Tunisian society also had

to be reformed and modernized as traditional beliefs and practices (**Islam**) were hindering

progress. Among the steps taken were:

1. The *Al-Zaytouna* university, which trained Islamic scholars and jurists, was brought under the control of the secular university system. Consequently, its power as an independent actor was eliminated.

2. The government took control of the mosques, appointed *imams*, and even distributed the sermon to be given at the Friday mid-day prayer.

3. A liberal code regarding women's rights was implemented giving them the right to work, request a divorce, and have access to education. Also, polygamy was outlawed, females were given an equal right to inheritance, and the age of consent was raised to 18.

4. Religious schools were also taken over by the state and their curriculums were secularized. Also, girls were banned from wearing veils to public schools.

5. The government also moved to weaken the *Sufi* mystical orders, which were popular in rural areas

Bourghiba's effort to ban fasting during the month of *Ramadan* because of the resulting

decrease in productivity, however, did fail.

Bourghiba remained popular throughout the 1960's and early 1970's as Tunisia's

economy flourished through tourism, oil revenues, and remittances from workers abroad.

At the same time, his independent foreign policy, which led to confrontations with Nasser,

Khaddaffi, and the French was also popular with many Tunisians. However, by the mid-

1970s, the regime began to come under criticism. First, a failed experiment with socialism

in the early 1970s had caused many to distrust the government. Second, power remained

highly centralized, dissent was not tolerated, and the regime was also attacked for human

rights abuses (Waltz, 1995).[5] Third, the end of the oil boom and other factors led to a

slowdown in economic growth. Finally, a growing number of Tunisians were disturbed by

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[5] One of the few independent political organizations in existence was the Tunisian Human Rights League, a predominately secular-liberal group. Interestingly, its most frequent interventions have been on behalf of the MTI and other Islamic political groups.

Bourghiba's unrelenting campaign to remove Islam not only from politics but as a guide for social relations as well. Throughout the 1970's, Islamic sentiment began to increase and several political groups, which will be discussed later, began to form.

Islamic Revival and Reconciliation

It was clear, by the early, 1980's, that Bourghiba had to be removed as the personalized presidential monarchy had turned into a cult of personality (Zartman, 1991). The last glimmer of hope for pluralism was dashed after Bourghiba legalized the formation of opposition parties in 1981 but rigged parliamentary elections so that the Neo-Destour won all of the seats. At the same time, the Islamic Tendency Movement began to actively call for the reform of Tunisian society through Islam. However, they claimed to be non-violent and hoped to participate in a democratic Tunisia (Magnuson, 1991). The president saw the Islamists as a reactionary threat to all of the change that he had implemented and opposed the MTI and other Islamic groups through mass arrests and torture (Waltz, 1988). As was the case in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Islam was the political language and force that was the most attractive in a rapidly changing society with an authoritarian government. Once again, it was those that were most adversely affected by the changes, first generation migrants to the cities, who joined the Islamic movements.

Development and economic growth in Tunisia led to the same problems, social disruption, an increasing disparity in the distribution of wealth, and large scale migration to the cities, that were discussed in the preceding cases studies. Many members of the MTI and other Islamic groups, like their counterparts in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, were educated, young adults of lower middle class backgrounds. Surprisingly, females were also strongly represented in the Islamic groups (Hermassi, 1991). As was the case in Syria, the

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Islamic political groups were organized in opposition to the government. However, with the exception of scattered organized demonstrations and sporadic acts of violence, which were condemned by the leaders of the MTI, political Islam remained non-violent. As will be discussed, this was due to the lack of supporting cleavages between the government and the Islamists, events in neighboring countries, and the inroads made by Bourghiba's drive for modernization and Westernization.

Bourghiba, during the 1980's, became senile and more despotic, eventually driving away most of his inner circle.[6] He also clamped down further on dissent and opposition, particularly the Islamists. In 1986-1987, hundreds of MTI members were imprisoned following demonstrations and the bombing of several tourist hotels. When the leaders of the MTI were sentenced to life in prison, rather than death, Bourghiba demanded that they be retried. Fearing massive violence and more erratic behavior from Bourghiba, Prime Minister Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali had Bourghiba (who was past 80) declared medically unfit to rule, using a constitutional provision, and assumed the presidency.[7] Ben-Ali granted clemency to the MTI members and other opponents of the regime and began to open the political system by restore civil rights to the press, labor unions, and opposition parties. As for the Islamists, it appeared that Ben Ali was going to apply Mubarak's strategy of trying to bring moderate Islamic political groups into legitimate politics in return for recognition of the secular state (Hermassi, 1991).

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[6] It was well known in Tunisia that Bourghiba's second wife, Wasilah, wielded great power as she controlled access to her husband. In addition, many other close relatives lived in the palace and served as informal advisors. Most, including Bourghiba's son were thrown out.

[7] The Prime Minister, under the Tunisian constitution, secedes the President. Bourghiba's removal from power did not involve violence or bloodshed. The former President, who is about to turn 90 lives in his place of birth, Monastir.

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Ben-Ali, like Mubarak, was also faced with the same task of mollifying a discontented populous that was tired of flamboyant, authoritarian rule. He was also similar to Mubarak in that he was a low key technocrat. Initially, it appeared that he was going to lead to Tunisia towards democracy as he called for multiparty elections and invited opposition groups to enter into a "National Pact" that would set the ground rules for elections, protection of civil liberties, and more representative government. The MTI expressed its support and its desire to participate. Subsequently, it changed its name to *Al-Nahdah* (The Renaissance) in order to circumvent the ban on religious based parties, reiterated its commitment to democracy, and declared its willingness to participate in a secular oriented government. At the same time, Ben Ali took measures which hinted that Islam, indeed, might be permitted to play a more significant role in Tunisian society and politics (Anderson, 1991).

1. He immediately made the pilgrimage to Mecca after ascending to power to pray for the country.
2. The call to prayer was broadcast on the state controlled radio network.
3. The harassment of imams and other observant Tunisians by the state security apparatus was ended.
4. The president stated that he was for a rebirth of Islamic learning and allowed *Al-Zaytouna* to refocus on religious education.

A Quick Return to Repression and One Party Rule

It is here, however, that the path taken by Tunisia diverges form that taken by Egypt as Ben Ali eventually chose Assad's strategy of banishment and repression. An important influence on his decision was that he took office as a relatively powerful leader.[8]

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[8] These factors are discussed in more detail in a number of articles that appeared in the years following Ben Ali's rise to power See Andersen (1981), Vare (1989), and Vandwalle (1989).

- Ben Ali was very popular when he took office as an overwhelming majority of Tunisians were relieved that Bourghiba had been removed. Ben Ali, in addition, was given credit for orchestrating the smooth and bloodless transfer of power.

- He replaced over 2/3 of the members of the central committee of the Neo-Destour party with supporters in his first three years of power.

- He had a solid base of support in the military and internal security apparatus.

- He took over a government and party that had successfully expanded into almost every sector of Tunisia's society and economy.

- Events in Sudan, which was rumored to be training radical Tunisian Islamists, and neighboring Algeria caused many Tunisians to be weary of *Al-Nahda*. Violent conflict took place in both of these countries when Islamists took, or nearly took, control of power.

The first elections following Ben Ali's takeover were marked by the high

expectation that the country was on the path to real democracy. Although *Al-Nahda* was

not permitted to field a list of contestants, candidates who were associated with the group

were allowed to run as independents. The religious bloc, despite its organizational

disadvantage, garnered the largest amount of votes (17%) among the opposition parties d.

The elections, however, were marred by charges that the opposition parties had not had

significant time to organize, vote fixing had taken place, and that the poll monitors from

opposition parties had been intimidated (Zartman, 1991). Also, the winner take all system

guaranteed that Ben Ali's party, the Democratic Constitutional Party (RCD), would win

an overwhelming majority of the seats.[9] After *Al-Nahda's* request to be recognized as a

legal political party was denied in 1990, it boycotted the Higher Council that was formed

to oversee the implementation of the "National Pact" (Andersen, 1991). By time the next

elections took place in 1993, relations between the government and the Islamists had

soured and the Islamists were not permitted to run as independents.

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[9] Ben Ali renamed the Neo Destour party to disassociate it from Bourghiba's legacy. It was, in reality, still the same party.

Several events served to end Ben Ali's experiment in permitting the Islamists to enter legitimate politics. The first was the Gulf War as Tunisia remained neutral and did not send forces to aid the coalition against Iraq. Here, Ben-Ali tried to capitalize on both sides of the issues. First, he exploited the anti-Saudi feeling in Tunisia by stating that *Al-Nahdah* was a tool of the Saudi government. Then, he blamed the Islamists for being the organizing force behind pro-Iraqi demonstrations (Waltz, 1995). Most likely, after the success of the independent Islamists candidates and the tremendous support that was organized for the Iraqis by Islamic groups across the Arab world, Ben Ali saw political Islam as a serious threat to his regime. This threat was heightened in 1991 when an Islamist campaign of insurrection that was intended to overthrow the regime was discovered. However, *Al-Nahdah* and other moderate Islamic groups denied any association with the radical splinter element that was organizing the attacks. Finally, the violence and terror instigated by Islamic groups in Algeria after elections (which the Islamic party, FIS, won) were canceled had a strong influence on Tunisia (Waltz, 1995).

Ben-Ali, following the discovery of the Islamists' planned insurrection, responded with mass arrests and the exiling of *Al-Nahda's* leader, Rachid Ghanouchi. After the government announced that it had uncovered an Islamist plot on Ben-Ali's life, thousands of *Al-Nahda* activists were arrested and 170 were convicted of sedition. Once again, *Al-Nahda* denied involvement but, it was labeled a terrorist organization. From that point, Ben Ali, like his predecessor, has maintained a policy of suppressing all Islamic based political activity. At the same time, the regime has come under frequent criticism for abusing human rights (Waltz, 1995). Restrictions on the press and association have also

been reimplemented. Finally, the RCD won 97% of the vote in the 1993 parliamentary elections but, again, charges of impropriety were leveled by the opposition parties. Clearly, in Tunisia, the rise and fall of democracy has been associated with the opening and closing of the system to Islamic political groups. As was the case in Syria, it was the Islamic groups that were calling for more democracy and the government that was, successfully, resisting.

Contextual Factors

The importance of the civil war in neighboring Algeria has already been mentioned. The violence and anarchy instigated by Islamic radical groups in Algeria following the canceling of parliamentary elections caused many Tunisians to be weary of Islamists in their own country. This feeling was expressed in a number of conversations during my visit to Tunisia in December, 1994. In short, many felt that that the mixing of religion and politics would also lead to violence and bloodshed in their own country. Even two university students, who said they would like to see Islamic law guide government policy, stated that a struggle for Islamic government would not be worth the suffering that was taking place in Algeria. Ben Ali is aware of this wariness and has used it as tool in his campaign against *Al-Nahdah*. Despite the group's support of democracy and denial of involvement with the acts of insurrection, Ben Ali still painted them as a dangerous terrorist group. He also claimed that *Al-Nahdah* was receiving support and training from Sudan's Islamic regime, which is rumored to be assisting a number of radical Islamic groups (Hermassi, 1991).

The weary reaction to the events in Algeria and the failure of "Islamic Fundamentalism" to overwhelm Tunisia is further disconfirmation of a monolithic political

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Islam that transcends national borders. *Al Nahda's* claim to be pro-democracy and its acceptance of secular authority illustrates the shallowness of the assertion, which is based on the events in Algeria, that political Islam is incompatible with democracy. The differences between Tunisia and Algeria which have caused political Islam to take a more virulent form in the later country will be apparent following the discussion in Chapter Seven. If anything, the violent tactics of Armed Islamic Group and other Islamic groups in Algeria have led *Al-Nahdah* to continue its strategy of moderation in the face of continued government repression in order to reassure Tunisians who do not want the peace in their own country disrupted. This leads to a second contextual factor, relative economic prosperity, as a majority of Tunisians maintain a decent standard of living.

Tunisia is often referred to as a model developing economy by the IMF and the World Bank. Although it is still developing a strong industrial base and is somewhat dependent on the fluctuations of the world petroleum market, political stability has facilitated a steady increase in Tunisia's GNP over the past twenty years. During the 1990's, this has led to the development of a booming tourist industry and a significant rise in foreign investment. These factors, in combination with a relatively small population (8 million), have allowed the government to provide a decent standard of living and develop the country's infrastructure (Vanderwalle, 1988).[10] Consequently, the middle class and the well-off are willing to tolerate a less than perfect democracy because they fear that increased power for the Islamists would lead to turmoil that would disrupt the economy.

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[10] Tunisia's relative prosperity is quite evident after one arrives from Morocco, as I did last winter. There are far fewer beggars in the areas frequented by tourists and the poorer quarters of Tunis are nowhere near as deplorable as the *Bidonville* of Casablanca. In fact, many of the Tunisians I spoke to were I offended when I even compared their country to Morocco.

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In addition, the growth of the private sector in the past 15 years has created another group that has an interest in maintaining the status-quo.

A final important contextual factor is Tunisia's well developed education system. First, the Westernization and secularization of education has caused Western and secular ideas and lifestyles to become popular among some Tunisians. Although Islamic culture still remains an important influence, particularly in rural areas, a significant segment of the middle and upper classes has relegated religion to the personal sphere (Waltz, 1986).[11] In short, Tunisia's culture is truly a mix between religious and secular. Hence, the moderation of *Al-Nahdah* and other mainstream Islamic groups. However, Tunisia's education system has also helped facilitate the growth of Islamic groups. The rapid secularization that was enforced during the Bourghiba era was offensive to many students in the South and rural areas (Hermassi, 1991). At the same time, these students were led to believe in ideas such as liberty, justice, and equality. When this group realized that they were living in an authoritarian, corrupt, and repressive one party state, they, naturally, turned to political Islam.

Regime Strength

Ben Ali, of the leaders discussed thus far, had the easiest task in consolidating power. To review, he replaced a leader who had become brutally repressive and unpopular. He also took control of a well developed and organized party structure that controlled all of the country's important governmental and societal institutions. In addition, he enjoyed the loyalty of the military as he was a career army man who had also

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[11] Once a again, a comparison with Morocco is telling. In Tunisia one sees fewer veils, more bars, and people eating in public during Ramadan

directed Tunisia's internal security apparatus. The military's pro-Western orientation also makes it a willing ally in Ben Ali's campaign against *Al-Nahdah*. Ben-Ali's public support increased in the three years after he took power when he restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners, and took steps toward instituting multiparty democracy. However, these gains were short lived and Ben Ali reverted to the use of the same repressive measures and human rights abuses as his predecessor to stifle serious dissent. At the same time, elections were rigged to guarantee the RCD's domination of the parliament.

It is important to note that associations such as labor and trade unions, professional organizations, and chambers of commerce, which might serve as opponents to the regime are also controlled by the RCD. Finally, as mentioned, opposition parties are at a severe financial and organizational disadvantage while the winner take all electoral system also favors one party dominance. These factors, along with the RCD's control of the bureaucracy and the state run economy, leave Ben Ali firmly in control of the political system. His authoritarian rule has been further supported by the previously mentioned contextual factors, a fear of an Algerian style Islamist insurrection, a flourishing economy, and a modestly westernized and secularized society. Consequently, as Ben Ali's reign progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the regime could survive without bringing in *Al-Nahdah* and other Islamic political groups as junior partners.

The Islamic Opposition
Ben Ali's decision to terminate the short-lived period of reconciliation with the Islamic opposition certainly was not a consequence of radical ideology. Of the Islamic opposition groups being considered, *Al-Nahdah* is among the most moderate and willing

to accommodate secular dominated government. The major Islamic political groups in Tunisia fall under Sheppard **Modernist** classification.

Radicals. A small cell of the Islamic Liberation Party (discussed in the section on Jordan in Chapter Four) is known to exist but has not been of significance since the mid-1980s. A radical group, the Commandos of Sacrifice, split from *Al-Nahdah* in the early 1990s and a number of its members were convicted of terrorist activities in 1992. However, since then, they have not caused any disturbances. Ben Ali has used the Commandos of Sacrifice to stigmatize mainstream Islamist groups by claiming that it was *Al-Nahdah's* military wing. However, both groups denied this allegation. Although COS does call for the replacement of the current regime with a *Sharia* based government and its tracts have discussed whether a *jihad* through force could be used to achieve this objective, it denies being associated with the violent acts of 1991-1992 (Waltz, 1995).

Modernists. The Progressive Islamic Movement is a small group, which is primarily dedicated to reforming Islamic thought. Their main contention is that Islamic thought must be brought up to date before an Islamic society can be built. The group's leader, Slaheddine Jorchhi (1989), calls for the integration of Islam with the rest of society. Thus, a flexible, tolerant, and modern Islam, which is open to differences in opinion is necessary in a rapidly developing society such as Tunisia. Although the group has put off active involvement in politics until it has developed an appropriate system of modern Islamic thought, Jorchhi (1989) has emphasized the importance of democracy and struggle on behalf of the betterment of the masses. The Progressive Islamist Movement could coexist with the present Tunisian government.

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The primary Islamic political group in Tunisia, *Al-Nahdah*, maintains the objective of using Islam as a tool to reform society. In short, politics, law, culture, and education all must be guided by Islamic principles. The group, during the Bourghiba era, leveled the same charge as the Egyptian Islamists had used against Nasser. Government and society had become corrupt because religion had been removed from public life. Subsequently, the regime had become abusive because a human ruler had claimed to supersede God (Ghanouchi, 1986). Although MTI/*Al-Nahdah* has always called for democracy and equality and rejected violence, it did not accept the legitimacy of the Tunisian government until Ben Ali came to power. As discussed, it then was ready to enter legitimate politics and accept pluralism but, its application to form a political party was denied.

Al-Nahda's program is more political than Islamic. Although it calls for an Islamic state and the eventual implementation of Islamic law, the primary concern is social justice. In the speeches and written statements of its now exiled leader, Rachid Ghanouchi (1986,1991), there is frequent discussion of uplifting the oppressed, fighting for worker's rights, and building a government that treats citizens humanely. He also calls for an open society, which encourages all citizens to participate in the governing process and permits criticism of rulers. Finally, Ghanouchi (1986, 1991) goes to great lengths to emphasize that secular parties would be free to participate in an *Al-Nahdah* dominated political system. The Islamic part of the program is that this transformation would take place through the following of Islam. Although specifics are not given, the group has taken a more liberal position in recent years on issues such as polygamy, women's right to work, and social intercourse between the sexes (Ghanouchi, 1991).

It would appear, based on ideology, that accommodation would be possible between the regime and the Islamic opposition. The harsh, rejectionist, and anti-government rhetoric that was used by the Syrian Islamic Action Front is absent here. However, as in Syria, the Islamic groups do not represent a segment of society that is vital to the survival of the regime. The ranks of the Islamic groups in Tunisia, like those in the countries previously discussed, are filled by people, first generation migrants to the city who have background in sciences, technology, and engineering and who are on the margins of society, (Zghal, 1991). Although they have better jobs and a higher standard of living than their parents, they still lag behind the established urban bourgeoisie. Most are from the poorer Southern and internal regions of the country. When they arrived in the coastal metropolitan areas, they experienced corruption and a distant elite that was propagating a culture of which they strongly disapproved (Magnuson, 1991).

The primacy of political issues over religious matters in Tunisian political Islam is further illustrated by *Al-Nahdah's* strength among the young and on university campuses. Like their counterparts all over the world, they are ideological and committed to abstract notions of social justice. When they leave the university, they find a reified political system that is built to prevent real change. Therefore, they either join the RCD or another state organ or, they turn to the ideological pureness of political Islam to express their grievances. An ironic aspect of the composition of *Al-Nahdah* is the strong representation of women (Magnuson, 1991). As stated, Tunisia has the most progressive policies regarding women's issues in the Arab-Muslim world. Again, it is a problem of dashed expectations. Educated Tunisian women are taught that they are equal to men and that

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they should work. However, this is not the social reality. Consequently, they turn to Islam

for fulfillment. At any rate, the young professionals that chose the path of political Islam

over the path of co-optation are neither a large or powerful enough group to threaten the

Ben Ali regime.

Supporting Cleavages

The divide between the Ben Ali regime and the Islamic opposition is not

exacerbated by significant supporting cleavages. Unlike Syria, where political Islam also

represents long-standing animosities between sects, regions, and classes, the conflict in

Tunisia is purely over form of government. Tunisia is almost exclusively Sunni and the

divide between Arabs and Berbers has not been politicized as in neighboring Algeria and,

to a lesser extent, Morocco.[12] Also, Tunisia is too small a country to have significant

regional divisions. Although members of *Al-Nahdah* usually have Southern and rural

origins, most now live in urban areas. Finally, the regime is not thought to be rooted in any

particular region of the country or favoring any geographic locations over others. In

Tunisia, it is the strength of the regime, relative economic prosperity, and the ominous

events taking place in Algeria that have kept Islam on the margins of government and

politics. The absence of supporting cleavages may be the reason why the competition

between the regime and the illegal Islamic opposition has not been as lethal it has in Syria.

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[12] The Berbers in Tunisia are a small minority in Tunisia while they comprise over half of the population in Algeria and Morocco.

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The Future of Islam and Politics in Syria and Tunisia

Continued Secular Authoritarianism

Little has changed in Syria and Tunisia regarding Islam's role in politics. After the Syrian Islamic Action Front was destroyed along with the city of Hama in 1981, Islamic political opposition has been absent in Syria as the surviving leadership fled to other countries. During the 1980s, Assad tightened Syria's hold on Lebanon and is now that country's defacto ruler. His rejectionist posture regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and betrayal of the Christians for the Palestinians and various Islamic groups in Lebanon has reestablished his Arab-Nationalist and Palestinian credentials. Also, the Syrian economy has been improving during the 1990's. The previously mentioned factors: continued repression, denial of civil rights, and human rights abuse: and the example of Hama have kept a tight lid on Islamic based dissent. At the same time, Assad's alliance with *Hizb Allah*, in Lebanon has strengthened his Islamic credentials. It is almost certain that Islam will be kept out of politics until, at least, after Assad's death

Islamic political groups in Tunisia have also remain marginalized. In the last two years, the government has continued its crackdown with more arrests and trials of *Al-Nahdah* members. Leaders of legal secular opposition parties also complain of harassment. However, sustained economic growth and the continuation of the Algerian Civil War help maintain public support for the Ben Ali regime. However, Algeria permitted two moderate Islamists to run in its November 1995 presidential elections. The end of the Algerian civil war and pluralization in Algeria may put pressure on Ben- Ali to institute real reform in his own country. The question, however, is whether it will take mass insurrection by frustrated Islamists, as was the case in Algeria, to bring about this change.

It is Not the Islamic Groups

The evidence presented in this chapter regarding Tunisia and Syria has further supported my assertion that it is not Islam that is the primary cause of political outcomes in Muslim countries and that Islam can be compatible with democracy. I have shown that Tunisia and Syria maintained authoritarian but, **secular based,** regimes. Some of the most oppressive measures and worst abuses of human rights have been used in repressing Islamic political groups. However, the largest political opposition groups in Tunisia and Syria were not entirely of a radical or extreme nature. *Al-Nahdah* in Tunisia favors democratic rule, is willing to accept the legitimacy of the secular Ben Ali regime, and claims that it would allow secular parties to participate in government if they ever became the dominant party. The Syrian Islamic Action Front did use violence to oppose the Assad regime but only after continuous repression and denied access to legitimate politics. The Islamic Action Front did support democracy and a pluralist political system. Of course, the moderation claimed by both groups may, as Assad and Ben Ali contend, be just a front.

The factor which led Assad and Ben Ali to repress Islamic political groups and marginalize Islamic political culture was regime strength. Both had roots in the military, strong party organizations which had permeated their respective societies, and the support of crucial groups outside of the government. In contrast, the Mubarak and King Hussein regimes are continuously threatened and in search of allies. A reason why the later felt relatively secure in pursuing the Islamists was that they, or their predecessors, had helped cultivate political Islam. Consequently, rules and boundaries had been created. In Syria and Tunisia, Islamic political groups formed to oppose the regimes in power. Thus, the secular leaders felt that they could never trust these groups to play by the rules. In Syria,

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long-standing ethnic, tribal, class, and geographical, cleavages made accommodation out of the question. An analysis of the relationship between Islam and politics in Iraq would reach the same conclusion. In Tunisia, the shadow of events in Algeria and low level acts of violence overruled *Al-Nahdah's* claim that it wanted to play by the rules. Now it is time to consider two Islamic monarchies, Morocco and Saudi Arabia which appear to contradict the assertions that Islam can facilitate democracy.

CHAPTER 6

SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO

Islamic Monarchies

Saudi Arabia and Morocco appear to contradict the central argument of this dissertation regarding Islamic political culture's negligible influence on democracy and other major political outcomes. Both countries maintain monarchies, which still dominate their respective political systems and use Islam to legitimate their reigns. Morocco's King Hassan II, the "Commander of the Faithful" and Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, the "Guardian of Islam's Two Holiest Places," are the spiritual as well as political leaders of their countries. Finally, neither Morocco or Saudi Arabia is democratic and both have been frequently criticized for their poor protection of human rights and civil liberties. At face value, it would appear that these two case support the notion that Islam, indeed, is a dangerous and regressive political force. Things, however, look quiet different when we take a closer look at Morocco and Saudi Arabia, analyze other factors which influence their political systems, and discover that they are quite different.

Morocco and Saudi Arabia, with the exception of the similarities listed above and close ties to the United States, have little in common. Of greatest importance, Islam's

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role in politics varies significantly between the two countries. Morocco's political system is far more open than Saudi Arabia's, and the West is viewed in very different contexts in the two countries.[1] These differences are not a result of the Saudis being more authentic Muslims than the Moroccans. Rather, they are a product of the interaction of religious texts and traditions, which leave room for interpretation, with different political cultures. In regard to political matters, the prevailing interpretations of Islam in Morocco and Saudi Arabia are highly dependent on history, geography, demographics, economics, and other non-religious factors. I will follow the format that has been detailed in Chapters Four and Five. For both countries, the historical focus will be more of a more general nature as both regimes have maintained power since independence and faced consistent threats to their reigns. Subsequently, the question of interest is how Islamic regimes deal with challenges to their authority from religious political opposition and how this "all Islamic" dynamic affects possibilities for democratic accommodation.

Saudi Arabia

Desert Tribal Leadership Legitimated by Puritan Wahhabi Islam

Saudi Arabia's Islamic authoritarian government is rooted the in the circumstances surrounding its creation and development. Through the beginning of the twentieth century, the Arabian Peninsula was inhabited by nomadic tribes. A majority of the peninsula was outside of Ottoman control and was never penetrated by the European

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[1] This was made clear to me on going and return flights from Casablanca to Tunis on *Saudia* airlines. Outbound, I sat next to a Saudi who told me that the Moroccans were not true Muslims who were controlled by Jews. Returning, I sat next to a Moroccan who informed me that the Saudis are primitive barbarians.

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colonial powers. Consequently, tribal, personal, patrimonial, and traditional government

was the norm up the founding of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The first king of Saudi Arabia, Ibn

Saud, was able to conquer and unify the tribes of the Nejd through marriage and the use of

Islam as Saud joined forces with the *'ulama* of the *Wahhabi* movement, which adheres to

a rigid and puritanical Islam. Saud, as a result, was able to enlist the traditionally oriented

Nejdi tribesman in his campaigns because, they believed that they were following God's

injunction to spread Islam. The *'ulama* gained a political force to help them spread the

Wahhabi practice of Islam (Helms, 1981).

The adoption of the *Wahhabi* movement by the Saudi family and the

legitimization of their rule though defending religion and enforcing its social norms

committed the regime to enforcing a rigid and traditional Islam. A lapse in this area allows

opposition forces to challenge the regime's authenticity. The importance of Islam as a

legitimating force was multiplied when the Sauds captured the Hijaz region, which

includes the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Thus, the ruling family has had to insure

that it does not adopt policies which would contradict its puritan Islamic underpinnings

because, the loss of the support of the *'ulama* and the traditionally minded tribesman

could easily topple the regime. This predicament has resulted in an uneasy agreement

between the regime and the *'ulama* where:

- *Sharia* is the law of the land and prevails in matters of personal status, criminal punishment, and the regulation of social behavior.
- Special government agencies and religious police insure that proper Islamic conduct is followed. This includes segregation of the sexes, strict restrictions on the appearance of women in public, the banning of alcohol and decadent Western forms of entertainment, and the propagation of *Wahhabi* Islam.

- The government ignores the religious establishment in important political matters, such as foreign policy, modernization, the economy, and most areas of public administration (Kechichian, 1986).

A second factor relating to the Nejdi capturing of the Hijaz also helped to solidify Islamic based authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia. The Nejdis, as mentioned, were nomadic, traditional, illiterate tribesman who had little contact with the outside world. The Hijaz, in contrast, was part of the Ottoman Empire and had been exposed to modern ideas, institutions, and technologies (Huyette, 1985). The ascendancy of the *Wahhabis* meant that the influence of a puritanical Islam patrimonial regime that was fearful of outside forces spread to the entire kingdom at the expense of the moderate Hijazi Islamic political culture. Thus, the key debate in Saudi politics is not whether Islam will play a strong role in government or whether a liberal or conservative Islam will guide Saudi political culture. Rather, it is whether the regime is sufficiently traditional and strict. This contrasts with Morocco, which was in constant contact with other civilizations and where the cities prevailed over the countryside.

Ibn Saud and his successors consolidated their hold on power through marriage, patronage, repression, and the destruction of forces that threatened the regime. The country's small population and the *Wahhabi* sanctioning of polygamy allowed the ruling family to marry into the important tribes and families in the kingdom. Saudi Arabia's small population also permitted a personal style of rule where every citizen has access to the ruling family (Yassini, 1985). At the same time, the monarchy and the ruling family were the only important political institutions in the country and opposition, such as the armed tribesman (the *Ikhwan*), who rebelled because they were against modernization and felt the regime had been lax in promoting religious values, were destroyed. However, the

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discovery of petroleum and the social consequences of the oil boom of the 1970s

undermined the regime's claim to represent true Islam and strained its grip on power.

The Disruptive Influence of the Oil Boom

The late 1950's and early 1960's saw the regime face a rare threat from secular

opposition forces as Nasser's Pan-Arabism and Arab- Socialism were introduced into the

kingdom by Egyptian and Lebanese guest workers (Abir, 1985). At the same time,

monarchies were overturned in Egypt, Iraq, and Libya. Finally, a group of princes in the

Saud family called for the passing of power from the monarchy to an elected assembly and

the granting of civil liberties. The "liberal" princes were quickly rebuked by the rest of the

royal family and went into exile while troublesome guest workers were deported (Huyette,

1985). Also, the appeal of secular opposition groups (Nasserists, Communists, and

Ba 'athist) was limited because an overwhelming majority of Saudis favor the use of

sharia to regulate society and daily life. However, a more serious threat to the ruling

family would arise from Islamic groups which questioned the regime's commitment to

maintaining an authentic Islamic society.

The discovery of oil, the development of the oil industry, and the wealth

accumulated as a result of the oil boom had a profound affect on Saudi Arabia. Revenues

from the sale of petroleum helped support the regime as the Saudis channeled funds into

developing infrastructure, housing, education, welfare, and other social services that

benefited lower class citizens. Also, the growth of government bureaucracy to administer

these services and projects provided well paying employment for many young Saudis. In

addition, members of the royal family, others connected to the royal family, and

government officials became wealthy serving as middlemen, agents, and contractors for

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the foreign interests competing for projects and contracts (Shaw, 1982). The oil boom, in short, added to the ranks of those with an interest in the status-quo.

A second consequence of the oil boom was that the kingdom was finally exposed to the influences of the outside world, particularly those of the U.S. These influences, however, ran head on into a xenophobic society with a tradition of puritan Islam that was being encouraged and spread by the government. Naturally, the religious elites railed against the vices and immorality brought by the expatriates who helped the Saudis produce their oil. The *'ulama,* which had opposed the introduction of television and airplanes, also disapproved of the country's increasingly close ties with the United States and its dependence on the West for weapons and defense. Finally, they were also weary of the thousands of Saudis who had received their university training in the United States and other Western countries (Wilson and Graham, 1994). In sum, the religious elite, along with many common Saudis, felt that the regime was selling its Islamic heritage for oil profits.

This belief was furthered by the ostentatious displays of wealth, particularly by the ruling family, that became quite common. Although oil profits were channeled into social services and public facilities that aided less fortunate Saudis, members of the royal family and those who were well connected clearly benefited the most. Stories abound of gold plated bathroom fixtures and princes buying new Mercedes when the old ones ran out of gas (Aburish, 1994). It is known that many members of the royal family consume alcohol, use drugs, and womanize behind the walls of their residences and when abroad.[2] To many,

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[2] For an entertaining collection of tales of the extravagance of the royal family, see Mackey (1988).

this was another sign of the regime's abandonment of *Wahhabi* Islam. The continued

abuse of human rights, the denial of civil liberties, and the failure to expand political power

beyond the royal family was also a indication of a turn away from the principles of true

Islam (Abir, 1994).

When faced with a deepening of its enduring credibility problem, the regime's

usual response was to grant further latitude to the religious police (*Mutawaeen*) in

cracking down on immoral behavior (Wilson and 1994). It also built three Islamic training

collages, increased religious education in the public schools, and stepped up its campaign

to reassure the religious elite that the regime was strongly committed to an Islamic

society.[3] As corruption, dependence on the U.S., and modernization continued, the royal

family appeared to be on shaky ground when the Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Iran,

challenged Saudi leadership of the Islamic world, and invigorated radical Islam. The

decline of the oil market in the 1980's and the subsequent recession in Saudi Arabia

further threatened the ruling family.

The Economic Decline of the 1980s and the Rise of Islamic Opposition

The ramifications of the ascension of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the growing

strength of Islam as an opposition force throughout the Middle East were felt in Saudi

Arabia in November of 1979. First, a group of zealots occupied the Grand Mosque in

Mecca in an attempt to rid the country of foreigners and other corrupting elements and

depose the monarchy. The group, led by a religious student and former member of the

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[3] In addition to the *Mutawaeen*, several other government agencies, such as The Committee for Preservation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice and the World League of Muslim Youth encourage and enforce Islamic norms. Also, the heads of several ministries such as health and higher education are usually clerics.

national guard, also criticized the *'ulama* for supporting the regime. Eventually, the mosque was retaken and the leaders of the rebellion were executed. The event, however, is telling of the role of Islam in Saudi politics. Because the ruling family claims to rule in the name of Islam, enforce *sharia*, and protect Islamic morals, it is susceptible to attacks regarding its performance in these matter. Consequently, all of the regime's shortcomings can be attributed to its violation of Islam, which lead to Islamic based opposition.

Two days after the takeover of the mosque, Saudi Arabia's *Shia* population, inspired by the revolution in Iran, revolted.[4] The *Wahhabi* consider the *Shia* to be heretics and have maintained a policy of persecution as *Shia* religious ceremonies are banned, *Shia* cannot serve in the armed forces, and they are not employed in government agencies. Many *Shia*, however, advanced through employment with ARAMCO and attended the schools it provided for its employees (Huyette, 1985). Motivated by the Iranian revolution and frustrated by their persecution, they violently pressed their case. The revolt was forcibly ended but, King Fahd did promise to improve facilities and services in *Shia* regions. The *Shia* insurgency actually galvanized support for the ruling family because of the *Sunni/Wahhabi* disdain for the *Shia*. Many Saudis also feared that the *Shia's* Iranian brethren would be a disruptive force in the region, which could hurt the oil industry.

The oil industry went into a long period of decline in the 1980s as a result of decreased demand and the failure of OPEC members to tow the line on production quotas. The consequences for the Saudi regime were quite serious.

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[4]The *Shia* compose approximately 30% of Saudi Arabia's population and are concentrated in the Al-Hasa area near the Persian Gulf. Iran is predominately *Shia* and its government adheres to *Shia* doctrine

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- The regime was forced to cut back on the construction of infrastructure and public facilities, which were important sources of wealth for workers, agents, contractors and middlemen.

- The regime was also forced to consider reducing its generous subsidies on basic products such as bread, water, and gasoline, which caused a public outcry and reduced confidence in the rule of King Fahd.

- Many of the young Saudis who had entered domestic universities and religious colleges because of the generous stipends given to students, for the first time, faced the prospect of unemployment.

- The corruption and extravagant lifestyle of the regime became even more distasteful during hard economic times.

- Traditionally minded citizens were disconcerted by the large amount of the kingdom's wealth that was being spent on foreign arms and technology.

In addition to the regime's economic woes, it faced a further challenge from the young graduates of the religious colleges who, unlike the older state sponsored *'ulama,* were not easily co-opted. Many saw the woes of the 1980's as God's punishment for straying from the path of Islam. This group was inspired by Islamic political groups in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Tunisia which, ironically, were all funded by the Saudi government. (Kechichian, 1986).

The Gulf War

The Saud family, in spite of the previously discussed pressures, remained firmly in power at the close of the 1980s because, as will be discussed, it still maintained the loyalty of the key segments of the population. Also, there was still enough wealth, especially after the oil market began to recover in the late 1980's and the placing of sanctions on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, to keep most Saudis contented. The Gulf War with Iraq in 1990-1991, however, served to place a whole new set of conflicting pressures on the Saudi regime.

1. The presence of hundreds of thousands of American and other Western troops, including women, was seen as a corrupting influence by the religious elite.

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2. The fact the "Guardian of Islam's Holy Places" had been forced to rely on America to defend them was a source of embarrassment to many Saudis.

3. Some Saudi women were inspired by the sight of female American soldiers and began to press for greater autonomy.[5]

4. Many Saudis pondered why they had launched a war against a tyrant when their own regime was highly autocratic.

Following the war two opposing groups began to articulate demands for reform.

First, a group of liberals published a letter in several newspapers in London and other Arab countries, while supporting the ruling family and Islam's role in society, calling for an opening of the political system, civil liberties, and reigning in the morality police. Then, a group of clergy sent a petition to the king calling for a return to the practice of pure Islam in the kingdom. King Fahd responded by dismissing many of the clergy and forbidding contacts with Islamic groups in other countries (Kechichian, 1991). In response to the liberals, he created a consultative assembly, which would be appointed by the monarchy and have no independent power, and issued decrees protecting the sanctity of the home (Abir, 1994). However, as will be discussed, an increasing number of Saudis are still discontented.

Contextual Factors

The continued reign of an Islamic monarchy in Saudi Arabia is strongly related to several contextual factors.

Oil Wealth. Saudi Arabia's oil reserves have been crucial in supporting the royal family's monopoly of political power. A population that is accustomed to authoritarian

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[5]Immediately after the war, a group of female professionals drove through Riyadh as a sign of protest against their second class status. They were all dismissed from their positions and harassed by the religious police even though no laws had been broken.

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rule is more likely to tolerate its continuation when material needs are more than accounted for. The overwhelming amount of wealth that poured into the kingdom has made a large number of elites, both inside and outside the government, very rich. Most elites see continued Saudi family rule as the best guarantee of stability and fear the possible results of a radical Islamic takeover (expulsion of foreigners, a state enforced ban on extravagance, and a more spartan existence). Oil wealth has also given the regime the means to buy sophisticated weapons for both its external and internal security. Finally, without oil, the U.S. and other allies would not have such a vested interest in the royal family's survival.

Oil, despite its benefits, might be the factor that brings down the Saud family. As mentioned, internal discontent and Islamic opposition groups surfaced in the mid-1980's when a decline in oil prices damaged the Saudi economy. Harsh authoritarian government may no longer be tolerable when personal fortunes dissipate, unemployment rises, social services are cutback, subsidies are reduced, and the expatriates laborers disappear. Rage is likely to be extreme in a country like Saudi Arabia, which has so far to fall. Oil wealth also brought the corrupt Western culture and the dependence on the West which galls the state *'ulama* and Islamic opposition groups. The establishment of Western culture and thought into Saudi Arabia's traditional and xenophobic society undermines the regime's Islamic credentials (Aburish, 1994). A scenario where Saudi Arabia's eventual economic crash is blamed on a regime that introduced Western values and placed itself in the hands of outsiders, (who really hate Islam) looms in the predictions of several analysts (Wilson and Graham, 1994, Abir, 1993, Aburish, 1994).

Demography. Another factor that enables the ruling family to resist change is the country's small population simply because there is more for everybody. A small population has also aided the ruling family as it is possible to either co-opt all key elites, such as the heads of important families and tribal groups with patronage or through marriage. It is also easier to be aware of the activities of the citizenry in a small country. Another factor benefiting the regime relating to population is dispersion. Although, most Saudis now live in cities, there are several large urban areas (Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca, Medina, Dhahran), which makes it difficult for opposition to organize on a national basis.

Geography. Islamic based authoritarianism is also rooted in Saudi Arabia's isolated desert society. As discussed, most regions of the Arabia Peninsula fell outside of the Ottoman Empire and the interests of the European colonial powers, which permitted the continued existence of a nomadic, tribal, patrimonial, and traditional society that was shaped by its desert surroundings. The ascendancy of the Nejdi tribes over the more cosmopolitan Hijaz insured that the political culture of the former would dominate Saudi Arabia. The presence of Mecca and Medina also intertwines the regime with Islam. Finally, the late arrival of the West engendered hostility rather than cultural integration. Islam's influence on politics and the nature of Saudi political Islam would both be quite different if Western influences had come earlier and the city had prevailed over the desert.

Regime Strength

The strength of the Saudi regime and the royal family is questionable. It appears, at face value, that the regime has bought off, married, or obtained control of all key segments of Saudi society. A large number of officers in the military are member of the royal family or connected to the Saud family. At the same time, the National Guard, which watches the

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military, is staffed entirely by tribes that are loyal to the regime. However, there have been at least three attempted coups launched from the air force, uprisings against officers, rumors of infiltration by Islamic opposition groups, and instances of units and fighter pilots being unwilling to fight during the Gulf War (Abir, 1994). For safe keeping, all major Saudi military installations are located on the outskirts of the kingdom. The internal security forces, however, are loyal and keep tabs on citizens with the latest computer technology.

The tribal population, which has almost entirely been settled, is largely loyal as it is tied to the regime through marriage, patronage, and patrimonial rule. Any ordinary citizen can gain an audience with the king or other important members of the royal family for assistance in resolving a problem relating to a government ministry (Huyette, 1984). The western oriented and educated merchants, agents, professionals, and government administrators are also, for the most part, loyal to the monarchy. They view the royal family as a progressive force and a bulwark against the religious elites and traditionally oriented tribes (Long, 1991). This group, recently, has begun to urge the royal family to release its monopoly on political power and has tired of the restrictive nature of Saudi society. The regime, however, has an increasingly difficult task of mollifying both the Western oriented elites and the 'ulama as both groups have pushed their agendas following the Gulf War. Also, various members of the royal family are entrenched in each of the two camps. This and other disputes within the ruling family have proved to be

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divisive. Familial power struggles, especially those related to succession, are always a threat to a monarchy.[6]

Religion is another double edge sword for the Sauds as the regime's survival has partly depended on representing, enforcing, and propagating a rigid and puritanical Islam. The regime's Islamic underpinnings help guarantee the allegiance of many Saudis, particularly those of Nejdi origin (Helms, 1981). Also, the royal family goes to great length to teach its citizens that the monarchy represents true Islam and that part of being a good Muslim is supporting the regime. Finally, the alliance between the regime and the *Wahhabis* has produced a mutually beneficial relationship that translates into the support of the *'ulama*, who grant *fatwa* supporting government policies (Bligh, 1984).

Islam is also the greatest threat to the Saud regime. As mentioned, because of the strong Islamic foundation of Saudi society and culture, religion is the first dimension on which policies are debated. Consequently, regime decisions regarding issues such as modernization, banking, oil production and pricing, relations with the United States, the Gulf War, and women's education are all susceptible to being criticized for being anti-Islamic. Because the regime claims to represent Islam, it must constantly protect its religious flank. This has led to the enforcement of extremely conservative social, personal status, moral, and behavioral code. It also means that opposition religious voices must be silenced out of fear that they will replace the regime as the authentic voice of Islam. More

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[6] Family politics is particularly relevant in Saudi Arabia because of the large size of the ruling family. Also, there are different sub-families represented in the house of Saud because most and kings, especially Ibn Saud, and princes have had multiple wives. The most noteworthy was a five year battle between Saud and Faysal after Ibn Saud's death for the throne, see Bligh (1984).

liberal and Western oriented critics must also be muted to demonstrate that the regime's piety. Hence, religion and authoritarianism go hand in hand (Aburish, 1994).

The Islamic Opposition

The Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia falls into two groups, the state controlled religious elite and groups organized to oppose the regime. Although the state sponsored *'ulama* are largely under control and have seen their influence decline over the years, they remain a crucial semi-autonomous force that must be mollified from time to time. This groups fits into Shepard's **Neo-Traditional** category as they have reluctantly accepted modernization but maintain a very orthodox and rigid practice of Islam. As mentioned, they usually yield on issues of high policy in return for control of matters relating to education, personal status, social conduct, and public behavior. Thus, they issued *fatwa* supporting the presence of American troops during the Gulf War and watched secular administration take over much of Saudi Arabia but, they have been unyielding in demanding a puritan social code (Wilson and Graham, 1994).

This relationship has held throughout the nation's history with periodic expressions of frustration, which result in greater power for the religious police and tighter control of public behavior. The petition signed by over 100 *alim* employed by the government signaled their growing discontent. However, they are likely to continue to support the regime because it provides them with funds and positions of power and, they fear the unknown that would follow a radical Islamist takeover. At the same time, radical opposition groups distrust them because of their past support of the regime (Kechichian, 1986). Many *'ulama*, however, sympathize with the goals of the opposition groups and, as discussed, question the Islamic zeal of the regime.

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The Islamic opposition groups in Saudi Arabia are of a **radical** nature. All maintain the objective of creating a new society and replacing the monarchy with some other regime that will also use the *Koran* as the constitution and *Sharia* as its legal system. The first group to gain attention was the Neo-Ikhwan, which was associated with the take over of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Most recently, a group called the Islamic Awakening organized in the 1990's and called for a demonstration against the regime (which was subsequently canceled when the security apparatus warned that all participants would be arrested). These groups are supported by Saudis living in exile in the West. The common theme of Saudi Islamic opposition is that oil has left the regime and society morally bankrupt. Wealth has led to corruption, unislamic displays of opulence, and social decay. Naturally, the regime's American friends are labeled as an enemy of Islam and the root cause of these disturbing tendencies (see, Juhayamann, 1980).

The Islamic groups call for an even more rigid and traditional Islam to govern society and are particularly concerned about working women. They are disdainful of the state *'ulama* for selling out to the regime and the Western oriented elites for being lured by the evil of the West (Juahayamann, 1990). Despite their "totalist" and anti-Western ideology, they claim to favor a more democratic form of government and even organized The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights in Saudi Arabia. Also, members living in Western countries are engaged in a campaign to tarnish the regime's reputation abroad. This might signify their acknowledging that the support of the United States is a necessary evil. The membership of the Islamic opposition groups is representative of Saudi Arabia's middle and lower classes. Many, of course, graduated from the religious

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colleges. The strength of the Islamic groups is difficult to gauge given conflicting propaganda by the regime and the opposition's foreign supporters.

Although the Islamic political groups in all of the countries being considered are organized against current regimes and forms of government, we have seen that their willingness to act as loyal opposition varies. Those in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia have sought reconciliation. In Saudi Arabia, like Syria, most do not. It should now be clear that there is no chance for reconciliation between the regime and Islamic political opposition groups in Saudi Arabia. The harsh response to the petition requesting reform sent by several members of the religious elite is evidence of this sharp divide. Given the crucial role of Islam in legitimating the Saudi regime, recognizing Islamic opposition would also be acknowledging that the regime no longer represented true Islam and was in need of corrective reform. The zero sum nature of the conflict and the regime's relatively firm grip on the state and society make Islamic authoritarianism the ruling family's best choice.

Supporting Cleavages

Class. Social class, given Saudi Arabia's tribal heritage, has not been an important influence on social mobility. With the exception of the tribal or family leader, male tribe members are considered equal. Outside of the ruling family, this egalitarian ethic continues to exist in contemporary Saudi Arabia. In short, one's background is not usually a hindrance to advancement (Huyette, 1986). After the oil boom, the availability of free university education and government stipends to support students further enhanced upward mobility for Saudi males. Finally, tremendous wealth combined with generous government subsidies, health care programs, and social welfare programs means that there is no real disgruntled Saudi lower class. This position is occupied by guest workers from

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developing nations. The viewing of foreigners as a threat has strengthened pressure on the regime to enforce a strict Islamic social code and demonstrate its desire to defend Islam.

Ethnicity. The presence of a Saudi Arabia's large *Shia* minority helps support Islamic authoritarianism. As mentioned, the *Wahhabi* disdain for the *Shia* has led to discrimination and persecution. The resulting *Shia* anti-regime activity, which has included the organization of both secular and religious based opposition groups, and support for Iran has had a rallying effect for the royal family (Aburish, 1994). Often the regime has portrayed itself as defending pure Islam against "the heretics." Democracy, or the granting of equal rights to the *Shia*, would come at the expense of the *Sunni* and the possible end of *Wahhabi* control of the state.[7]

Geography. The threat of the *Shia* is alleviated by their concentration in the outlying Eastern Province. The government has also adapted a policy of preventing *Shia* migration to other regions. Concurrently, in the last 20 years, it has increased spending on infrastructure and public facilities to mollify the *Shia* population. The old rivalry between the *Nejdis* and the *Hijazis* still affects Saudi politics. The later view the former as uneducated country bumpkins and resent their domination of power. The *Nejdis* view the *Hijazis* as being lax Muslims and too Western (Helms, 1981). However, the Sauds have employed the more administratively advanced *Hijazis* in the government and, after 70 years, the groups have mixed. Recent policies to promote the *Nejdis* have angered the *Hijazis* but this regional divide is not strong enough to threaten the regime.

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[7] It was widely believed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that the *Shia* were planning an insurgency that would lead to merging Saudi Arabia with Iran.

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The Genesis of a Moderate Islamic Political Culture

Morocco's monarchy, although firmly grounded in Islam, has propagated modernization, religious moderation, and tolerance. The relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Morocco, like that in Saudi Arabia, is rooted in the extent of its pre-independence exposure to Western influences and the circumstances surrounding its creation. North Africa, in contrast to the Arabian Peninsula, had a long history of contact with Europe and the West, which culminated in the French Protectorate from 1906 until 1956. During the protectorate, the French completed the ascendancy of the urban central authority over the tribes and the countryside. Also, political parties and other associations organized to oppose the protectorate and Morocco's ties to Europe were cemented. Consequently Western, ideas, institutions and technologies are strongly rooted in Moroccan political culture and have been encouraged by Morocco's government. In addition, a tradition of political activism and participation developed among the elite. It is also important to emphasize that Islam remains the lens through which most Moroccan evaluate the state of their country and society.

The current Moroccan dynasty, the *Alawis*, have reigned, uninterrupted, for close to 500 years.[9] The *Alawi* family claims direct despondence (*Shorfa*) to the prophet Mohammed and the present king, Hassan II, claims to be "God's Shadow on Earth" and

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[8] References to personal conversations and observations relate to information obtained from September 1994-July 1995 during my residency in Morocco. Names are withheld to protect the well being of those who shared their invaluable thoughts and opinions.

[9] Since French rule in Morocco was a "protectorate," the monarchy, in theory, still reigned. However, Mohammed V, Morocco's fist post-independence king, was exiled when he called for Moroccan independence.

"The Prince (or commander) of the Faithful." Thus, Islam, as in Saudi Arabia, is a strong component of the monarchy's legitimacy. Hassan II has gone to great extents to emphasize his role of religious leader through the broadcasting of his performance of important rituals, such as leading study sessions during *Ramadan* sacrificing the first sheep on the prophet's birthday (*Aid Al-Kabir*) (Coombs-Schilling, 1989). The leaders of the dominant political force fighting the protectorate, the *Istiqlal* (Independence), were also observant Muslims and grounded the party's platforms in Islamic terminology. In short, despite the strong Western influence on Moroccan society and political culture, there was never a turn away from Islam and move towards rapid secularization, as was the case in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, and Iran.

The "Islamic consensus" in Morocco resembles that of Jordan rather than that of Saudi Arabia (See, Entelis, 1989). In short, most Moroccans accept the value of modernization, are at ease in a society that mixes native and outside influences, and are willing to tolerate "unislamic practices" as long as they remain in reason and are done discretely.[10] Given the regime's propagation of Islam, its use of religion as a source of legitimacy, and the ease with which Western culture has been integrated, Islamic political opposition in Morocco did not become a significant force until the 1980s and remains weaker than Islamic groups in the other countries being considered. However, the monarchy is always vulnerable as the king's continued domination of the political system, repression, and the abuse of human rights in combination with a stagnant economy and a

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[10] This "mixed" Moroccan" culture is best exemplified in the way many Moroccans naturally switch back and forth between Moroccan Arabic and French in daily conversations. One often sees women in traditional garb walking arm in arm with women in Western dress.

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20 to 30% unemployment rate have produced a growing class of disenchanted Moroccans. Again, grievances and solutions are increasingly being expressed in the context of Islam.

The continued existence of the monarch is a result of the French decision during the protectorate to expel the Sultan, Mohammed V, a supporter of independence. Mohammed V's association with the nationalist cause and deportation made him a national hero and his return became the rallying point for the nationalist movement (Ashford, 1963). Subsequently, the monarchy was retained after independence. The *Istiqlal* and other parties envisioned a constitutional monarchy but Hassan II, upon ascension to the throne, enervated the political parties, turned the parliament into a debating society, and centralized power in the monarchy.[11] Since then, the king has carefully employed a strategy of rewarding supporters with positions in the government and the private sector while imprisoning, torturing, and even murdering those who refuse to play by the rules.[12] He has also encouraged the factionalization and splitting of political parties to ensure that they remain weak and beholden to him (Mossadeq, 1987) .

The king, after the failure of two coups launched from the military in 1970 and 1971, achieved control of the country's political system, and economy. The threat of one of Morocco's socialist parties had been terminated by the murder of its leader in France and a campaign to portray it as unislamic. Since then, the king has relied on his status as

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[11] The Moroccan Constitution states that is illegal to criticize the person of the king, the form of government, or the Islamic nature of the state. The king appoints the prime minister and the government, has veto power, and may dismiss the parliament. In short, he is the country's true legislative and executive power.

[12] The ruling family also dominates the economy as it is estimated to own up to 40% of the private sector. At the same time, Hassan II has co-opted what is known as the "500 wealthy" families that dominate the Moroccan economy and government. It was told to me by a number of Moroccans that is impossible to be successful in any field in Morocco if you are out of favor with the king.

religious leader, the carrot and the stick, luck, and a high profile in world affairs to maintain power. However, following the attempted coups and the weakening of the political parties, the king found himself isolated. Fortunately, the Spanish announced their attention to withdrawal from the Western Sahara in 1973. The king, playing on overwhelming nationalist sentiment regarding Morocco's claim to the region, led a march of civilians into the disputed area in 1976. All of the political parties rallied behind the monarchy and supported the ensuing war against the POLISARIO for control of the region (Price, 1979). Nationalism was furthered by saber rattling with Morocco's neighbor and rival, Algeria, which was supporting the insurgents.

The Sahara campaign deflected attention from the lack of progress toward true democracy (the parliament was suspended for 5 years during the 1970s) and the failing economy. However, as the army failed to achieve a quick victory, the phosphate (Morocco's primary export) market collapsed, and the shock-waves of the Iranian revolution and the resurgence of political Islam reached Morocco, opposition began to coalesce. It is important to note that, unlike Saudi Arabia, there are outlets in Morocco for political participation such as political parties, trade unions, professional associations, and student groups. The parliament was eventually reinstated and elections take place on a regular basis.[13] Finally, lively political debate and commentary is permitted in the press as long as it does not specifically criticize Islam or the king.

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[13] It is well known that elections are, to varying extents, rigged. Also, 1/3 of the parliament is elected indirectly by local councils, which are, of course, tied to the monarchy.

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The Limited Appeal of Islamic Political Groups

Limited participation, repression, and the rewards for playing by the rules served to weaken Islamic political opposition in Morocco. In addition, almost half of the population remains illiterate and most literate members of the rural and urban lower classes are apolitical. Most see politics as a matter beyond their control, accept the legitimacy and religious nature of the monarchy, and are preoccupied with economic survival. (Eichleman, 1987).[14] All of these factors limited the appeal of the various illegal Islamic political organizations which began to surface in the 1980s. Also, King Hassan II does not have to maintain the standards of strict, rigid, and puritanical *Wahhabi* Islam in a xenophobic society, as do the Sauds. However, like King Fahd, Hassan II cannot permit the emergence of Islamic voices opposing the regime because they would challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy, the notion that his rule is blessed by God (*baraka*), and his claim to be God's Shadow on Earth.

Islamic opposition forces began to surface in the late 1970's as study groups and youth clubs were formed. The king, as usual, attempted to co-opt these groups by offering them financial support in return for acknowledgment that the regime represented "true Islam" and the avoidance of politics. Some groups, such as The Islamic Youth, which was a becoming a force on high school and university campuses, continued to rail against the regime (Munson, 1993). The largest Islamic political group, the Islamic Charitable

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[14] My lower class Moroccan acquaintances frequently displayed apathy towards politics because they felt powerless to change anything. When I asked them their opinions about political matters they usually would politely switch the topic or tell me that Morocco was not like the United States and that a king was appropriate for their country. Most also viewed Islam in turns of its religious obligations (prayer, fasting, abstaining from alcohol, etc.) and not as a solution to Morocco's political and economic woes. These matters are either in the hands of God or beyond their control.

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Association, was led by a former government employee, Ahmed Yassin, who sent the king

a letter detailing his unislamic actions and his abuses of power (Yasin, 1974).

Subsequently, he was sent to a psychological hospital and many of his activists were

arrested or fled the country. As is the case in the other countries under consideration,

these groups are a product of economic stagnation, a rapidly changing and modernizing

society, urbanization, authoritarian government, and resentment caused by the unequal

distribution of wealth. Many of the members, again, are from the lower middle class and

are educated new arrivals to the city.

It has appeared, at several points in the last 20 years, that the monarchy was at the

brink of being toppled. Approximately every five years, there have been large

demonstrations in the poor quarters of one of Morocco's large cities in response to

announced cuts in government subsidies, unemployment, corruption, or general social

malaise. The government then responded with force and things returned to normal.[15]

Islamic activists usually participated in these demonstrations and Islamic slogans were

shouted. However, it is widely accepted that the demonstrations were not organized by

the Islamists but, rather, were spontaneous displays of rage by Morocco's underclass . It

should also be noted that Marxists and other groups were also present at the

demonstrations and that the violence was usually instigated by the military and police. In

short, these protests cannot be seen as organized militant Islamic insurrections (Munson,

1993).

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[15] I spoke to several Moroccans and foreigners who were in Fez during the 1990 riots in which a luxury hotel and several other buildings were burned down. They all told me that the day after the military had restored order, life remarkably returned to normal as if nothing had happened. Several members of the elite told me that it was necessary to let the lower classes blow off steam every now and then.

The Moroccan political system remains, for the most part, stable and static. The last major disturbances were nationwide protests in 1991 against Morocco's participation on the side of Kuwait in the Gulf War. The king, however, permitted these demonstrations, expressed his sympathy for the Iraqi people, and has called for the lifting of the sanctions against Iraq. The civil war in neighboring Algeria has further weakened the popularity of militant Islam as most Moroccans fear that the rise of Islamic political groups in their country could lead to the same widespread violence and anarchy. An overwhelming majority of the Moroccans I spoke with are not willing to sacrifice peace and stability for an Islamic revolution. The monarchy continues to benefit from the Sahara issue as the army has consolidated its hold on the Western Sahara and most Moroccans still emphatically support its integration with Morocco.

It appears that political Islam in Morocco is almost entirely the domain of King Hassan II and the government. The *'ulama* are highly supportive of the monarchy and, as is the case in the other countries being considered, frequently issue *fatwa* supporting the regime's policies (Munson, 1986). The appointment of *imam* to mosques is controlled by the Ministry of Religion, all Friday sermons are reviewed by government inspectors, and mosques are closed during the day to prevent them from becoming centers of opposition politics. Finally, the king has taken steps to insure that the regime is in touch with the "Islamic pulse" of the country by training Ministry of the Interior officials in Islamic law, advising the *'ulama* to be up to date on contemporary issues, and creating a council of religious leaders to advise the regime (Entelis, 1989). The state owned television channel also broadcasts a number of programs that provide answers to viewers questions

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regarding Islam or that feature *'ulama* giving sermons. Finally, leaders of Islamic political groups are co-opted. Many former members now spread the message as teachers in the nation's public schools (Eikleman, 1987).

Contextual Factors

The Moroccan government is plagued with many of the typical problems relating to development and modernization. The country's population has more than doubled since independence and roughly 40% of its inhabitants are under 18. Providing jobs for this rapidly growing population is a Herculean task. As mentioned, estimates of Morocco's unemployment rate range from 20% to 30%. At the same time, a large segment of Morocco's rural poor have moved to the city creating Casablanca's infamous *Bidonvilles*. A government's inability to provide for its citizens has been factor that has been associated with the rise of radical Islam in other countries. In Morocco, this dilemma is particularly severe as it has also suffered from a stagnant economy since independence. Unlike Saudi Arabia, or even Tunisia, there is little reason to support the status-quo because most citizens' material needs are not being provided for.

Morocco's relative poverty and large national debt have forced the government to cutback on subsidies and social program to please the IMF and World Bank. There is almost no government safety net for the poor, while a small, wealthy, and privileged class exploits an unlimited supply of cheap labor. Education, at the same time, has rapidly expanded and the country's illiteracy rate, although still over 50%, is rapidly falling. In addition, low cost higher education is producing far more college graduates than the economy can absorb. As in other Middle East and North African countries, Moroccan college campuses are political hotbeds with active Islamic political groups. Consequently,

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it would appear that the social and economic conditions in Morocco are ripe for Islamic insurgency as the country remains poor, corruption is widespread, a generation of college graduates remain unemployed, and the government appears to serve only the interest of the elite.

These economic and social difficulties are alleviated by several factors. First, Morocco has never really experienced a period of rapid growth and rising aspirations. This contrasts to the oil booms in Saudi Arabia and Algeria and the doubling of the size of the Iranian economy during the ten year period prior to the overthrow of the Shah. Poor Moroccans have never really experienced raised expectations and hopes for significant improvement in their personal fortunes. Most lower and middle class Moroccans I spoke with had resigned themselves to their current conditions. Also, some find employment in Europe as roughly one million Moroccans work abroad. However, in recent years, the demand for guest workers in Europe and the Persian Gulf countries has decreased.

Morocco's enduring poverty and the lack of a government safety net have produced a strong self reliant ethic. Many unemployed Moroccans in their late teens and twenties simply live with their families. I encountered an infinite number of Moroccan families with single adult children living at home. Many poor Moroccans also earn a living in unofficial sectors such as selling goods on the streets, providing "services" to tourists, and as day laborers. Most lower class males are too busy trying to survive to concern themselves with political matters. This might not be the case if the government had a comprehensive welfare system. Also, begging is not frowned upon as it is in the United States and many indigent survive on handouts from fellow citizens. Finally, because jobs

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are so scarce, those that hold them do not want to jeopardize them through association with outlawed political groups.

Illiteracy and isolation, as is the case in Egypt, also help to maintain support for the regime. Again, the half of Morocco's population that has not yet benefited from education is politically inactive as they have not developed a sense that they can influence their futures. Outside of a small elite, the rural sector is also unconcerned with matters relating to politics and national affairs (Entelis, 1989). Consequently, it is no surprise that the government, in recent years, has implemented a policy of limiting migration to urban areas. As will be discussed, the Islam practiced in rural areas focuses on saint worship and superstition and does not have an activist political agenda (Gellner, 1981). Finally, the spread of modern education has meant that more citizens learn about the benevolence of the monarchy and that the Islam propagated by the government is true Islam.

A final contextual factor that has limited the influence of radical Islamic groups is that Morocco does not have an established radical tradition. Morocco's colonial occupation was quite short (50 years), relatively benevolent (when compared with that of neighboring Algeria or Egypt), and ended without a prolonged struggle. The monarchy, as discussed, remained intact and the primary opposition party, the *Istiqlal* was traditionally oriented and rooted in Islam. In addition:

- Morocco has never experienced a successful coup or change in the form of government that would have raised the expectations of the population.
- In contrast to the other countries under consideration, Morocco (along with Jordan and Saudi Arabia) has not gone through a period of Arab Socialism or secular based government, which did not deliver representative government but did offend the sensibilities of the population.

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- All of Morocco's radical secular parties have either been disbanded or been co-opted into supporting the monarchy.

- The 35 year tenure of Hassan II and the 400 year reign of the *Alawi* family have led many Moroccans to fear the consequences of change.[16]

- Moroccan political culture is historically conservative and Moroccans tend to be weary of bold action. In short, there is strong sense of mutual distrust and fear that antagonizing someone will lead to catastrophic retribution[17]

Regime Strength

It should now be evident that the regime of King Hassan II is in control of

Morocco's political system. To review:

- The king weakened the political parities by causing internal fragmentation and creating a number of small parties that were all beholden to him.

- All opposition figures who posed a threat to the regime have either "disappeared" or were co-opted through the granting of positions in the government or the private sector.

- A thirty year reign has allowed Hassan II to establish an aura of invincibility. Among traditional Moroccans, which translates into his rule being blessed by God (*Baraka*). Among more educated Moroccans this translates into a resigned acceptance that the benefits of supporting the system outweigh the costs of falling from favor.

- The royal family owns approximately 40% of the private sector giving it further control over Moroccan society.

- The Green March, the subsequent war in the Sahara, and the current campaign to gain international support for Morocco's control of the region have deflected attention from economic stagnation, social malaise, and authoritarian government.

- The king is also given credit for obtaining a high profile for Morocco in international affairs through mediating conflicts in the Arab and Muslim worlds, serving as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West, and playing a role in bringing a just resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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[16] I found a consensus, even among the educated, that the current regime is preferable to other options such as a military takeover, an Islamic revolution, or even true democracy.

[17] For an in depth discussion regarding the historical development of Moroccan political culture, Waterbury (1970).

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It is also important to reiterate that the king has been, for the most part, successful in portraying himself as an Islamic ruler that is in tune with the Moroccan "Muslim Consensus" (Entelis, 1989). The traditionally oriented lower class and uneducated segments of society accept the religiosity of the monarchy. The more Westernized and secularized segments of Moroccan society support the king's propagation of a moderate Islam that is tolerant of the less observant. As many Moroccans informed me, the king appears to have a finger on the pulse of Moroccan society and political culture.[18] The Moroccan religious establishment is firmly controlled by the monarchy and contributes to legitimizing the religious authenticity of the royal family. Finally, radical and extremist Islam does not appear to jibe with Morocco's political culture.

The military has been the most difficult crucial sector to control. As mentioned, two coups were launched from the air force in 1970 and 1971 and a third was preempted in 1981. Hassan II responded by decentralizing power in the military and diversifying the composition of the Berber dominated armed forces and called on the elite families to encourage their sons to choose a career in the military. He also took a stronger role in the affairs of the armed forces and later turned control over to the crown prince, Sidi Mohammed. Finally, economic opportunities were provided to officers through land grants and shares of businesses in the private sector (Zartman, 1987). The status of the military has risen as it has been increasingly successful in the Western Sahara.

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[18] A Moroccan friend who would like to see a more open democracy put it best. "Although I do not agree with our form of government and everything it (the king) does, he really is one of us. He represents what our culture stands for."

The Islamic Opposition

Neo-Traditional. Three significant Islamic political groups have operated in Morocco. The first was the loosely organized followers of Sheik Al-Zamzani, a Tangier preacher. The group posed the least significant threat to the monarchy as Al-Zamzami preached a **Neo-Traditional** Islam. This orientation is more concerned with the proper performance of ritual and preventing Western influences from entering Islam than political revolutions. Al-Zamzami (1979) did rail against excessive wealth, corruption, and the neglect of the poor, which could be taken as criticism of the monarchy. However, he was careful not to directly criticize the king and called for the reforming of individuals rather than society. Al-Zamzami was popular with members of the lower middle class, such as shopkeepers and laborers (Munson, 1993). Again, this segment of Moroccan society is largely apolitical. Al-Zamzami's censure by leaders of more radical groups and his not being arrested by the regime are telling signs that he was not a threat to the political order. Finally, his influence declined after his death in 1989 despite his sons efforts to maintain the movement.

Radical. Two **Radical** groups are known to exist in Morocco.[19] The first is the *Jihad al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Revolution) led by Abd Al-Karim Muti. Muti's (1980) ideology is typical of the radical strain. Morocco was in a state of decline because it had strayed from Islam. The king was to blame because it was he who encouraged Westernization, modernization, and secularization. Islamic Revolution did not become a

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[19] There are also a number of small secretive Islamic cells across the country, particularly on university and high school campuses. I tried, unsuccessfully, for nine months to get in touch with the members of such a group that was said to exist at the university in Fez.

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significant force as Muti was forced to flee the country in 1979. Since then, its membership has been limited because of fragmentation and government repression. Many of its constituents have drifted to legal Islamic study groups and clubs. Some even tried to gain recognition as a political party (Tozy, 1989).

The Islamic Justice and Benevolence Society has been Morocco's strongest radical Islamic political group. Its leader, Sheik Yasin (1974), as mentioned, sent the king a 90 page letter criticizing his abuse of power, luxurious lifestyle, and Western tendencies. Once again, his writings and speeches are based around the central theme that society is decline because the country has turned away from Islam. Yasin (1982) wrote that all Western influences must be driven from the country, the monarchy should be dissolved, and wealth should be equally distributed. Yasin also made it clear that he was against democracy, would ban all political parties, and that government would be in the hands of "men of God" (Yasin, 1982). The appeal of the Islamic Benevolence Society, like Islamic Revolution, is limited by government repression. Yasin, after being released from the mental institution has been under house arrest and banned from printing.

Several factors limit the appeal of radical groups in Morocco.

1. They are out of tune with Morocco's moderate and tolerant political culture.
2. Their violent nature is particularly unattractive given the events that are unfolding in neighboring Algeria.
3. Most Moroccans believe that the current regime is sufficiently Islamic.
4. There are legal Islamic revivalist organizations that focus on personal reform and education.
5. The Neo-Traditional Islam of a majority of Moroccans is apolitical. Hence, the government funds societies and festival which honor local saints.

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However, there is a growing class of Moroccans who are frustrated with authoritarianism and economic stagnation. Under these conditions, there is always the potential for radical solutions to win favor.

Supporting Cleavages

The fortunes of Islamic political groups in Morocco have not been supplemented by exploitable ethnic, regional, class, or sectarian cleavages. The primary **ethnic** cleavage in Morocco is the Arab-Berber division. Although the *Alawi* family and a majority of the "500 families" are of Arab dissent, a significant Berber nationalist movement does not exist. Once of Morocco's important post-independence political parties the *Mouvment Populaire* was founded by Berbers. However, it has a socialist orientation and has always supported the monarchy. Four factors limit the appeal of radical Islam in the Berber community.

1. Since the arrival of the Arabs in Morocco, there has been significant mixing of the populations. Thus, ethnic based appeals from Islamic groups have little appeal.

2. The Berbers who left the countryside have done well in the city as they have come to dominate several economic sectors, such as neighborhood grocery stores.

3. Most Islamic radicals look down on the Berber practice of Islam, which has strong elements of saint worship and superstition.

4. The king, of course, has co-opted a majority of the Berber notables

    Sect is also not an important factor in Morocco is the Muslim population is almost

exclusively *Sunni*. The country's remaining Jewish population (approximately 8000) is not large enough to be pose a threat to the overwhelming Muslim majority. In fact, most Moroccans are proud of the king's benevolent protection of Morocco's Jews. However, given the residual anti-Semitism that exists in Morocco, this might not have been the case

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if most of Morocco's Jewish population had not departed for Israel, Europe and North Africa. Their historical presence has strengthened the tolerant nature of Moroccan culture.

Regional favoritism, in spite of the distinct nature of Morocco's localities and enduring regional rivalries, is also not a divisive factor in Moroccan politics. The last outlying area, the Rif, to rebel against central authority was pacified in the early 1950s. The government, in the last 10 years, has granted more power to elected local councils and provincial authorities. This decentralizing tendency has opened new channels for political participation and allowed for the expression of regional variation. Consequently, Islamic political groups, in contrast to Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, do not have a strong hold on a particular region.

Class anger, as has been true in the other countries being considered, has fueled the forces of radical Islam in Morocco. A majority of the members of Islamic political groups originate in Morocco's urban lower middle class. One of their primary grievances is unequal distribution of wealth and the exploitation of the masses by a small elite. The luxurious lifestyle of the royal family in a poor country is a sore point with many Moroccans.[20] However, this factor, as has been argued, does not guarantee the success of radical Islam. If so, Islamic political groups would rule in all of the countries being considered. In addition, many Moroccans feel that the king **should** live better than the rest of society.

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[20] A good example of this resentment is the 400 million dollar mosque the king built in Casablanca to commemorate himself.

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The Future of Islamic Monarchies

Little has changed in Moroccan and Saudi politics. The Sauds survived the Gulf War and, as has been par for the course, made cosmetic changes in response to the calls for reform from Western oriented elites and religious groups. King Hassan remains firmly in control of Morocco's political system and also makes minor adjustments when change is demanded. In 1990, he created a Ministry of Human Rights in response to both domestic and international criticism of Morocco's human rights record. In 1994-1995, he was involved in negotiations to form a new government and, in the Spring of 1995, he shuffled the cabinet and removed the highly unpopular Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri. The Saudis continue to enforce a rigid, traditional and puritanical Islam. When the *'ulama* and other conservatives agitate, they clamp down on women, foreigners and unislamic behavior. Official Islam in Morocco remains diverse and tolerant.

The future of Islam and politics remains tied to political culture and important non-religious variables. Most likely, they day of reckoning in Saudi Arabia will come when declining oil revenues or the depletion of the oil reserves cause a significant decline in the standard of living. Given Saudi Arabia's history, society, and culture, it is likely that the Saud family will be replaced by another traditional and rigid Islamic based regime. The open question is whether it will be a more democratic regime. The event that will play a large role in defining Morocco's future is the end of the reign of King Hassan II. Although he has been grooming the crown prince for the throne, this might be the moment when disgruntled actors take action. The unknown factor in this transition is particularly significant because the last transfer of power was in the early 1960s. Poor performance or

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the complete abuse of power by Sidi Mohammed could also lead to insurrection. Morocco could go in any of a number of directions ranging from military rule, to Islamic government, to democracy. Given Morocco's relatively well developed democratic institutions, mixed political culture, and ethic of tolerance, the last option is viable.

The cases of Morocco and Saudi Arabia have provided further evidence against the proposition that Islam is incompatible with democracy and that it is the source of abusive government. I have shown that factors relating to history, societal structure, demography, geography, and wealth have led to an authoritarian and puritanical Islamic monarchy in Saudi Arabia. A different set of conditions related to these variables has produced an Islamic monarchy in Morocco that permits limited democracy, encourages tolerance, and accepts Western influences with little difficulty. True, Islam plays a strong role in supporting and legitimizing authoritarian rule family in both countries. However, it will most likely be an Islamic political group in Saudi Arabia that might install a more democratic form of government. In Morocco, an Islamic monarchy coexists with democratic institutions and, some day, may truly share power with them. The differences between political Islam in Morocco and Saudi Arabia are evidence against the monolithic view of political Islam. As stated in the introduction and illustrated in this chapter, with the exception of their monarchies, the political systems of Morocco and Saudi Arabia have little in common.

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CHAPTER 7

ALGERIA AND IRAN

Radical Islam

The cases of Iran and Algeria seem to provide the strongest evidence of Islam's

incompatibility with democracy and its association with turmoil and extremism. The

Iranian Revolution brought an Islamic regime to power that has repressed political

discourse and behavior that falls outside of proper "Islamic" parameters, eliminated its

opponents, worked to spread radical Islam, and supported terrorism. The rise of Islamic

political groups in Algeria and their victory in local and parliamentary elections threw the

country into a catastrophic civil that still rages. Iran and Algeria (along with the Sudan)

have caused political Islam to be labeled a dangerous and regressive force. An important

objective to be achieved in this chapter is to discover how Algeria and Iran differ from the

six other countries under consideration according to the variables relating to history,

regime strength, regime strategy, economics, demographics, development, supporting

cleavages, and the nature of Islamic opposition groups.

Regime strength and strategies for dealing with Islamic opposition, again, will be a

central focus. A related task is to investigate the extent to which the secular regimes of

the Shah of Iran and the FLN in Algeria are responsible for their own demise and the

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radicalization of political Islam. The Shah ruthlessly repressed the Iranian clergy and attempted to marginalize Islam's role in Iranian society to an extent that was unacceptable to most Iranians. The Algerian civil war was instigated by the military's seizing control of the government, outlawing of the Islamic Salvation Front, arrest of the FIS's leadership, and nullification of the results of the fair and democratic elections that had brought the FIS to power. In short, the victory of radical Islam may be a result of regimes selecting the wrong strategy for dealing with political Islam.

It is important to note that Iran is more democratic today than it was under the Shah and that the opening of the Algerian political system in the late 1980's and early 1990s was associated with the rise of political Islam. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss the nature of the Pahlavi regime in Iran and the FLN regime in Algeria, the rise of political Islam in both countries, and the interplay between government and opposition when the Islamic oppositions challenged secular authoritarianism. The key interval in Iran was the 1970s up to the Iranian revolution and the subsequent return of the Ayatollah Khomeini. In Algeria, I will focus on the period beginning in the late 1980s leading up to the army's intervention in 1992, which resulted in the end of Algeria's experiment with democracy. Finally, it will also be important to consider changes in the nature of political Islam in Iran after the death of the Ayatollah, the end of the war with Iraq, and the maturing of the revolution. I will also discuss what transpired during the brief period when the FIS controlled a majority of Algeria's local and regional governments and its role in the ongoing civil war.

Algeria

The Disruptive Influence of French Occupation

The ambivalent relationship between Islam and politics in contemporary Algeria has its roots in the 130 year French occupation. Unlike the French protectorate in Morocco, which left Moroccan culture and society largely intact, the French occupation of Algeria was total and devastating. The attempted integration of Algeria with the motherland necessitated a policy of transforming it into a Westernized francophone society. Also, the indigenous population became second class citizens to the hundreds of thousands of French who settled in Algeria. The result of French rule was that traditional cohesive units such as the family, local community, Islam, tribe, and ethnic groups were weakened or eradicated (Waltz, 1994). Some of the specific consequences were:

- French replaced Arabic as the country's official language and became the language of business, government and the elite. This served to cut off several generations of Algerians from their cultural heritage. The imposition of a foreign language and culture also alienated many Algerians from France and the West.

- The French fought the influence of rural Islam as its focus on saint worship and superstition inhibited the Frenchifying of the population. This furthered the sense of anomie among traditional Algerians

- A large portion of fertile agricultural land was expropriated for the French settlers which forced native Algerians to migrate to the city. The native population, in general, was moved about to serve the economic needs of the French. It is estimated that 1/3 of the populations was relocated during the colonial period.

- Associations such as political parties, labor unions, and other organization that threatened French interests were banned.

- The French played on regional rivalries and the Arab/Berber divide and mixed competing tribes and ethnic groups in political units to pacify the country. These fractures continue to affect Algerian politics and society today.

- The eight year war of liberation against the French served to radicalize Algerian politics, raise expectations for post-independence Algeria, and sharpen the divide between native Arab/Muslim culture and Western/secular culture.

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An important consequence of France's anti-Arab and anti-Muslim policies was to intertwine these two identities with Algerian nationalism (Reudy,1994). One of the first groups to organize in opposition to French occupation was the Association of Algerian *'Ulama.* which stressed cultural authenticity as a means of fighting the French. The major nationalist movement, the FLN (National Liberation Front) also played on Islamic themes and used Islamic terminology to rally opposition to the French. Because of the overriding objectives of driving out the French and gaining independence, the FLN served as an umbrella organization (primarily military in nature), which included factions spanning the ideological spectrum from Marxism to Islamism (Jackson, 1977). However, after these goals were achieved, the FLN became the country's sole legal political party and it adopted a secular based Arab socialist/Arab nationalist orientation.

The first twenty years of Algeria's existence was a period of state and national identity building. The second President, Houari Boumidienne, implemented socialist, state centered policies, such as the collectivizing of agriculture and the development of heavy industry. Under Boumidienne's charismatic leadership, Algeria served as a model of a progressive, developing, non-aligned country. At the same time, Islam was brought under the control of the state authorities and, as in Egypt, efforts were made to convince the population that socialism and Islam were compatible (Entelis, 1988). Algeria, unlike Egypt, did not have a reputable institution, such as Al-Azhar, or a cadre of trained clergy. At one point, the government even brought in a notable Egyptian *'alim* to lead the newly founded Islamic seminary and serve as a spokesman for the government (Vatin,1982). In short, the government's Islamic legitimacy and credibility has always been questionable.

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Boumidienne's regime remained largely unchallenged from external sources as the

novelty of independence, the process of state building, the country's prominent role in the

non-aligned and Arab-Socialist movements, and the President's personal popularity served

to maintain support for the government (Jackson, 1977). Also, the country's economy

enjoyed a period of growth as the world hydrocarbon market was in a boom period.

However, after Boumidienne died in 1978, the weakness of the government and fractures

in Algerian society became evident.

- The military remained the true power in politics as both Boumidienne and his successor, Chadli Bendjedid, were career army men. At the same time, opposition outside the FLN was repressed, independent associations such as trade unions were banned, and the press was heavily censored.

- Both the agricultural collectives and the heavy industry developed under Boumidienne failed as the country began to import food during the 1980s and the industries produced goods which could not compete internationally and were of little use domestically.

- The FLN remained ideologically vacuous and factional infighting preventing effective governance. Corruption was also widespread and personal interests took precedence over public policy.

- The government's Arabization policy led to a sharp cleavage between those who spoke French and those who did not. Despite the fact that all official documents were in Arabic, French remained the elite language. Those who were educated after independence spoke only Arabic and were served by a terrible public school system. Soon this language cleavage transformed into a division with lower class, Arabic speaking, traditionally oriented Algerians on one side and middle-upper class, French speaking , secular oriented Algerians on the other.

- The government began to falter in providing key services such as water, health care, employment and housing

Political Islam Rises To Fill the Void

Most Algerians, given the preceding, were skeptical and cynical about their

government and political system in the years following Chadli Bendjedid's rise to power.

As has been the case in the other countries being considered, Islam became an appealing

solution to the country's growing malaise. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, signs of the growing strength of political Islam manifested itself in increased mosque attendance, the building of new mosques without government permission, and demonstrations by Islamic students on college campuses (Vatin, 1982). Again, the government attempted to tap into the growing Islamic sentiment and co-opt it as more Koranic schools were opened, religious education was introduced into the *lycees*, Friday replaced Sunday as the day of rest, and a return to a more traditionally oriented personal status code was considered (Vatin, 1982). It is important to note that, unlike, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco(and similar to Syria, and Tunisia) Islamic groups were not formed with the consent or assistance of the government but in opposition to it. The importance of this factor will be considered later.

Algeria's economic situation worsened throughout the 1980s as the price of hydrocarbons continued to plummet. It also became clear that the state controlled economy was inefficient and riddled with corruption. Consequently, Bendjedid put the country on a course of economic liberalization and privatization that resulted in rising prices, increased unemployment, a growing disparity between the haves and the have-nots, and resentment from mangers and technocrats who previously had been guaranteed employment. The Islamists were quick to capitalize on the growing despair and blamed the government for the mess because it had turned from Islam and towards the Western values of consumerism, individualism, and secularism (Hermassi, 1994). At the same time, Islamic groups, with funding from Saudi Arabia, began to step in and provide welfare, health care, and other social services.

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The disenchantment of a growing segment of the Algerian population was exhibited in frequent riots and demonstrations. Tensions also arose between Berbers and the Islamists. Algerian Berbers are secular oriented and saw the Islamic groups as attempting to enforce an Arabic/Islamic hegemony over the country (Duran, 1992). Bendjedid, like Mubarak, King Hussein, and Ben Ali saw opening the political system as away to relieve the pressure that was coming from below and as a way of consolidating control over the unruly FLN (Entelis, 1994). As would be expected, the party's old-guard, the bureaucracy, and the military disapproved of economic liberalization because it weakened their own power.[1] Within three years, Algeria was to go from a one-party authoritarian state to an open multi-party democracy. An Islamic political group, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was to be a key player in this transformation

The Transition to Democracy

The process of major reform began in 1988 following major rioting in Algiers and other cities against unemployment and a corrupt and repressive political system. The Islamists played an important role in the demonstrations and many of their activists were among the 500 dead and 300 arrested (Entelis, 1992). It was then that Bendjedid decided to take a conciliatory stand, met with several opposition preachers, and promised to move the state toward an Islamic moral foundation. On November 8, 1988, voters approved an amendment to the constitution separating the government from the FLN and, in the ensuing months, the cabinet was reshuffled to include many reformers. In 1989, additional amendments were passed creating a multi-party system and protecting free press, freedom of speech, and freedom of organization.

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[1] High ranking officers in the Algerian military often moved into important political positions.

The FIS and several other Islamic parties formed in 1989 to compete in the 1990 municipal elections. Although formed in opposition to the government, the FIS adhered to a policy of non-violence and the achievement of an Islamic state through democracy. Many of its followers were protesting economic decline and the corruption of the FLN but a majority supported the return to Islamic values and the implementation of *Sharia*. The meteoric growth of the FIS was a result of its networks of neighborhood mosques, which were outside the control of the Ministry of Religion. Their preachers railed against the government, and, as mentioned, they also provided social services and welfare when the government became incapable of doing so (Roberts, 1992). Consequently, the 1990 elections for local and regional council took shape as a contest between the FLN and the FIS.[2]

The elections resulted in a stunning victory for the FIS as it gained 53% of the vote and control of over half of the councils including the major cities of Algiers, Oran, and Constatine. The FIS's record as the party in power was mixed as it focused on problem solving and quality of life issues in some areas but also attempted to enact strict Islamic behavior codes in others (Entelis, 1992, 1994). Bendjedid than announced that two stage national legislative elections would be held in the summer of 1991. Riots, however, followed as the FIS protested the electoral laws, which favored the rural areas where the FLN support was strongest. They also called for Bendjedid's resignation and presidential elections. After a state of emergency was declared for the army to restore order, the elections were held. The FIS won another overwhelming victory in the first

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[2] Secular opposition parties were slow to form as most key secular opposition leaders had been "eliminated" or fled the country. The now legal socialist party, the Socialist Forces Front, boycotted the elections.

round gaining 188 out of 430 seats and would have gained a majority in the second round.[3]

The army, after Bendjedid had entered talks with the FIS regarding power sharing, forced the president to resign and nullified the results of the elections. A High Security Council was setup and a leader of the provisional government during the war of independence , Mohammed Boudiaf, was brought back to serve as President after 28 years in exile in Morocco. The military than turned on the FIS and arrested its leaders, Dr. Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, and 500 other activists. The suspension of the constitution was followed by violent rioting. Since 1992, the country has been engaged in a catastrophic civil war pitting the Islamic groups against the army. The FIS has been involved in the war but, at the same time, has offered to negotiate an end to the violence. An extremist splinter faction, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), has vowed to fight until the government falls and it has assassinated government officials, civilians, foreigners, entertainers, journalist, and other purveyors of secular culture (Waltz, 1994).

It is important to emphasize that it was not the FIS or other Islamic groups that terminated the democratic process but, rather, the military. The FIS had been an eager participant in the democratic process from the start and did not turn to insurrection until after it was outlawed and the military canceled the second round of elections. True, Islamic groups had demonstrated and protested in 1991 but, this was in response to unfair election rules which favored the FLN. The FIS also stated that it did not want to compel people to practice Islam by law and that individual observance was a personal decision. Its

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[3] The FLN won only 15 seats and the Berber dominated FFS won 25. The second round was for runoffs in districts where no candidate had achieved a majority.

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leader, Abbasi Al-Madanni called for moderation and told Algerians that the rights of all citizens would be respected under an FIS led government (Entelis, 1992). Therefore, it is difficult to blame the termination of Algeria's brief democratic interlude on the FIS. My analysis of the relationship between Islam and politics in contemporary Algeria will focus on two questions.

1. What factors led Bendjedid to open Algeria's political system and seek accommodation with the FIS?
2. Why did this experiment end in failure?

Contextual Factors

Problems related to the economy and modernization had a strong influence on Bendjedid's decision to open the political system because the widespread discontent in Algerian society in the 1980s was partly due to the country's declining economy. As mentioned, the agricultural sector had been disrupted by French colonization and Boumidienne's collectives. Consequently, the government was forced to spend revenues importing food. Shortages, however, still existed. In addition, the cost of Algerian food products was inflated by the high salaries paid in the agricultural sector, which were intended to stop migration to the cities. Algeria, like Morocco, has a 20%-30% unemployment rate, which was rising because of privatization (Reuddy, 1994). This rapid population growth has led to overcrowded cities. Urban areas, despite the attempt to keep people in the countryside, have large concentrations of unemployed young males, many of whom have become members of the FIS and other Islamic groups (Labat, 1994).

Bendjedid was also left to deal with the failed heavy industries of the Boumidienne era. Closing the factories deepened the unemployment problem and alienated the FLN

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cadres who managed them. The factories, however, were an economic drain that the state could no longer support. The decrease of hydrocarbon prices from $40 per barrel to $10 per barrel also cut into government revenues. The FIS boosted its credibility when it stepped in to provide food, services, and welfare when the government could not (Roberts, 1992). Bendjedid's solution to Algeria's economic woes, privatization, isolated him from his party and strengthened the FIS. As mentioned, the old guard of the FLN, the bloated bureaucracy, and the mangers in the state industry all benefited from statism and socialism and, consequently, resisted reform.

Bendjedid, given the party's reluctance to accept economic change, was forced to weaken the FLN's grip on power. Bendjedid decided to go to a multi-party system which would make him the powerbroker over the competing parties. The disunity and infighting resulting from Bendjedid's policies, however, hurt the FLN's ability to mount effective campaigns in the 1990 and 1991 elections (Entelis, 1992, 1994). Although Bendjedid, ironically, was trying to transform Algeria into a competitive market economy, he, as a result of his association with the FLN, was blamed for its past failures and the growing pains of change(Entelis, 1992, 1994). The FIS also supported economic liberalization, which influenced Bendjedid's desire to bring it into legitimate politics. At the same time, the increasing gap between rich and poor, which was partly caused by privatization, was political hay for the FIS. It claimed that this gap was a result of government corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency. Naturally, a party based on Islamic morals and values would not fall subject to these practices (Entelis, 1992, 1994).

Bendjedid may have erred in opening the political system at a time when the economy was in decline and economic change was already shaking the foundations of Algerian society. The current politics of Russia and other Eastern Europe countries are further evidence that it is difficult for a fledgling democracy to support the change from socialism to capitalism. In Russia, the "fundamentalist" solution is to go back to hard line Soviet communism, in Algeria it is to return to Islam. It is important to emphasize the influence that the French occupation and the War of Independence had on Algeria. The French, as mentioned, destroyed or weakened most of the traditional structures, such as rural Islam, family, and tribe, which provide comfort (and still exist in Morocco) during periods of rapid change. Their exacerbation of tribal and ethnic cleavages helped prevent a sense of national identity and unity. Finally, the long, arduous, and costly revolution raised hopes and aspirations for post-independence Algeria. The FLN's failure to deliver fostered cynicism, skepticism, and contempt, which led many voters to the FIS. This ambivalence also explains why there was little surprise or opposition when the army ended democracy.

Regime Strength

The move to multi-party democracy, as was the case in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, was a result of a weakening political order. In addition to the problems related to economic decline and modernization, Bendjedid also had to deal with a historically fractured and ineffective party, the FLN.

- The FLN's monopoly on Algerian politics meant that it was an umbrella for a wide range of ideological orientations. Hence, it never presented a clear and coherent plan of governance to the Algerian people.
- These factions were constantly in conflict, which led to clandestine power plays and personal interests taking precedence over public policy.

- Because the FLN was tied to the military, the bureaucracy, and other government institutions, favoritism, corruption and other abuses of power were widespread as there was no check on authority.
- The intertwining of the FLN with the army has translated into the military being the real powerbroker in Algerian politics. Two Algerian presidents have been removed through soft glove coups.

The power of the Algerian presidency, in short, lies in the individual rather than institutions (Waltz, 1994). Boumidienne was a strong president because of his charismatic personality, the continued spirit of independence, a booming economy, and his leadership of the state building process. Bendjedid took office in a period of economic decline and had to deal with the failed statist policies that he inherited from Boumidienne. Later, Bendjedid became the victim of the public's realization that the promises of development and equality born in the revolution had not been kept. At the same time, Algeria's status in world affairs declined with the demise of the Arab-Socialist and Non-Aligned movements. At odds with his own party, a weak Bendjedid had to bring newcomers into the political system in order to shore up his regime. He, however, was not strong enough to maintain control of the new system.

Bendjedid had no choice but to seek an accommodation with the FIS and other Islamic groups because there was no viable secular opposition. Although the FIS agreed with Bendjedid's economic policies, used primarily non-violent methods, and supported democracy, the president was taking a risk. In contrast to Egypt and Jordan, the Islamic groups were not co-opted by the regime nor were they dependent on it for their continued existence. Consequently, there was no mutual understanding are regime defined "rules of the game." In Egypt and Jordan, clear parameters were set for the Muslim Brotherhood to enter legitimate politics. The FIS would have been free to change the rules because it

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was in no way beholden to the man who brought it into the political system.[4] The prospect of the FIS in control of the country was a risk that the military could not chance and a frightening prospect to many Algerians.

Bendjedid also made the mistake of miscalculating his own strength as he thought that the FLN would prevail in multi-party elections. Given the lack of viable secular opposition parties, Bendjedid believed that most Algerians would pick the old standby (FLN) out of fear of a FIS dominated government (Entelis, 1992, 1994). Consequently, his main election strategy was to warn Algerians that extremism would result from a FIS victory. His own party, however, did not offer a competing moral vision for the country and it was in a state of disunity. Of greatest importance, Bendjedid did not realize the contempt and disdain which a majority of Algerians felt toward the FLN (Entelis, 1992, 1994). Hence, the overwhelming FIS victory and the army's decision to intervene.

The rapid transition to democracy was also problematic. Algeria, as mentioned, went from a one party authoritarian regime to a multi-party democracy in less than two years. The military, the FLN, the FIS, and other groups were not given sufficient time to adjust to the new arrangements and there was no trust and confidence building period where elites develop a mutual interest in building democracy. The lack of a unifying institution, such as the monarchy in Jordan, to oversee the transition left the country facing a complete unknown after the 1991 elections. Algeria also did not have the cohesive society and the strong national identity that are necessary to alleviate the tensions caused by political competition. Consequently, the military resumed its role as the ultimate

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[4] The FIS, most likely, would have had the 2/3 majority necessary to change the constitution (had the second round of elections taken place as scheduled).

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arbitrator of the country's political system when democracy steered the country toward an unknown path. In summary, Bendjedid was too weak to rule by himself but not strong enough to share power with a group that was not controlled or trusted by the army.

The Islamic Groups

The strength and ideology of the primary Islamic political group in Algeria, the FIS, helps explain both Algeria's move towards democracy and the subsequent military takeover. Two other Islamic parties, *Hammas* and *Al-Nahdah* also participated in the 1991 elections but were largely unsuccessful.[5] The FIS resembles the FLN in that it is a front composed of groups representing diverse ideological orientations[6]. One faction sought to inject Islam into the current government, others saw the system as unreformable, and a third faction called for a focus on reforming individuals. The broad scope of the FIS is symbolized by its two leaders, Ali Belhaj and Abassi Al-Madani. Belhaj (1988) is of a more **Radical** bent and has stated the FIS, if victorious, would not maintain Western style democracy and would implement strict Islamic law. He has also justified the use of violence to achieve Islamic government . Madanni (1989), a **Modernist**, preaches moderation, a slow transition to Islamic government, continuation of democracy, and spreading Islamic values through proselytizing rather than coercion.

The behavior of the FIS also reflected its simultaneous use of hard-line and soft-line approaches. It did organize as a political party and supported the democratic process. However, the FIS's creation resulted from the 1988 riots and it took to the streets in 1991 and confronted with the military when it wanted a change in the electoral laws. As

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[5] Both are moderate and remain legal. *Hammas* has no ties to its Palestinian namesake.

[6] For an in depth analysis of the primary ideological groupings in the FIS, see Labat (1994)

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mentioned, the FIS's record in power when it controlled a majority of the country's local and regional power was also mixed. Hence, the military and the rest of the country really did not know what to expect when the FIS was on the verge of controlling the National Assembly. The contradictory ways of the FIS continued after the state of emergency was declared and the civil war began as it has been engaged in the violence. However, the Islamists claim that they are only defending themselves and have called for a negotiated end to the conflict. The FIS's reputation has also been tarnished by the assassination of citizens, government officials, and foreigners by splinter extremist groups such as the GIA.

It is likely that Bendjedid would have preferred a more reliable opposition. However, the strength and size of the FIS forced the former president to include it in legitimate politics despite a constitutional ban on religious parties. The FIS's core constituency was the lower middle class that was falling behind as a result of the opening of the economy. The young men had received a poor education in the country's substandard schools and found advancement to better jobs difficult because they did not speak French (Labat, 1994). The anti-government, anti-Western, and anti secular tirades of Belhaj struck a resonant cord with this group. University students who faced uncertain futures and saw a corrupt government controlling channels for advancement were also well represented in the FIS. Many voters, however, simply chose the FIS as a protest against the FLN. In all, the FIS's constituency was large enough to insure its inclusion in legitimate politics (Labat, 1994)

The meteoric rise of the FIS was facilitated by the government's weak Islamic credentials. As mentioned, Islam's importance to the FLN was as a cultural heritage more than a spiritual force, certainly not a guide for governance (Jackson, 1977). The FLN was also tarnished by its socialist past and did not have any deeply rooted Islamic institutions, such as the monarchy or Al-Azhar to rest upon. In short, the mantle of the defender of Islam was up for grabs. Because, religion was not a crucial legitimating factor for the Bendjedid regime (unlike the monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco), an independent religious force was tolerable. It was also hoped that the inclusion of the FIS in the government **as a junior partner** would make democracy acceptable to religious Algerians. Also, banning the FIS would have led to widespread violence (as it eventually did) and delegitmized the elections. Bendjedid, therefore, had to chance it with the ideologically and tactically two headed FIS.

Supporting Cleavages

The initial rise and subsequent collapse of democracy in Algeria was also influenced by societal divisions that deepened the religious/secular divide. Although Algeria is almost exclusively Sunni Muslim, ethnic, class, and linguistic cleavages have exacerbated tensions between the FIS, the government, and the Berber population.

Ethnic. The Arab/Berber cleavage falls along the fault line between religious and secular.[7] Ironically, both groups were among the first to protest for more representative government. The Berbers practice a less rigid Islam and view the FIS as trying to enforce an Arab/Muslim cultural identity upon them. They also resent the government's

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[7] Again, **religious** and **secular** are relative terms as most Berbers remain believing Muslims.

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Arabization program and feel that their culture is subject to official persecution. The Islamists, in turn, see the Berbers as untrue Muslims. There have been several riots on university campuses between Berber and Islamic groups (Vatin, 1982). This cleavage also has a **regional** dimension as the Berbers are concentrated in the Qabliyah region. The Berbers voted overwhelmingly for the socialist FFS and there was talk of secession in these areas if the FIS was allowed to lead the government. The Berbers viewed the military intervention as being preferable to a Bendjedid/FIS dominated government.

Class/Linguistic. The significance of language in Algerian politics. should now be clear. As mentioned, a divide developed between those who spoke French and those who only spoke Arabic. This gap also separated the well educated from the poorly educated and, to some extent, the rich from the poor. The Arabic speaking, Algerian educated lower classes viewed the upper class French speakers as serving the interests of the West and exploiting the poor. Although the government sponsored Arabization, the FIS was able to direct this anger at the FLN. The FIS, in general, was able to portray itself as the vanguard of Arab/Muslim/Algerian culture. In other words, **the Islamists** now embodied the values of the revolution. In contrast, the FLN had become corrupt, too Westernized, and represented only the elite. This societal fracture pushed many of Algeria's downtrodden and unemployed to demonstrate and support the FIS.

Iran

A Case of Poor Leadership

Iran is the case that appears to refute my argument that Islam does not hinder democracy or facilitate brutal and repressive political systems. However, after I outline the

events that led to the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979 and consider the factors that led to

the transformation to Islamic government, it should be clear that it was a combination of

influences, such as declining regime strength, economic malaise, rapid modernization, a

charismatic opposition leader, and the mobilization of the lower classes, that facilitated

the excesses of the regime of the Ayatollahs. Some of these conditions did not exist in the

other countries discussed while others were more severe in Iran. The keys, however, to

understanding what went wrong in Iran are the Shah's poor record in governing, the many

mistakes he made while in power, and his failure to establish legitimacy.

The weakness of the Pahlavi "dynasty" and the Mohammed Shah regime can be

traced to their establishments.[8] Reza Shah, a former military officer, took power through a

gradual coup that resulted in the abrogation of the 1906 constitution and the termination

of democracy. Reza Shah than began the process of modernizing of Iran's infrastructure

and administration. As an adherent of Ataturk, Reza Shah also set out to weaken the

influence of Islam and the independent power of the clergy. He, however, was forced to

abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammed, by occupying British and Soviet forces when he

began to court Nazi Germany. Following World War II, the nationalist prime minister,

Mohammed Mossadeq, asserted himself at the expense of the young Shah and nationalized

the British owned oil industry in 1951. This led to a military coup, which was

orchestrated by the CIA, that removed Mossadeq and put Mohammed Shah in full control

of the government. Hence, both the Pahlavi dynasty and the Mohammed Shah regime

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[8] Although the 2500 year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy was lavishly celebrated by the Shah in 1971, the Pahlavi dynasty dated back only to 1926 and includes only Mohammed and Reza Shah.

came to power without the support of the population and it the expense of more representative governments.

The Shah's dependence on outside forces for his ascension to the throne and the removal of the popular Mossadeq tarnished his legitimacy from the beginning (Arjomound, 1988). This contrasts with Ibn Saud, who unified Saudi Arabia by leading military campaigns and forming an alliance with the *Wahhabi*. Also, the Shah's (from this point, unless noted, I will be referring to Mohammed) rise to power when the dynasty was still in its infancy meant that his reign was not ingrained in the country's psyche, as is the case with Hassan II in Morocco. Finally, because Iran had not been occupied by a European power or the Ottomans, the Pahlavis were faced with the task of building a modern nation state. They, however, erred in mounting a frontal attack on both Iran's religious establishment and its Islamic based political culture.

The continued existence of monarchies, as discussed, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco is dependent on their ruling families' utilization of Islam as a legitimating factor. The Pahlavis, in contrast, decided that *Shia* Islam was a regressive force that was hindering the development of a modern society. Consequently, they chose to emphasize an Iranian nationalism that connected to pre-Islamic Persia and ignored 1000 years of Iranian history (Afkami, 1988). This was an offense to most Iranians who saw *Shia* Islam as the cornerstone of their culture and national identity.[9] Ironically, the Iranian clergy supported the coup against Mossadeq because they were concerned about his socialist leanings.

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[9] Iran is the largest *Shia* majority country and, its adherence to *Shia* Islam, along with the Persian language and ethnic identity, have separated it from its *Sunni* Arab neighbors.

However, after the Shah felt that he was firmly established in power, he resumed his father's campaign of rapid modernization and, concurrently, secularization.

The first major clash between the Shah and the *ulama* resulted from his "White Revolution," a modernization campaign, which was to cause Iran to catch up with countries, such as Japan, by the turn of the century. The *ulama* strongly objected to provisions that gave voting rights to women and minorities and that instituted a massive land reform program. The former flew in the face of Islamic tradition and the latter directly hurt the clergy as Iranian religious leaders held large tracts of land which they used to support their religious institutions and seminary students (Tabari, 1983). It is important to note that the clergy in Iranian *Shia* Islam, in contrast to *Sunni ulama*, have traditionally resisted control by the state. Rather, they tend to operate as an opposition force and pressure the government against policies that hurt their interests or are against Islam.[10] Eventually, after adamant opposition by the Ayatollah Khomeini and a period of demonstrations, the Shah proceeded with the entire White Revolution including the provisions opposed by the *ulama*. From that point, the Shah waged a battle against the influence of Islam and the clergy, which included expelling Khomeini to Iraq, where he continued to vehemently oppose the regime and lead the call for revolution..

Land reform was intended to break the power of the rural aristocracy and the *ulama* and to gain support among the peasants. However, collectivization and the failure

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[10]The *Shia* contend that the Twelfth *Imam* disappeared from the earthly ream and is in hiding. Until then, no government can be deemed truly Islamic. Hence, they have accepted secular rule as long as Islamic principles and *Sharia* are followed. This contrasts to the *Sunni ulama* who generally tended to sanction whoever was in power and were part of the state apparatus. Also, the resistance of the caliph Hussein and his followers to the majority in a dispute over Caliphal secession created a tradition of *Shia* martyrdom and opposition to unjust rule. For in-depth discussions of *Shia* Islam see Enayat (82), Watt (83), Algar (69), and Keddi (1983).

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of many peasants to make a living forced them to sell their land and move to the cities

(Green, 1983). The disheartened urban poor eventually became the backbone of the

revolution. Many other seeds of discontent were also planted during the 1960s.

- The regime developed a dependency on the United States as vast amounts were spent on American armaments and goods. Also, Americans flooded Iran to work in the oil industry, manage industries, and supervise the modernization process. This furthered the image of the Shah being a tool of American interests and replacing Iranian culture with Western culture.

- The government wasted large sums of money on unnecessary projects such as the development of heavy industries, the construction of a subway system in Tehran, and high tech weaponry.

- Multi-party democracy was terminated and, the Shah created "majority" and "loyal opposition" parties. At the same time, dissent was repressed, civil liberties were violated, and human rights abuses became common.

- The Shah attempted to modernize Islam by creating a "Religious Corps" and a Department of Religious Propaganda, which preached loyalty to the regime and the wisdom of the Shah's policies. At the same time, the government took control of the religious endowments (the *Vaqf*) from the clergy. The Shah frequently railed against the backwardness of the *'ulama* and their hindrance of progress.

- The Shah's pro-Israel stance and Iran's diplomatic relations with the Jewish state also alienated many Iranians, particularly Khomeini.

Social and Political Mobilization

An important consequence of the Shah's modernization campaign was the social

and, subsequent, political mobilization of a large segment of the population (Green, 1983).

Increased access to education and the media along with opportunities to travel and study

abroad helped many Iranians see the shortcomings of the Pahlavi regime. Two "Islamic

Marxist" groups, the *Fedayeen* and the *Mujahadeen* launched various bombings,

assassinations, and other acts of insurgency. The secret police, SAVAK, however, was

successful in infiltrating and weakening these groups. Iranian groups abroad also began to

organize and launched anti-Shah propaganda attacks in the West. Several intellectuals,

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most notably Ali Shariati (1971, 1976) ,Al-e Ahmad (1978), Mehdi Barzagan (1976), and

Abolhassan Bani- Sadr (1979), published works criticizing the Shah and called for a

remaking of society based on Iranian culture, Islam, egalitarianism, and social justice.[11]

The push of the intellectuals and the middle class for political reform intensified in

the 1970s. The Shah called for reform but resisted real change as the large and well

equipped Iranian army along with the wealth produced by the oil boom of the early 1970s,

created the false impression that the regime was on stable ground (Green, 1983). The

period from 1973 to 1975 was a time of amazing economic growth as the GNP rose by

32%, government expenditures nearly tripled, and oil revenues quadrupled from 4 billion

to 16 billion. This growth actually hurt the regime as:

- The Shah's refusal to control oil production gave the appearance that he was willing to sell off Iran's most important natural resource at a bargain price to please American and the West.

- The waste of resources during the 1960s on grandiose projects and the glorification of the Shah became even more distasteful as the inadequacy of basic infrastructure, such as water and electricity systems, became apparent. Given Iran's new wealth, this was intolerable to many Iranians.[12]

- The rapid growth of the economy also caused 41% inflation, which, of course, had the most adverse effect on the lower and lower-middle classes.

- The incoming wealth, for the most part, ended up in the hands of the wealthy and government officials as the gap widened between rich and poor.

The Shah's problems worsened in 1975 when the oil boom ended and the Iranian

economy fell into a rapid decline. By this time, the populations of major cities had tripled

and a large class of unemployed young men who had recently immigrated from rural areas

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[11] Hence the term "Islamic Marxists"

[12] The Shah's claim that Iran would soon overtake Sweden seemed ridiculous as Tehran was subject to regular blackouts in the early 1970s.

(largely because of the failed land reform scheme) began to show signs of disgruntlement. The intellectuals, the clergy, and a large segment of the middle class had already positioned themselves against the regime. However, these groups would have been satisfied with a return to the 1906 constitution, which called for a division of power between the monarchy and the parliament, democracy, respect for Islam's role in society, and civil liberties (Kamarava, 1990). It was at this point that the Shah's blundering proved to be fatal as the disheartened and disgruntled class did what it has yet to do in the other countries that have been considered-- **it became politicized and gave its active support to the opposition**.

The Fall of the Shah and the Rise of Khomeini

The Shah, following the economic downturn of 1975, committed a number of major errors. The first was his failure to appreciate the widespread discontent in his country. Up to 1977, he continued to attribute the growing unrest and turbulence to the previously mentioned "Islamic Marxist" organizations (Arjomound, 1988). In fact, these groups were relatively small and were largely controlled by the secret police. This led to his second error, the failure to begin the process of opening the political system and initiating real reform. As has been seen in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and (to a lesser extent) Tunisia, a move towards pluralization can strengthen an authoritarian regime. Instead, the Shah disbanded the puppet loyal and opposition parties and created a single party, the *Rastakhiz* (Resurgence). The *Rastakhiz*, however, was not a forum for free political expression and participation but, rather, it was an organization for propaganda and for mobilizing support for the regime (Salehi, 1988).

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The intellectuals, the middle class, and, increasingly, state employees easily saw through the scheme and became convinced that the Shah was unreformable.[13] A third mistake was the use of the *Rastakhiz*, in 1975, for a campaign against corruption and greed, which was mostly aimed at the shopkeepers and merchants of the Bazaar. The Bazaari merchants are traditionally oriented and have provided financial support to the *'ulama*. Consequently, many saw the anti-price gouging campaign as an attack on a group that opposed the Shah and an attempt to deflect the blame for Iran's economic woes (Graham, 1978). This sense of incompetence and scapegoating was furthered by the constant replacing of the prime minister and the cabinet from 1975-1977. A fourth mistake was the Shah's continued dependence on the United States as, by this time, the Shah was consulting with the American government before making major decisions (Bill, 1988). However, the unquestioned support given in the Nixon Doctrine was taken away by Carter as the Shah was becoming a liability,

Another costly error was the continued attack on the religious establishment, particularly the Ayatollah Khomeini. Some of the more revered religious leaders, such as Barzagan and Shariat'madari, maintained a moderate course and called for called for the Shah to institute reform (Kamarava, 1990). However, their position was weakened as the regime outlawed polygamy, raised the age of consent for marriage, gave women the right to sue for divorce, and switched from the Islamic calendar to the ancient Zoastrian calendar. Furthermore, the government paper published a blistering and slanderous attack on Khomeini that enhanced his status as leader of the opposition. Khomeini, since his

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[13] It is interesting to note that the *Rastakhiz* idea came from American educated political scientists who were familiar with the works of conservative development theorists such as Huntington and Apter (Greene, 1983).

exile, had remained steadfast in his campaign against the Shah, while others had sought accommodation. Also, the mysterious death of Khomeini's son was also blamed on the Shah. Finally, the Shah erred in requesting Iraq to expel Khomeini in 1978 as the Ayatollah went to Paris where he received the attention of the world media (Milani, 1988).

I do not have the space to detail the specific events that led to the fall of the Shah in 1978-1979. In short, after a year of demonstrations, strikes, protests, civil disobedience and sporadic acts of violence, the Shah got on a plane and left. For my purposes, the important aspect of the Iranian revolution was the mobilization of the urban lower classes and an overwhelming majority of the Iranian population. As has been discussed, this process, for varying reasons, failed to take place in the other countries being considered, with the possible exception of Algeria. The rapid disintegration of the seemingly invincible Pahlavi regime, which Jimmy Carter had called "an island of stability" one year before the Shah's departure, is a reminder of the importance of regime strength and decesionmaking. The fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini is also an important lesson in what happens when a leader attempts to separate a political system from its political culture.

Khomeini's eventual consolidation of power following the departure of the Shah was inevitable. He, as discussed, had emerged as the leader of the opposition, while in Paris, and was the only one who could mobilize the lower classes. In contrast, the liberals, the "Islamic Marxists," and the socialist groups appealed to limited segments of the population. First, the prime minister appointed by the Shah, Shapour Bakhtiar, was forced into hiding. The provisional government eventually fell under Khomeini's control, which was solidified by the war with Iraq in 1980 (Bakash, 1986) . Soon after, *Sharia* became

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the law of the land, minorities were persecuted, and rigid Islamic social codes were enforced. That, however, is not the end of the story as Iran began to transform itself and move towards a more participatory form of government after Khomeini's death.

Contextual Factors/Regime Strength

Modernization And The Economy. It is impossible to separate the influence of contextual factors and regime strength because so many of the Shah's policies related to modernization and the economy helped to cause his own downfall. As mentioned, the "White Revolution" planted the seeds of discontent in Iran. The land reform program led to massive migration to the cities and the expansion of the disinherited and disheartened class. This group had difficulty finding employment and was alienated by the Western values and cultures that were taking hold in Iran's cities. The mobilization of this class was crucial in bringing down the Shah and facilitating Khomeini's rise to power. Modernization and development in Iran also resulted in the wasting of revenue and resources on unnecessary projects, which made the Shah appear to be out of touch and interested only in self aggrandizement. At the same time, the regime could not deliver electricity and water, which tarnished its credibility with an already skeptical public.

Increased access to education, both in Iran and abroad, led to social mobilization and the subsequent demand for political participation. The university students in Iran and Iranians abroad were among first to organize in opposition to the Shah and call for reform. Ironically, many of the Iranians who were educated in order to fill the ranks of the bureaucracy and run Iran's modern industries, instead, turned on the regime and supported the opposition (Green, 1983). At the same time, many of the imported modern consumer goods, such as tape recorders and photocopy machines, were used by the opposition to

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stimulate countermobilization against the regime. In short, the Shah wrongly believed that modernization and economic development could take place without allowing citizens the opportunity for real political participation. Schemes such as the *Rastakhiz* further alienated the middle class and intellectuals.

The intertwining of modernization and Westernization was another policy that backfired as Iranians felt that the Shah was subverting Iranian culture and identity to those of the West. The banning of the of the veil in universities and the switch from the Islamic calendar were offensive to the sensibilities of most Iranians. Emphasizing the symbols of ancient Zoastria and Persia failed to weaken the bond that most Iranians maintained with Islam. The feeling of cultural alienation was exacerbated by Iran's close ties with the United States and the presence of a large number of Americans in the country. Of greatest importance, these anti-Islamic policies and the regime's constant attacks on the *'ulama* mobilized the clergy and their allies against the regime. The *'ulama*, in turn, preached against the Shah in the mosques and seminaries. It is easy to see the contrast between the Shah and the kings of Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia who, while modernizing, have emphasized Islamic values.

The Shah's mishandling of the oil boom and the economy, particularly his failure to put the brakes on the rapidly expanding economy, also contributed to his downfall because of the resulting high inflation and unemployment, which had the most severe impact on the lower classes. The dependence on oil hurt the regime when the boom ended in 1975 because the government was forced to cutback on spending and the unemployment problem grew worse. At the same time many Iranians believed that Iran's oil production

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was secretly being controlled by the U.S. (Milani, 1988). Finally, a small group, members of the royal family, the military, international businessmen, and foreigners, led extravagant lifestyles while the average Iranian was struggling. Again, an Islamist, the Ayatollah Khomeini, offered the turning away from religion as the source of this corruption, abuse, and an unequal distribution of wealth. The religiously oriented disinherited class was receptive to Islam as the solution.

Legitimacy and Support. The Shah had little leeway in dealing with the strains caused by modernization, the economy, and his own bungling of these matters because the Pahlavis had never established legitimacy or developed a solid base of support. The Shah, as mentioned, was brought to power by the British and Soviets and kept there by the CIA in 1953. The suspicion that the ruling family was beholden to outside forces and its lack of populist appeal is said to have made to Shah insecure and disdainful of his own people (Saikal, 1980). This would explain his dependence on the United States for aid and council, which was fine when American support was absolute. However, when the U.S. began to call for reform and its support the Shah wavered, the opposition intensified its campaign because it believed that it had the Americans' tacit support. At the same time, the Shah vacillated and felt abandoned by his old friends (Bill, 1988).

It was the Pahlavi's search for legitimacy and support that led both Reza and Mohammed to modernize and secularize. Both, through modernization, hoped to weaken antagonistic groups such as the clergy, the merchants of the Bazaar, and the rural landholders and create new cadres of supporters. As mentioned, Mohammed's land reform program was intended to win over the peasantry. The modernization strategy backfired as

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the only group that still supported the Shah at the end was the military. The Bazaaris and the clergy maintained their traditional alliance with the former providing the financial support for the later's campaign against the Shah. Ultimately, most of the peasants moved to the city and turned on the regime. Three important "modern" groups, the new middle class, the intellectuals, and the state employees, also defected to the opposition when it became clear that the Shah was not going to initiate serious reform. Unfortunately, these less religious groups threw their lots in with Khomeini figuring that they would end up on top after the revolution (Bakaash, 1986). They, too, made a fatal strategic error.

The military, eventually, also abandoned the Shah as the soldiers, who were trained to fight foreign armies, refused to fire on fellow citizens and defected in large numbers (Arjomound, 1988). Had the Shah acknowledged the new elites and permitted autonomous institutions, such as parties, unions, and private businesses, to develop, he might have cultivated a group with a vested interest in the system. If he had been more cautious in trampling on Islamic sentiments and reached out to moderate clergy, such as Shariat'madari, he might have isolated more extremist elements like Khomeini. King Hassan II and King Hussein, who seem to have learned from the Shah's downfall, provide good contrasts. Iran's Islamic revolution was more a result of one man's poor political judgment and another man's character than a mass desire for a rigid, orthodox Islamic government. This will become clear after the discussion of the Islamic opposition.

The Islamic Opposition

The structure of the Islamic opposition in Iran differed from those in the other countries under consideration because of the independent nature of the clergy in *Shia* Islam. In Iran, the *'ulama* remained outside of government control and received most of

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their funding from private sources. As a result, they have served as a sort of independent pressure group on Iranian regimes (Tabari, 1982). Following the announcement of the White Revolution, the subsequent raid on the Ayatollah Khomeini's seminary in Qom, and the Shah's attacks on Islam and the clergy, the *'ulama* felt that their interests were seriously threatened. Although there is a hierarchy in the Iranian religious establishment, variations exist in the political leanings of the highest ranking *'ulama*. In addition, there were intellectuals outside of the clergy, such as Shariati, who were also offering Islamic based ideologies to mobilize opposition to the Shah. However, outside of the "Islamic Marxist" groups, there were no large organized opposition movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, I will focus on the ideas and followers of key personalities.

Islamic Marxists. This group is best represented by the previously mentioned *Mujahadeen* and *Fedayeen*. These organizations were composed of students and other intellectuals who sought to synthesize Islam and socialism. This type of thought is best represented in the works of Ali Shariati, who studied in Paris and was well versed in Marxist thought. Shariati (1979) emphasized the egalitarian ethic in Islam (the community of believers) and *Shia* Islam's historical role in fighting tyranny. Given that Shariati and his followers called for a synthesis of Marxism and Islam, the two forces that the Shah detested the most, accommodation was neither possible or necessary as the power of the *Fedayeen* and *Mujahadeen* was limited by their small numbers and SAVAK's success in infiltrating these groups. Shariati was, however, quite influential in intellectual circles and taught his ideas at an educational institution, *Hosseini- ye Ershad*, which was eventually closed by the government. The writings and ideas of Shariati, along with Ahmad (1961),

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Barzagan (1976), and Bani-Sadr (1979) are credited with stimulating opposition to the Shah in the early 1970s and winning support for the institution of Islamic government. Eventually, these groups, which supported Khomeini during the revolution, fell out of favor when they criticized the increasingly absolute nature of his rule.

Moderates. There were moderate elements in the Iranian religious hierarchy. Most notable among this group was the Ayatollah Shariat'madari. Like Khomeini, he was a *marj'a taqlid*, one of the six highest ranking clergy in Iran. Although he frequently spoke out against the authoritarian and the abusive nature of the monarchy, he also called for support of the 1906 constitution. Unlike Khomeini, he did not think that the clergy should run the political system but, rather, they should pressure from the outside for adherence to *Sharia* and government by Islamic principles (Kamarava, 1990). During the unrest and revolution, he frequently spoke to the Western media and hinted that an Islamic Iran would not necessarily be hostile to the West. He and his supporters never gained significant public support because of the Shah's hostility to all religious forces. The cultivation of Shariat'madari and his followers, early on, could have given the regime religious credibility. However, the Shah's unyielding opposition to Islam drove most Iranians to support the more extremist Khomeini.

Khomeini. I have already discussed the genesis of Khomeini's opposition to the Shah in the White Revolution and the attack on his seminary in Qom. At first, he demanded that the Shah institute *Sharia* and Islamic government. However, following his expulsion, he called for a government let by a religious scholar (*viliyat al Faqih*) and the toppling of the regime. In his writings, the theme of cultural treason is quite prevalent as

the Shah is constantly portrayed as being a tool of the Americans and the Israelis (Khomeini, 1971). The Shah, as a result, had instituted policies that were detrimental to the bulk of the Iranian people and that were destroying the country's moral and social fabric. Khomeini's writings and speeches came back to Iran with his followers who visited him in Iraq. Ironically, his expulsion gave him the freedom to openly and vehemently criticize the regime without fear of retribution, which enhanced his credibility and brought him attention. As mentioned, the alleged murder of his son by SAVAK and his refusal to compromise his principles also won him respect.

Khomeini (1971), although explicit in his writings, was elusive in his proclamations about his plans for Iran after the Shah was gone. At some points, he hinted that he favored democracy and rights for women . However, he was intentionally vague so that he would not frighten the liberals and secular oriented opposition. The crucial factor that led to his rise to the symbolic leadership of the revolution was his ability to mobilize the lower-class through his supporters among the clergy in Iran. Many young lower-class men were not particularly observant but they were still deferent to the *'ulama* and strongly believed in the righteousness of Islam. In the Ayatollah, they saw a principled man who was willing to make sacrifices for the nation (Hoogland, 1980). Eventually, all groups involved in the revolution acknowledged Khomeini's leadership to expedite the departure of the Shah. However, the secular oriented groups, which had instigated the call for reform in the early 1970s, were outflanked after the Shah finally left. After suffering the abuses of the monarchy, they proceeded to suffer the abuses of the ayatollahs.

Supporting Cleavages

The outstanding feature of the Iranian Revolution was the opposition of almost all segments of society to the regime. The groups which originally opposed the Shah, the clergy, the Bazaari merchants, the intellectuals, and the liberals, were eventually joined by the urban lower class, the middle class, and even government employees. The Shah failed to establish a connection, with any segment of Iranian society, with the exception of the rural peasantry (a rapidly shrinking group). It is also important to note that the country's major minority ethnic groups, the Kurds and the Azarbijanis also supported the revolution. Even the *Sunni* and Arab minorities threw their lots in with the *Shia* dominated revolution. In short, all class, ethnic, regional, and sectarian cleavages became secondary to the cleavage between the Shah and the rest of the country. The Shah also suffered from the perception that he favored Iran's minuscule Bahai and Jewish minorities.

Islam and Democracy Since the Iranian Revolution and the Algerian Civil War

There is still hope for the coexistence of Islam and democracy in Algeria and Iran. The Algerian Civil War still rages on as of April 1996 with both the army and the Islamic militias resorting to random acts of violence. The main victims of the war are civilians who are frequently the casualties of indiscriminate shooting and bombing. The extremist GIA has targeted journalists, foreigners, entertainers, and government officials for assassination. Neither side appears to be close to obtaining victory, despite the army's claims to the contrary. A "National Dialogue Conference" in 1994 was boycotted by most opposition parties because the FIS was not invited. Presidential elections, however, took place in November, 1995 with two of the four candidates representing Islamic parties. The

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elections are reported to have been fair, although the FIS was, again, banned from

participating. The winner, Liamine Zeroual, who had been serving since being appointed

by the military in 1994, stated that he was committed to democracy and parliamentary

elections. It is doubtful, however, that Algeria's problems will be solved without the

inclusion of the FIS in the process of reconciliation.

Iran, in the last 10 years, has moved towards a more open political system, if not a

more liberal society. Parliamentary and presidential elections have taken place on a regular

basis since 1980 and, political parties are permitted if they "do not violate the

independence, sovereignty, unity and principles of the Islamic Republic." However,

candidates have yet to be allowed to declare partisan affiliation and no opposition parties

have been sanctioned.[14] Significant debate does occur in the Iranian parliament, which

usually pits the reformers, supported by President Hashemi Rafsanjani against a collection

of hard-liners. With the country's economy in shambles and a growing number of Iranians

chaffing under strict Islamic law, newspaper articles critical of the government have

begun to appear and citizens are increasingly free to speak their minds. In sum, Iran is a

more democratic country today than it was under the Shah.

Iran and Algeria do not support the notion that is Islam is conducive to arbitrary

government and cannot support democracy. An Islamic group, the FIS, in Algeria led the

call for democracy, participated in two sets of elections, and appeared to accept

democratic norms. The current civil war is a product of a turbulent history, a military that

is used to controlling the political system, a troubled economy, a miscalculation by Chadli

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[14] The government party, the Islamic Republican Party, was disbanded in 1987.

Bendjedid, and a divided society. Despite the military's annulment of the 1991 election results and the persecution of the FIS, the Islamists are still prepared to negotiate with the government. Democracy brought Algeria's political system closer to its political culture. If Algeria's government would have become more religious based than is acceptable to most Algerians, elections could have, again, restored the balance.

Iran's political system also was taken, by force, away from its political culture. This situation might also been resolved without a resort to extremism if it were not for the blundering of the Shah. His refusal to adapt Iran's political system to meet the needs of a rapidly modernizing society led many Iranians to the person who had the greatest potential to bring down the monarchy. The regime that took power after the Shah's departure was characterized by the zeal and extremism which often follow a costly revolution. In this case, the zeal and extremism were of an Islamic nature. In recent years, democracy has begun to take root and more pragmatic policies are being implemented. Iran and Algeria, however, both have a long way to go. At this point, it should be clear that Islam will not be the force that prevents these two troubled nations, along with the six other countries which have been considered, from developing free and open political systems. It is now time to test this assertion across a large number of cases.

CHAPTER 8

CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

Results of the Case Studies

The evidence provided in the previous four chapters strongly suggests that Islam does not hinder democracy or facilitate harsh, authoritarian government. This is not surprising given the ambiguous and amorphous nature of the discussion of government and economics in the basic sources of Islam and in the works of contemporary Islamic political theorists. Now it is time to examine Islam's influence on political systems and government policies across a broad sample of predominantly Muslim countries and to compare these Muslim countries with developing non-Muslim countries. In the following chapters, I will systematically investigate the relationship of Islam with democracy and human rights, while controlling for other influences. In this chapter, I will first summarize the factors identified in the case studies which were determined to have significant influences on political systems. The next task will be the operationalization of factors that can be reliably quantified. I will then outline the research design and methods to be used here and in Chapter Nine. Finally, I will develop and test hypotheses regarding Islam's affect on democracy.

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The factors that were found to influence the relationship between Islam and democracy in contemporary nation-states can be divided into six general categories.

1. **Historical** influences such as experience with colonial rule, a period of government enforced secularization, and the results of involvement in international conflict.

2. The strength of the **regime** in terms of its grip on the political system and society.

3. The regime's **strategy** for dealing with political Islam.

4. The strength and ideological orientation of **Islamic political groups**.

5. **Contextual Factors** relating to modernization, economics, and demographics.

6. The existence of politicized sectarian, ethnic, linguistic, or class **cleavages** which further the divide between secular oriented and religious oriented groups.

The first four of these categories cannot be reliably quantified because they deal with relatively abstract concepts, data are not readily available, or they cannot be on placed on an ordinal scale.[1] Consequently, I will briefly discuss the hypothesized influence of each of these unquantifiable factors and then discuss and operationalize variables from the last two categories.

History

      <u>Colonialism</u>. Radical Islam appears to be stronger in countries such as Algeria, Syria, and Egypt, which were subject to long, complete, and disruptive periods of colonial rule. In contrast, political Islam takes less of a defensive and extreme form in countries like Morocco and Tunisia where colonial rule was comparatively short, mild, and left society in tact. This difference in colonial experience manifests itself in three ways.

1. There is a stronger lingering hostility towards ideas attributed to the West (liberalism and democracy) and Westernized classes because of their association with the former colonial overlords.

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[1] It, for example, would be hard to come up with a scale to score how disruptive colonialism was in a particular country or to reliably judge the extent to which a regime is in control of a political system.

2. This hostility was sharpened because the systematic attack of the colonial rulers on Islam and tradition was more severe (in countries like Algeria) and more complete.

3. Higher expectations, which were rarely met, were placed on post-independence governments because more suffering and repression took place under colonial rule. As a result, extremist solutions to political, economic, and social woes are more appealing.

The lack of a period of colonial domination can also affect the contemporary relationship between Islam and politics. This was seen in the discussion of Saudi Arabia where the ascension to power of the *Nejdi* tribes, which had remained largely isolated from the outside world, over the more worldly *Hijazis* led to the enforcement of a more rigid and puritianical Islam. The absence of a period of colonial domination also meant that the Sauds, like the Pahlavis in Iran, had to complete most of the process of modernization. In both cases, the modernizing monarchs met with opposition from the *'ulama* and Islamic political groups. This conflict over modernization and, concurrently, the integration of ideas and technology from the West led to a radicalization of some religious elements.

International Conflict. Defeats in wars and other apparent humiliations in the international arena have also served to stimulate and radicalize political Islam. The resurgence of political Islam in Egypt (and much of the Arab world) was partly a result of that country's humiliating defeat in the Six Day War. Syria's siding with the Christians in Lebanon and its refusal to oppose Israeli forces in 1978 and 1982 was one of the major complaints of the Islamic Action Front. Finally, Islamic opposition groups in Saudi Arabia pointed to the military's poor performance in the Gulf War as proof of the ruling family's corruption and incompetence. On the other hand, military success can neutralize Islamic

opposition. A prime example of this tendency was Hassan II's use of the Green March and the subsequent occupation of the Western Sahara to rally support for the regime. Also, Sadat's "Islamification" of the "victory" over Israel in 1973 won him temporary favor with Islamic groups in Egypt.

Enforced Secularization. A period of government enforced secularization also serves to radicalize Islamic groups and weaken the possibility of accommodation. This was the case, to varying extents, in Iran, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, where government secularization campaigns led to the creation of Islamic political groups. In contrast, radical Islamic groups are weaker in Jordan and Morocco, where the monarchies and the political systems have remained firmly rooted in Islam. The conflict between uncompromising secular based regimes, such as the Shah's, and Islamic opposition groups rapidly becomes a zero sum game, which weakens the possibility of the regime opening the system to Islamic groups. Consequently, the opposition become more extreme and resort to violence. In contrast, some Islamic groups and *'ulama* in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have determined that utility may be gained from working within a system that is already somewhat Islamic. These actors are not fighting for a complete overhaul of government but, rather, reform. The same process also was beginning to unfold in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia where Islamic groups attempted to enter legitimate politics when leaders who were mindful of Islam replaced secularists.

Regime Strength

A second factor which shapes Islam's influence on political systems is a decline in the ability of authoritarian regimes to control their respective political systems and societies. This, to varying extents, was also the case in all of the countries considered in

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the case studies. In short, each regime faced, or is facing, a crisis of authoritarianism which

was caused by a number of reasons.

- Economic Malaise
- Defeat in War
- Failure to Provide Basic Services
- Denial of Civil Liberties

- Rapid Modernization
- Unemployment
- Dependence on the United States
- Corrupt and Inefficient Bureaucracy

The classes and segments of society which suffered the most from these problems and saw

the greatest threat to their way of living usually participated in the formation of Islamic

political groups. The weakened regimes were then faced with the dilemma of neutralizing

the Islamic opposition.

Regime Strategy

A crucial variable in explaining the relationship between Islam and political systems

is the strategies regimes utilized in dealing with the rise of political Islam and Islamic

political groups. I have summarized the strategies used by the regimes and their

consequences in **Table 8.1**.

TABLE 8.1
Regime Strategies and their Consequences

Country	Strategy	Result
Egypt	Accommodation/Repression	Minor Democratization
Jordan	Accommodation	Moderate Democratization
Syria	Violent Repression	Secular Authoritarianism
Tunisia	Accommodation/Repression	Minor Democratization
Saudi Arabia	Repression	Islamic Authoritarianism
Morocco	Co-optation/Repression	Moderate Democracy
Iran	Repression	Islamic Revolution/Moderate Democracy
Algeria	Accommodation/Repression	Democracy/Anarchy

It is clear that accommodation is usually associated with a move towards increased

democracy while repression leads to authoritarianism or violence. If permitting Islamic

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political groups to enter legitimate politics often leads to accommodation, why did some leaders chose to repress their Islamic oppositions?

1. Some regimes, as was the case in Syria and Tunisia, were still powerful enough to successfully resist the pressure of the Islamic opposition.

2. Leaders, such as the Shah of Iran, overestimated their own strength and undervalued the power of the Islamic movement.

3. Radical secularists, such as the Shah and Bourghiba, and Arab-Socialists, such as Nasser, and Assad, viewed Islam as incompatible with their political programs.

The preceding strongly suggests that political Islam is not a dark cloud that overwhelms society and that it does not hinder democracy. Islamic political groups are a response to specific sets of social, economic, and political conditions. Most Islamists want access to the political system and are receptive to offers of accommodation by regimes. Ironically, in Tunisia, Syria, and Algeria, Islamic political groups called for greater democracy and were repressed by secular oriented regimes.

Islamic Political Groups

Another factor that influences regime strategy is the nature of the Islamic political groups. The moderate/modernist nature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan supplied Anwar Sadat and King Hussien's with loyal Islamic oppositions which were brought into the political system to support the regime and to provide outlets for dissent. Also, regimes, in both Egypt and Jordan, helped in organizing and funding the Brotherhood. Finally, there was also a union of interests in supporting a market economy and countering the influence of radical groups. The FIS's acceptance of democratic norms and its desire for a market economy led Chadli Bendjedid to attempt to bring the Islamists into legitimate politics. The army, however, was unwilling to see if the FIS would, indeed, play by the rules.

I also determined that it was not the radical or extremist nature of the Islamic groups in Syria, Tunisia, and Iran which led political leaders in those countries to adopt a policy of confrontation. The case of *Al-Nahdah* in Tunisia is particularly telling as that group called for democracy and agreed to work for the implementation of Islamic law through teaching and propagation rather than violence. The Islamic Action Front in Syria also supported democracy and stated that the practice of Islam would be left to individual discretion and would not be enforced by the government. The problematic aspect of the platforms of the IAF, Islamic groups in Morocco, and the Ayatollah Khomeini was their desire to depose the existing leadership. These groups, however, moved to these extreme positions only after they became convinced that the regimes in power were unreformable. The real radical groups, which call for the immediate implementation of *Sharia* and which use violence have usually been marginal.

The last two groups of variables, cleavages and contextual factors, which affect Islam's influence on political systems are quantifiable. Consequently, I will discuss their hypothesized influence and operationalize them in the next section. By now it should be clear that the case studies have shown that Islam can be compatible with democracy and does not automatically facilitate harsh, authoritarian government. In order to test this assertion, I have developed an index of Islamic political culture which will be used to rank the extent to which Islamic political culture influences political systems in 23 predominately Muslim countries. If Islamic political culture does affect political systems, its varying influence on governments in predominately Muslim countries should explain variance in levels of democracy and protection of human rights and civil liberties. In order

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to provide further evidence that will disconfirm the "Islam is Everything" explanation, I

will control for other factors which influence the establishment of democracy.

Operationalization of Variables

Developing a Measure of Islamic Political Culture.

My primary objective in developing an indicator of Islamic political culture is to

capture the most important dimensions of contemporary Islamic ideology. Many

typologies which classify Islamic ideologies have been produced in recent years.[2] As

mentioned earlier, I will expand on William Shepard's (1986), which classifies Islamic

ideologies according to two characteristics, *comprehensiveness* and *authenticity*. The

independent variable representing the extent to which a political system is influenced by

Islamic political culture will combine these two dimensions. It is important to note that this

measure deals only with a country's political culture and not the extent of its religiosity or

adherence to Islam.

Comprehensiveness. (Shepard labels this "totalism.") This first dimension relates

to the extent to which Islamic law is followed. The implementation of *Sharia*, simply put,

is the foundation of Islamic government. Included in this dimension is not only Islamic

jurisprudence but, also, the use of the *Koran*, *Sunna*, and *Hadith* as the guiding principles

of governance. The importance of *Sharia* to Islamic government is best exemplified in the

claim of all of the theorists and ideologues who were considered for this project. Humans

can only reach their potential in a society guided by Islamic law. Adherence to *Sharia*,

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[2] For a discussion of these typologies, see Shepard (1986). In short, Shepard finds that most of the other typologies
focus on the same dimensions as his does.

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according to Muslim political theorists, is what separates Islamic governments from other governments. The coding of the *comprehensiveness* dimension will be based on the extent to which Sharia is used in the following legal spheres.

1. Issues of personal status such as marriage and divorce
2. The regulation of economic matters such as banking and business practices
3. Prescribed religious practice such as restrictions on women's clothing, alcohol, and other practices that are considered against Islam
4. The use of Islamic criminal law and punishment
5. The use of Islam as a guide for governance

Islamic law, in these areas, varies from Western secular based legal codes. Consequently, it is expected that the following of the principles of Islam and the implementation of *Sharia* should influence political systems and public policies. By looking at the constitutions of the countries in the sample and various texts which describe their political systems, I will determine the extent to which Islamic law is used in each of the five spheres. I will use a 0, 1, 2, 3 scale, where zero means Islamic law is not used and 3 means it is used exclusively. A nation's scores from each of the five spheres will be totaled and combined with its score from the second dimension.

Authenticity. (Shepard labels this dimension, "acceptance of Western ideas and sciences.") This dimension captures the extent to which, and how, a regime and its leaders are willing to accept ideas and technologies which originate outside of the Muslim world. This is also an important aspect of contemporary Islamic political culture because political Islam is viewed as a movement which seeks to return to traditional and indigenous doctrines and practices (Shepard, 1986). Consequently, the way in which a society accepts, rejects, or accommodates ideas, institutional frameworks, and technologies must

also be included in a measure of contemporary Islamic political culture. This, however, is

a more difficult concept to measure but, based on Shepard's description of authenticity, my

classification will utilize the following designations, which proceed on a scale from 0 to

15, according to the extent to which authenticity is required.

- 0-2. Non-authentic ideas, institutions and technologies are accepted without reference to Islam.

- 3-5. Non-authentic ideas, institutions, and technologies are utilized but are claimed to be compatible with Islam

- 6-8. Non-authentic ideas, institutions, and technologies are utilized but are claimed to be improved by Islam's spiritual components.

- 9-11. Non-authentic ideas, institutions, and technologies are utilized, but efforts are made to trace their roots in Islam.

- 12-15. A complete rejection of non-authentic ideas, technologies and institutions.

The assigning of three possible rankings within each grouping is intended to

account for the variance among countries placed in a specific category. Also, ideologies

and political cultures do not fit perfectly into the groupings. Regimes, such as Turkey's,

which almost completely accepts non-authentic ideas, institutions, and technologies would

receive a 1. In contrast, Senegal's government, which accepts some non-Islamic

institutions and technologies without reference to Islam but also claims that Islam is

compatible with Western ideologies would receive a 3 or a 4. Rankings will be based on

statements by the government leaders, texts on the political systems, constitutions, and

media reports.[3] In coding both dimensions, I also consulted with embassies and personal

contacts from the various countries included in the sample. Finally, I sent a survey to

members of the Middle East Studies Association in order to see the extent to which my

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[3] My primary media sources were Western as I relied heavily on FBIS. I also consulted a variety of newspapers, news magazines and journals from both the West and the countries being considered.

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rankings were replicated. For an in-depth discussion of this process and a copy of the coding sheet and instructions, see **Appendix I.**

Cleavages

Various cleavages, which exacerbate the divide between governments and Islamic opposition groups, were found to play a significant role in preventing accommodation and pluralization in several of the countries in the case studies. For example, sectarian, regional, and class cleavages all intensified the animosity between the Assad regime and the Islamic Action Front in Syria. It is likely that one of the causes of the turbulence in Algeria and the tranquillity in Morocco is the differing levels of ethnic based politicization of the Berbers. In Algeria, the Berbers are politicized as an ethnic group; in Morocco they, for the most part, are not. The importance of ethnicity's influence on democracy, in general, has been recognized in the growing body of literature on this topic.[4] An ethnic, sectarian, or linguistic cleavage will exist when more than **15%** of a country's population are members of a minority ethnic (Arab/Berber), sectarian (*Sunni/Shia*), or linguistic group. This cleavage must also be politicized and divide the regime from a significant opposition force. A simple **1/0** (presence of a cleavage/ absence of cleavage) dummy variable will be utilized.

Religious Minority

It was also found that the presence of a minority religion tends to radicalize political Islam. These minority religious groups are often seen as being the agents of the West (as they were often favored by the colonial powers) to undermine Islam (Lewis,

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[4] Interesting examples of works in the ethnicity and democracy literature are Lijpart (1977), Gurr (1994) and , Horowitz (1985).

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1992). The granting of equal civil and political rights to these groups can stimulate anger because Jews and Christians are second class citizens (*dhiminis*) in Islamic law while other religions are not recognized. Also, leaders of regimes and opposition groups often use minority religious groups as scapegoats for their countries' social and economic problems (Ansari, 1984). This was seen in the cases of the substantial Coptic population in Egypt and Jewish and Bahai populations in Iran. In contrast, the minuscule Jewish communities in Morocco and Tunisia do not stimulate the same fear and animosity. I will use **five percent** of a country's population (not including expatriates) as the minimum size for a religious minority. Once again a **1/0** (religious minority/no religious minority) dummy variable.

Contextual Factors Relating to the Economy

Wealth. The relationship between wealth and democracy was established in Lipsett's (1958) seminal piece on the social and economic foundations of democracy. In short, economic development is viewed as a prerequisite for the growth of democracy. It might be that poverty, rather than Islam, is the reason for authoritarian rule in predominantly Muslim countries because almost all are developing nations and most are poor as well. I will use GNP per capita as a measure of wealth because I am concerned with the fortunes of individuals. Supposedly, increasing personal wealth translates into individuals having the time and means to take an interest in politics. In addition to a continuous GNP variable, I will also separate the wealthiest countries (those whose GNP per capita is $8000 a year or greater) and poorest coutnries (those with a GNP per capita below $500 per year) with a dummy variables. It is important to remember that, in the case studies, I argued that it was Saudi Arabia's extreme wealth which facilitated the

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tolerance of authoritarian rule. The presence of other oil rich nations, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, in the sample for the statistical analysis could bias the results and cause the GNP variable to be insignificant.

I will also include an indicator measuring changes in rates of economic growth. In all of the countries considered in the case studies, rapid economic growth and decline were associated with the rise of political Islam. The boom and bust of the Iranian economy and the subsequent revolution is an excellent example of this pattern. Rapid growth and decline is often associated with inflation, a widening unequal distribution of wealth, unemployment, and dislocation, all of which are conducive to extremist politics. It is also difficult to establish democracy under these conditions, as was illustrated in the case of Algeria. To capture changes in growth, I will use the annual rate of growth/decline for the ten year periods preceding 1980 and 1990. All GNP data have been taken form the World Bank's *World Development Reports* and *Social Indicators of Development.*

Contextual Factors Related to Modernization
. The first generation of development theorists (e.g. Leaner, 1958; Rostow, 1959, 1971; Inkeles, 1973; Deutsch, 1962) predicted that modernization would lead to social mobilization, political mobilization, and, ultimately, democracy. The case studies illustrated a modernization process that causes disruption, turmoil, and controversy. It is logical, on the one hand, to expect that education, communication, travel, and other benefits of modern society would cause individuals to become politically active and demand a role in the running of society. However, the rapid change and dislocation which often result from modernization have also led people to look to religion for comfort. Very often, it is a form of political Islam that supports authoritarianism. On the other hand,

Islamic groups have led the recently socially and politically mobilized in the call for democracy. In short, modernization seems to both support and attack the establishment of democracy.

It is important to note that modernization has had the same disruptive effect on all developing nations, not just Islamic ones. The religious resurgence of the 1980s was felt world wide as rapid change took place in all societies (Keppel, 1994). Hence, it cannot be claimed that anti-modernization is unique or inherent to Islamic political culture. In other words, anti-modernization-- **a separate concept from anti-Westernism--** is not covered in the indicator of Islamic political culture. Hence, it is important to include variables which capture elements of the modernization process to see if they, independently, are affecting levels of democracy in the Islamic world. The measuring of development is a source of debate and controversy. For my purposes, I am looking for indicators that will capture both the social mobilization and the dislocation which result from development.

Literacy captures both the ability to absorb ideas and the potential to be socially mobilized. People who cannot read or write remain isolated from the rest of their society and the world around them. The large rural, illiterate class in Morocco and other countries support authoritarianism simply by being ambivalent to politics. Literacy enables an individual to realize that there are alternatives to authoritarianism and that he or she has the ability to have a say in determining his or her future. A second indicator, the average annual growth rate of urban areas over a decade, will represent the disruptive elements of modernization. It was the rapid growth of cities and the creation of the urban dispossessed

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and disheartened class that fueled the growth of Islamic political groups Data for both indicators are taken from the previously noted World Bank publications.

Democracy

Freedom House's seven point scale (seven represents the most democratic governments) for political rights will be used as the indicator for democracy. Their coding is based on 10 criteria which are common to democracies.[5] I have chosen Freedom House's measurement because it separates civil and political rights. Including civil rights in a definition of democracy adds a "liberal bias." In short, I do not feel that liberalism and democracy are one and the same. It is possible that there may be such a thing as Islamic democracy but not Islamic liberalism. Furthermore, the relationship between Islam and civil liberties will be evaluated in Chapter Nine.

TABLE 8.2
Summary of Variables and Indicators

Variable	Indicator	Source
Democracy	Political Rights	Freedom House
Islamic Political Culture	*Comprehensiveness + Authenticity*	developed by author based on Shepard's typology
Cleavages	Dummy Variable: cleavage = at least 15% of pop. and politicized	*World Almanac*, author's determination
Religious minority	Dummy Variable: religious minority = at lest 5% of pop.	*World Almanac*
Wealth	1. GNP per capita 2. Dummy Variable for wealthiest/spoorest nations	World Bank
Economic Growth/Decline	Change in GNP PC over 10 year period	World Bank
Social mobilization	Literacy rate	World Bank
Displacement	Change in urban % population	World Bank

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[5] These are election of the chief executive and legislators, fair election laws, all groups in the electorate have a voice in policy formation, existence of more than one legal political party, shifts in power through elections, significant opposition vote, government free of military control, all adults must be eligible to participate in politics, decentralized power, and opposition parties have a role in government.

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Research Design

Sample and Methods

The sample will include 23 countries with a significant Muslim majority (80% of the population), excluding the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. A list of countries is included in **Appendix II**. The regression analysis will include observations for each of the 23 countries for the years 1980 and 1990, which will provide me with 46 units of analysis. The first set of tests will be bivariate regressions using only the Islamic Political Culture variable. Then, I will add the other independent variables to demonstrate the importance of controlling for other influences. I will run a second series of regressions including a set of 23 non-Muslim developing nations, which were randomly selected from the World Bank's list of developing nations. The Islamic political culture score for these countries will obviously be **0**. Finally, I will see if there is a correlation between changes in the Islamic political culture score and changes in levels of democracy in the period between 1980 and 1990.

Hypotheses

Islam and Democracy. A significant body of evidence has been presented which suggests that Islam does not prevent democracy. At the same time, it cannot be assumed that Islam is conducive to democracy. I have shown that, in some countries, the rise of political Islam was associated with the growth of democracy. However, few of the Islamic countries can be considered a true democracy. Many political systems, such as Saudi Arabia's are clearly Islamic based and authoritarian. Consequently, it expected that Islamic political culture will not have a statistically significant relationship with democracy.

- *H_1 - Islamic political culture does not affect levels of democrat in predominately Muslim countries.*

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Cleavages and Democracy. The presence of ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic cleavages is expected to have a negative relationship with democracy. The existence of a minority religious group is also a factor that represses democracy.

- H_2 - *If country has a politicized sectarian, ethnic, or linguistic cleavage, its political system will be less democratic.*
- H_3 - *If a minority religious group exists in a country, its political system will be less democratic.*

Economic Conditions and Democracy. Following the logic of the Lipsett and other, wealth should be associated with democracy. However, in this sample, it might be that extreme wealth and poverty will hinder the development of representative government. Also, the dislocation caused by rapid economic change should act against the growth of democratic institutions.

- H_4 - *The greater a country's wealth, the more democratic it will be.*
- H_5 - *If a country is extremely wealthy, it will not be democratic.*
- H_6 - *If a country experiences rapid economic change, it will be less democratic.*

Modernization and Democracy. It is expected that the social mobilization aspect of modernization will facilitate democracy. At the same time, the process of development disrupts people's lives and society which pushes people towards political extremism.

- H_7 - *The greater the percentage of a country's population that is socially mobilized, the more democratic it will be.*
- H_8 - *The greater the disruption caused by the modernization process, the less democratic a country will be.*

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Alignment of Cases

The findings show that Islamic political culture does not have a significant affect on democracy. This insignificant relationship can be see seen clearly in **Figure 8.1**,[6] which shows a relatively random distribution of levels of democracy across the predominately Muslim nations. The most striking aspect of the alignment of the cases is the overall low level of democracy among the predominately Muslim countries as most of the democracy scores are clustered between one and four. It is also interesting to note that, although that four of the five most democratic political systems are predominately secular, the Islamic political culture scores for most of the least democratic countries range between 0 and 3. This supports my assertion that Islam must be allowed to play a role in government and politics if predominately Muslim countries are to be democratic. However, the "moderate" countries with Islamic political culture scores between six and fifteen also appear to be randomly distributed, which contradicts the notion of democratic competition between more religious and less religious groups. Rather, as was the case in Morocco, it is moderation that is propagated and enforced by the government. Finally, the presence of three of the six countries with the highest Islamic political culture scores at or above the mean democracy score (3) is evidence that Islam might facilitate democracy.

Figure 8.1

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[6] For a list of abbreviations and country names see **Appendix II**.

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Islam and Democracy

y = 3.758-0.072*x+eps

Bivariate Regressions

The regression results presented in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 also provide evidence of the insignificant relationship between Islam and democracy. **Table 8.3** includes the results of the bivariate regressions which include the only the "Islamic Political Culture" variable and which do not control for the influence of other factors. The "Islamic Political Culture" variable is insignificant at the .05 level in the sample of predominately Muslim countries. Therefore, even when other factors are not considered, Islamic political culture does not explain variations in levels of democracy among Muslim countries. However, when the matching sample of non-Muslim developing nations is added, the Islamic political culture variable becomes significant at the .02 level. This difference between Islamic and non-Islamic developing countries suggests the Islamic political culture is, indeed, an important influence on levels of democracy. However, the low adjusted R^2 statistic, .05, tells us that

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Islamic political culture only accounts for a very small part of the story of democracy in Islamic countries. This will become clear in the regressions when control variables representing other factors, which influence levels of democracy, are added.

TABLE 8.3
Bivariate Regression Results
Predominately Muslim Countries (N=46)

Variable	B/	Standard Error	Significance	Adjusted R²
Islamic Political Culture	-.07	.04	no	
Equation			no	.05

Entire Sample (N=92)

Islamic Political Culture	-.06	.03	.02	
Equation			.02	.05

Multivariate Regressions

The addition of variables representing wealth, economic growth, social mobilization, displacement, cleavages, and minority religions in **Table 8.4** caused the Islamic political culture variable to be insignificant both in the sample of predominately Muslim countries and the full sample. This supports the argument which I have been emphasizing throughout this dissertation. Low levels of democracy in the Islamic world are a result of factors which are not related to Islam. The fact that the variable representing Islamic political culture was insignificant across the full sample demonstrates that, in general, Islamic countries are no less democratic than other countries. This finding was substantiated by replacing the continous "Islamic Political Culture" variable with a dummy variable separating the Islamic countries from the rest of the countries in the sample. It, too, was insignificant.

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I also tested to see if there was a significant correlation between changes in the influence of Islamic political culture on political systems and changes in levels of democracy between 1980 and 1990. The correlation coefficient , although negative (-.24), was also insignificant. The question now becomes what does influence levels of democracy in developing Muslim countries? The low R^2 statistics for both the full sample and the predominately Muslim sample show that most of the factors which explain the slow emergence of democracy in Islamic countries are extraneous to the model. This, however, is not surprising given the importance of the influences related to history, regime strength, regime strategy, and Islamic groups, which were discussed in the case studies but could not reliably be quantified.

.   A noteworthy finding is the negative association of the "Percentage Change in GNP" variable with democracy. In fact, this was the only variable that was significant at the .05 level in both the full sample and the group of predominately Muslim countries. This finding was expected as almost all Muslim countries have developing economics and societies. The difficulty of sustaining democracy during periods of rapid economic change is illustrated by the current anarchy in Algeria, which went to a free market economy and then immediately opened its political system. Another interesting finding relates to wealth.[7] The variable representing the most wealthy countries was significant in the predominately Muslim sample but not the full sample. This, of course, is a result of the of the oil rich countries, which are all non-democratic and comprise about one-fifth of the Islamic

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[7] The variable representing wealth, GNP per capita, has been taken out of the analysis. It was shown to have a very high correlation with the variable representing extreme wealth. This is a sign of multicolliniarity which could distort the regression results. The GNP per capita variable was insignificant in the tests using both the full sample and the tests using only the predominately Muslim countries. As mentioned, this, most likely, was caused by a number of oil rich countries in the sample which are not democratic.

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countries. The influence of extreme wealth is weakened in the full sample with the addition

of non-oil producing wealthy counties, which are more democratic

Table 8.4
Multivariate Regression Results
Predominately Muslim Countries Only (N=46)

Variable	B	Standard Error	Significance	Adjusted R²
Islamic PC	-.02	.04	no	
Ethnic Cleavage	-.72	.55	no	
Minority Religion	-.75	.63	no	
Wealthiest nations	-1.56	.85	.07	
Poorest Nations	-.73	.73	no	
% Change in GNP	-.02	.01	.03	
Literacy	-.03	.02	no	
% change urban pop	-.10	.13	no	
Equation			.001	.30

Entire Sample (N=92)

Islamic PC	-.04	.03	no	
Ethnic Cleavage	-.60	.38	no	
Minority Religion	-.25	.40	no	
Wealthiest Nations	-.84	.58	no	
Poorest Nations	-.86	.44	.06	
% Change in GNP	-.02	.01	.01	
Literacy	-.01	.03	no	
% change urban pop	-.02	.02	no	
Equation			.001	.23

A surprising finding was the **negative** (but insignificant) association of literacy,

which is often thought of as a prerequisite for participation in politics, with democracy. It

is important to remember that Pakistan and Bangladesh, which have low literacy rates and

are somewhat democratic, contradict this assertion. This finding also supports elite

theories of democracy, which contend that democracy begins with a consensus among

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elites and eventually spreads to the rest of the populations. Under such conditions, mass literacy is not necessary for the expansion of opportunities for real political participation. At the same time, many leaders, such as the Shah and Bourghiba, saw social mobilization as a threat and tried to channel political participation into regime supporting activities rather than democracy.

The variable representing displacement, "Growth in Urban Population," was also insignificant (although negative). This was also not expected because I hypothesized that urbanization represents the disruption in people's lives that results from modernization. Consequently, this group would be expected to bring about political change or further government repression by causing turmoil. However, the large urban poor class, except in Iran and Algeria, has remained largely ambivalent to politics and has not been politically mobilized. It is also important to note that it was the leadership of educated elites that stimulating this class to action in those two countries rather than a spontaneous desire for political participation. The insignificance of the variables representing minority religions and supporting cleavages was also unexpected, given the importance of these factors in the case studies. It might be that these countries would not be democratic even if they had homogenous populations. However, it could be that ethnic cleavages and minority religions influence human rights practices, the subject of the next chapter.

Conclusion

The results of the statistical analysis in this chapter provide the final piece of evidence in support of my contention that Islam is not the cause of the lack of democracy in predominately Muslim countries.

- Variance in the influence of Islamic political culture on political systems in Muslim nations does not have a significant relationship with levels of democracy.

- Predominately Muslim nations are no less democratic than other developing nations.

- The appearance that Islamic countries are less democratic than other countries is a result of the failure to consider the influence of factors relating to history, regime strength, regime choice, economics, modernization, and the nature of Islamic political groups.

- Oil wealth and rapid economic change have been particularly potent influences on preventing democracy in the Islamic world.

These findings are, of course, tentative. Much has happened in the Islamic world since 1990. Another round of fair elections took place in Jordan, which saw the removal of the Islamic Brotherhood from power. Free elections took place in Yemen, which were followed by a civil war. Democracy continues to take root in Asian Islamic countries, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In short, the Islamic world, despite several setbacks, appears to be inching toward representative government. At the same time, evidence is also accumulating to support the notion that democracy helps to moderate Islamic political groups. This certainly has been true in Jordan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey and might have been the case if Islamic groups had not been forced from legitimate politics in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia. Given the preceding findings, we should spend less time thinking about whether Islam is compatible with democracy and focus on how to create conditions in Islamic countries which facilitate democracy.

The answer to the question of Islam and democracy remains unsettled because an important scenario, Islamic political groups gaining complete control of a government through democratic means, has yet to unfold. Will they then proceed to destroy the democratic institutions which facilitated their rise to power? Will they limit legitimate

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political participation to Muslims or to groups and individuals that support an Islamic state? What will happen to the rights of women and non-Muslims? This could result in the irony of Islamic political groups destroying the democracies which they have helped to create. Unfortunately, the Algerian army prevented the answering of these questions by nullifying the results of the 1991 elections and outlawing the FIS. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan demonstrated relative tolerance when it controlled the Jordanian parliament. Of greatest importance, it accepted its defeat in 1991 elections. It is important to remember that the Brotherhood's actions were constrained by King Hussein's dominance of the political system. In summary, I can only conclude that Islam does not hinder democracy. Its ability to facilitate representative government is still in question.

The negative reputation of political Islam is not solely based on the notion that it is anti-democratic. The irrational dark cloud view of political Islam also paints a picture of harsh and abusive government. Consequently, an investigation as to whether Islamic political culture influences how governments treat their citizens is necessary. It might be that, although Islam does not have a significant affect on political systems, it does influence government policies. A discussion of Islam and human rights is pertinent because this relationship is also being debated at the theoretical level and on an ad-hoc basis. Once again, cross-national comparison that controls for the influence of other factors and compares the human rights practices of predominately Muslim countries with those of other developing countries is needed. That will be the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 9

ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Another Case of Deceptive First Appearances?

The debate regarding Islam's influence on human rights policies is rapidly reaching

the same intensity as the debate on Islam's influence on democracy. Scholars are

examining the *Koran, Sunna, Hadith,* and *Sharia* to collect evidence as to whether Islam

can or cannot facilitate the protection of fundamental human rights. At the same time, they

are reading the works of modern Islamic political theorists and the various human rights

documents which have been produced in the Islamic world to see if they are compatible

with international human rights declarations. Finally, they are looking at the human rights

practices of various Islamic countries on an ad-hoc basis. As was the case with

democracy, the prognosis for Islam and human rights appears to be grim. The *Koran,*

again, is amorphous and can be interpreted to support a variety of positions. The *Sharia* is

troublesome, particularly in the areas of rights for women and non-Muslims. Islam, in

general, has been interpreted in way that stresses people's obligations to society rather

than their rights against government.

It still cannot be concluded that Islam influences human rights policies in

predominately Muslim countries as that would mean

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that culture has a significant affect on government policies. If Islam does not affect

political systems, as was demonstrated in the previous five chapters, why would it affect

public polices? It is also important to remember that, at face value, it appeared that Islam

cannot facilitate democracy. However, after rigorous analysis of this relationship across a

large sample of countries comparing Islamic developing countries to other countries and

which controlled for other factors, face values were proved to be deceiving. In this

chapter, I will investigate the relationship between Islam and human rights using the same

methodology that was employed in the last chapter. Once again, I will take a debate

regarding political Islam from the theoretical and ad-hoc levels to the empirical level.

First, I will look at the general role of culture in human rights. Then, I will briefly discuss

arguments regarding Islam's compatibility with human rights. Finally, I will test this

relationship across a large sample of Islamic and non-Islamic developing countries.

Culture and Human Rights

Cultural Relativism

The role of culture is an important issue for both practitioners and scholars in the

field of human rights. Practitioners are faced with the problem of accounting for local

cultures when drafting universal human rights documents. Saudi Arabia's refusal to sign

the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 was based on the claim that the

document violated Islamic law, which already guarantees human rights. Since then, there

has been an ongoing debate as to whether there are such things as universal human rights

(See Donnelly, 1989). For example, many Muslims claim that Islam emphasizes economic,

social, and collective rights while the West emphasizes political, civil, and individual rights

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(An-Naim, 1995). Consequently, several human rights schemes have been drafted in the Islamic world which vary significantly from international human rights documents. Two particular areas, women's rights and religious freedom, where there is disagreement between Islamic conceptions of human rights and those of the West, will be discussed later. I, however, will bypass these issues in the empirical analysis by using an indicator of human rights protection that measures rights which are seemingly universally accepted.

Another source of controversy regarding culture and human rights is the contention that universal human rights schemes are simply a ploy to strengthen the Western Christian world's dominance of the developing non-Christian countries (Tabadeh, 1970). This position has often been advocated by Iran when its human rights record has been criticized (See Mayer, 1991, pp. 10-11). Along the same lines, it is claimed that Western nations have committed a variety of human rights violations which are usually swept under the rug, while Muslim countries are publicly lambasted. Finally, Western criticism of the human rights practices is attributed to long-standing Western hostility to Islam (An-Naim, 1995). Adherents to this argument point to the West's condemnation of Saddam Hussein's human rights violations while it ignores those of Israel in the occupied territories. Furthermore, the West often ignores violations of the rights of Muslims under the control of non-Muslims in Bosnia and various countries in Western Europe. Cultural variations, in short, make it difficult to define human rights and to claim to study them objectively.

The Systematic Study of Human Rights

The dilemmas caused by the defining of universal human rights and cultural relativism help to explain the omission of culture from most cross-national studies of

human rights. Including variables representing various cultures exposes researchers to two type of criticism.

1. Singling out specific cultures or religions is a sign of bias against the culture(s) in question.
2. A finding that a particular culture or religion is abusive of human rights can be dismissed by the claim that that culture has a different conception of human rights.

A more significant obstacle in including culture in cross-national studies of human rights is defining and operationalizing culture. One needs only to look at Samuel Huntington's (1993) controversial "Clash of the Civilizations" article in which he divided the world into seven culturally based civilizations. One of dominant themes in criticisms of Huntington's argument was the artificial nature of Huntington's demarcation of cultures (Ajami, 1993). Consequently, culture has not been included in most quantitative studies of human rights.

It is important to note that the scientific study of human rights has only been undertaken in the last 15 years.[1] Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect that a reliable indicator of culture would be developed in this short period of time as researchers have yet to agree on a standard measure of human rights. There have, however, been a small number of studies which have accounted for culture. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) included a variable representing countries which experienced British colonial rule. It was expected that the British would have transmitted Western human rights values to the cultures which they dominated. This variable, however, was found to be insignificant. Park (1987) used the percentage of a country's population that is Christian as an indicator of culture but this variable was also found to be insignificant in both studies.

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[1] A recent standard- bearing article in the field is Poe and Tate (1994), which also contains a comprehensive review of the literature in the cross-national study of human rights

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Both of these indicators of culture stand on shaky theoretical grounds. British colonial rule is not a measure of a country's native political culture but, rather, it is an indicator of the extent to which it is influenced by an external culture. The size of a country's Christian population tells us little about the extent to which its government is influenced by Christian political culture. One needs only to consider Poland and the United States, both of which are overwhelmingly Christian, to see this weakness. This chapter will help to fill the "cultural void" in cross-national studies of human rights through the inclusion of a variable that reliably measures the extent to which a political system is influenced by a political culture. Islamic political culture provides a good case to test culture's influence on human rights because it is widely believed that Islam facilitates abusive government. Also, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, argue that Islam has a unique conception of human rights. In the next section, I will briefly outline how human rights are dealt with in Islam's fundamental texts, *Sharia*, and contemporary Islamic human rights schemes.

Islam and Human Rights

The Basic Sources

The *Koran*, *Hadith*, and *Sunna*, do not contain many discussion which specifically deal with human rights. As was the case with democracy, various *sura* (verses) of the *Koran* can be interpreted to support a variety of positions. Verse 13 of Chapter 44, for example, calls for mutual understanding and cooperation between people and that a person's worth is based on one's moral conduct toward others. This type of language appears to be very supportive of respect for individual rights. However, the same verse

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also mentions that this is especially true of those in the sight of God. As a result this verse

can be interpreted to apply to Muslims only (Al-Naim, 1995). The fact that the *Koran* is

addressed to "mankind" and "The Children of Adam," not the clergy or other interpreters,

also emphasizes the primacy of the individual. It is this respect for the individual and set of

moral principles which has led many contemporary Muslims to claim that Islam, 1400

years ago, presented the first program of human rights (Nadri, 1966). However, Islamic

law and tradition has developed over that 1400 year period in a manner that facilitates the

restriction of human rights.

Islamic Law and Tradition

The three primary forces, *Sharia*, the closing of the gates of *ijtiahad*, and the

precedence off duties over rights, working against the protection oh human rights are as

much a result of historical development as they are a product of Islam's basic sources.

Following the codification of Islamic law and the development of Islam's four schools of

jurisprudence, Islamic law and the practice of Islam have remained fixed up to the present

day. Also, Islamic jurists and scholars have maintained complete control over the

interpretation of *Sharia* and Islamic tradition (Traer, 1991). Finally, several facets of the

Sharia appear to place sharp restrictions on human rights. With the closing of the gates of

ijtihad (an individual's right to make his or her own interpretation of Islam), Muslims have

been compelled to follow the rulings and interpretations of the *'ulama* on a body of law

that has not changed in this millennium. Given that individuals are denied the right to

interpret Islam for themselves and the primacy of following the *Sharia* in Islamic political

culture, individual autonomy is severely restricted.

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It is also important to remember that Islamic law developed in response to the social conditions of 1000 years ago. The *'ulama 's* refusal to reevaluate *Sharia* has led to an Islamic legal system that is based on the conditions of a patriarchal, authoritarian, and traditional society. Two areas, the status of women and the rights of non-Muslims are of particular concern. Ann Mayer's (1991) in-depth study of Islamic law and international law regarding human rights concludes that *Sharia* is clearly incompatible with most international human rights agreements in these areas.[2] Restrictions on women can be traced to several verses in the *Koran* and the *Sharia* which clearly discuss women's intellectual, emotional, and physical inferiority to men. The status of women, however, harkens back to the earlier discussion of cultural relativity as Islamic women, by Western standards, are most definitely second class citizens.

The views of Muslim women regarding their role in society is another question. Some Muslim women (and men) are vocal in their criticism of the status of women in contemporary Muslim societies (See Memisi, 1987, 1988, Sadawi, 1991). At the same time, a majority of the women I talked to in Morocco vehemently defended the position of women in Islamic society. Some went as far as claiming that they have it better than Western women who are expected to work and raise a family. Given the preceding, I am going to sidestep the whole issue of the rights of women in Islamic countries. This, of course, is an important topic which should be researched and debated. However, I do not have the space to give it due consideration in this chapter. Consequently, women's rights

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[2] Mayer is in no way alone in reaching this conclusion. Scholars and practitioners, both Muslim and non-Muslim, point to the divergence between Islamic law and Western international law in these areas.

are not covered in the indicators of human rights and civil rights to be utilized in the hypothesis testing.

The second area of concern for Mayer (1991) is the rights of religious minorities. According to the *Sharia*, non-Muslims are clearly second-class citizens in Islamic political systems. Jews and Christians (people of the book) are given status as *dhiminis*. They are allowed to practice their religion and regulate their own internal affairs if they pay a tributary tax (*jizya*). They are not entitled to hold political office, serve in the military, or to convert Muslims. Also, their testimony in court proceedings is not of equal value to that of a Muslim. Although Jews and Christians have fared better in Muslim countries than Muslims and Jews have in the Christian world, there has been a historical pattern of discrimination (Lewis, 1982,). Finally, according to *Sharia*, pantheists, pagans, and non-believers have no rights. In short, they have the options of conversion or death. The concern regarding the treatment of non-believers is supported by the persecution of the Bahai in Iran and guest workers in Saudi Arabia.

Rights Versus Obligations and Order

A general area of divergence between Islamic conceptions of human rights and those of international human rights treaties is whether the needs of the individual or the society take precedence. Liberalism's overwhelming concern is protecting the rights of individuals. Consequently, the primary purpose of human rights schemes developed in the West is to demarcate individual rights which cannot be violated by governments. The Bill of Rights in the *United States Constitution* is the most famous example of the setting aside of rights for citizens which shield them from arbitrary use of the power of the state. A reading of the major post World War II human rights conventions such as the *Universal*

Declaration of Human Rights (1948), *The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights* (1966), and *The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966) finds the same overriding objective of protecting certain individual rights from the whims governments.

Mayer's (1991) analysis of the *Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights* (1981) and the *Draft of the Islamic Constitution* (1979) published by the Islamic Research Academy of Al-Azhar University concludes that human rights in these documents are really obligations.[3] This conclusion is not surprising given the strong communitarian ethic in Islam. Muslims do not face God as individuals but rather as a community (the *umma*) and, a Muslim can lead a truly Islamic life only in a state governed by *Sharia*. Consequently, the government that enforces *Sharia* is to be obeyed because it is facilitating the society that will lead to the perfection of mankind. It is, therefore, an individual's obligation to obey the government and to do well unto others so the *'umma* will remain in God's favor. In short, individuals will benefit from obeying the government and following the law, not fromhaving certain rights against the government protected by the law (Mayer, 1991).

Another trend in Islamic societies, which has developed over the past 1000 years and which could act against the protection of human rights, is an emphasis on order. This stressing of the importance of political order is found in the writing of the famed Muslim sociologist, Ibn Khaldoun (1958). Khaldoun, wrote that one of the most important duties of political leaders is to maintain order so thatcommerce can thrive. This philosophy, for

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[3] Noted human rights scholar Jack Donnelly (1989) makes the same conclusion regarding human rights in Islam really being obligations.

the most part, has been sanctioned by the *ulama*, up to modern times because it was thought that even order based on harsh government was preferable to chaos (Esposito, 1992). As a result, the abusive treatment of citizens by governments became acceptable in many Islamic societies. This practice, of course, had no precedence in the *Koran* or the life of the prophet. Today, Islam is the ideological force which often motivates opposition to abusive government and *ulama* who support corrupt regimes.

Islam and Human Rights: The Current Record

This perception that Islamic political culture is not conducive to the protection of human rights is supported by the records of countries such as Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (under General Zia), which claim (ed.) to have governments that function according to *Sharia*. Once again, a second look sheds doubt on this assertions. Iran and Sudan had abusive governments before Islamic oriented regimes rose to power. Pakistan's human rights record has improved as that country has moved towards democracy following Zia's death. Although the Saudi government is Islamic based, both Islamic and secular oriented opposition groups have taken it to task for its abuse of human rights. It was found in the case studies that Islamic opposition groups in Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Iran frequently listed the failure to protect human rights as one of their major grievances against their respective regimes. As mentioned, secular base regimes in Islamic countries such as Syria and Iraq are also among the worst violators of human rights.

Another important consideration in evaluating the relationship between Islamic political culture and human rights is the record of Islamic countries in signing international human rights treaties. I mentioned that Saudi Arabia refused to sign the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights*. Pakistan, however, not only signed the declaration but,

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also, their UN representative criticized that Saudi contention that the treaty violated Islamic law and principle. Both Donnelly (1989) and Mayer (1991) have found that a majority of Islamic countries have signed on to the major human rights declarations and, neither could discern a distinct pattern of Islamic countries not signing important human rights agreements. In fact, some have better records in this matter than the United States. Thus, it appears that most Islamic countries have accepted the legitimacy of accepted international norms of human rights protection. The presence of human rights issues in the debate between government and opposition groups is a sign that abusive government is not an accepted aspect of contemporary Islamic political culture.

Another piece of ad-hoc evidence against the argument that Islamic political culture is associated with harsh government is the existence of human rights organizations in several Islamic countries. Susan Waltz (1994) documents the developments of human rights groups in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Despite various forms of government repression, these groups have been active in challenging abuses committed by the regimes in their respective governments. Morocco, as a result, created a Minster for Human Rights.[4] It is of interest to note the Islamic groups in Algeria and Tunisia were quite happy to receive the assistance of human rights groups, which have secular oriented leadership. This suggests that the poor human rights records of many Islamic countries are a result of authoritarian government rather than Islamic political culture. I have already demonstrated that Islam is not the primary cause of authoritarian government in predominately Muslim countries. It is now time to take the examination the relationship

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[4]The domestiic press, political parties, and labor unions frequently take the Moroccan government to task for its human rights record. Many editorials in Moroccan newspapers have argued that human rights abuse is intolerable because it violate the principles and spirit of Islam.

between Islam and human rights from the theoretical and ad-hoc level to the level of

rigorous cross-national analysis.

Operationalization of Variables

Human Rights

I have decided to utilize two indicators of individual rights, one for **human rights**

and one for **civil liberties**. The aspects of *Sharia* and Islamic political culture which

appear to act against the protection of individual rights are related to civil liberties rather

than human rights. It is very difficult to interpret any aspect of Islamic political culture, be

it the basic sources, Islamic law, or traditions, that would sanction the violations of the

most fundamental human rights, freedom from torture, freedom from imprisonment, and

respect for the sanctity one's home. However, the emphasis on obligations over duties and

the second-class status of non-Muslims may, indeed, lead to violations of civil liberties

such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Consequently, I will use variables

representing both **human rights** and **civil liberties** in the regression analysis.

Human Rights. I will utilize the coding scheme developed by David Cingranelli

and the Binghamton University human rights data set project.[5] Scores, which range from 0

to 6, are based on three equally weighted sub-scores representing the frequency of the use

of torture by the government in question, the frequency of disappearances (which are

attributed to the government), and the number of political prisoners being held. Zero will

represent the lowest level of human rights protection and 6 will represent the highest.

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[5] I am grateful to Dr. Cingranelli for sharing this data set and for providing me with instructions for coding countries which were not included in the data set.

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Civil Liberties. Scores for this indicator will, again, range from 0 to 6 with zero

representing the lowest level of civil liberties given to citizens and six representing the

highest. The civil liberties indicator will be based on three equally weighted sub-scores

representing government censorship of the media, restrictions on religious practice, and

restrictions on the freedom of assembly Information for the coding of both the civil

liberties and human rights variables is taken from Amnesty International and the State

Department annual reports on human rights practices in the world.

Independent Variables

The independent variables to be used in this chapter were discussed in Chapter

Eight (see pp. 208-214) In review:

TABLE 9.2
Summary of Independent Variables and Indicators

Variable	Indicator	Source
Democracy	Political Rights	Freedom House
Islamic Political Culture	*Comprehensiveness + Authenticity*	developed by author based on Shepard's typology
Cleavages	Dummy Variable: cleavage = at least 15% of pop. and politicized	*World Almanac*, author's determination
Religious minority	Dummy Variable: religious minority = at lest 5% of pop.	*World Almanac*
Wealth	1. GNP per capita 2. Dummy Variable for wealthiest	World Bank
Economic Growth/Decline	Change in GNP PC over 10 year period	World Bank
Social mobilization	Literacy rate	World Bank
Displacement	Change in urban % population over 10 year period	World Bank

These variables represent the factors wealth, modernization, economic change, ethnic

cleavage, form of government, and, of course, culture, which have been included in most

quantitative studies of human rights practices (See Poe and Tate, 1994). It is important to note that the Freedom House indicator of political rights, which represents democracy, is now a control variable.[6]

Research Design and Hypotheses

The sample and methodology used in Chapter Eight will also be applied here (See page 214 for discussion).

Islam, Human Rights and Civil Rights

It is expected that Islamic political culture will not have a significant influence on human rights protection as it is difficult to find justification for torture or government sponsored random acts of violence against individuals in Islamic texts, law or traditions. Although some Islamic based regimes have poor human rights records, many have signed on to various international human rights conventions. On the other hand, given the second-class status of non-Muslims and restrictions on individual behavior in Islamic law, it is probable that Islamic political culture will have a negative influence on levels of civil liberties.

- *H_1 - Islamic political culture does not influence human rights protection in predominately Muslim countries.*

- *H_{1A} - The greater the influence of Islamic political culture on a government, the less it will predict civil liberties.*

Cleavages, Human Rights and Civil Liberties

Ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic cleavages will all have a negative influence on the protection of both human rights and civil liberties. Some of the worst atrocities in recent

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[6] I did not use Freedom House's civil rights score for my civil liberties dependent variable because some of the factors considered in Freedom House's coding are accounted for in my human rights dependent variable.

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history have been committed by ethnic groups in control of the state against their rivals. Bosnia, Rwanda, Lebanon, Iraq, and Guatemala are all examples of cases where politicized primordial cleavages have been associated with government sponsored brutality. The treatment of the *Shia* in predominately *Sunni* nations is particularly relevant to Islamic countries. As was seen in the case studies, this abuse has included both arbitrary imprisonment, discrimination, and restrictions on religious practice. The same negative affect is expected when a country contains a religious minority. This relationship should be particularly significant, given the second class status accorded to Christians and Jews and the rejection of non-believers and monotheists, in Islamic law.

- *H_2 - If country has a politicized sectarian, ethnic, or linguistic cleavage, its government will have a poor record of protecting human rights and civil liberties.*
- *H_3 - If a minority religious group exists in a country, its government will have a poor record of protecting human rights and civil liberties.*

Economic Conditions, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties

Following the logic of the liberal modernization theorists, it is expected that wealth, should have a positive relationship with human rights and civil liberties. However, in this sample, it might be that extreme wealth will be associated with the abuse of human rights and civil rights, just as it was associated with authoritarian government, because of the oil producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Because of the maltreatment of guest workers in these countries, oil wealth should play a stronger role in influencing human rights practices than it did in repressing democracy. The dislocation caused by rapid economic change should facilitate harsh government because the dispossessed classes tend to take to violence on a periodic basis. Also, regimes use the importance of fostering economic growth as a rational for authoritarian government.

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- *H_4 - The greater a country's wealth, the better it will protect human rights and civil liberties.*

- *H_5 - If a country is extremely wealthy, it will have a poor record of protecting human rights and civil liberties.*

- *H_6 - If a country experiences rapid economic change, it will have a poor record of protecting human rights and civil liberties.*

Modernization, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties

The social mobilization aspect of modernization should facilitate the protection of

human rights and civil liberties. The increased awareness of the citizenry of the activities

of government and a push for greater participation will lead the government to be wary of

violating human rights and to grant more liberties for the population. At the same time, the

process of development disrupts people's lives and society as a whole, which pushes

people towards extremist politics and to cause turbulence. Governments, in these

situations, often respond with Martial law, repression, and counter-violence.

- *H_7 - The greater the percentage of a country's population that is socially mobilized, the better its government will protect human rights and civil liberties.*

- *H_8 - The greater the disruption caused by the modernization process, the more a government will abuse human rights and civil liberties.*

Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Liberties

There is an obvious expected relationship between democratic government and the

protection of human rights and civil liberties. It is highly unlikely that Islamic despots treat

their citizens worse than other despots treat their citizens. Most cross-national studies

have, indeed, found that democracy is the most significant factor in explaining human

rights practices (Cingranelli, 1992).

- *H_9 - The more democratic a country's political system, the better it will protect human rights and civil liberties.*

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Findings

Islam and Human Rights

 <u>Alignment of Cases.</u> **Figure 9.1** illustrates the insignificant relationship between Islam political culture and human rights practices as many of the countries with the worst human rights records , Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan (when the Soviet installed regime was still in power) have secular oriented regimes. A closer look at the distribution of cases finds what appears to be a curvilinear relationship between Islamic political culture and human rights as both highly secular and highly Islamic governments, for the most part, have the worst human rights records. In contrast, countries with moderate or mixed political cultures such as Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, have higher human rights scores. This finding seems logical as extremist governments must repress both opposition groups at the opposite ideological pole as well as moderate opposition. It is important to note the tenuous nature of this relationship because of the small variance across the sample. Eighteen of the 23 predominately Muslim countries have human rights scores at three or lower and the highest score in this sample is four. This tells us that something is repressing human rights in these Islamic nations.

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Figure 9.1
Figure 9.1
Islam and Human Rights

y = 1.215+0.419*x-0.137*x^2+0.019*x^3-0.001*x^4+0*x^5+eps

Bivariate Regression. Further discomfirmation of the Islamic political culture

facilities human rights abuses hypothesis can be seen in the results of the bivariate

regression in **Table 9.2**. Although the Islamic political culture variable does have a slightly

negative coefficient in both the sample of predominately Muslim countries and the full

sample, the **t** statistic is insignificant. The R^2 statistics of zero in both samples means that

Islamic political culture has almost no measurable influence on human rights practices.

This finding supports my assertion that it would be difficult to use religion as a

justification for government sponsored torture and murder. Consequently, it is necessary

to evaluate the results of the multiple regressions to see what is repressing human rights in

predominately Muslim countries.

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Table 9.2
Bivariate Regression Results: Islam and Human Rights
</div>

Predominately Muslim Countries (N=46)

Variable	B	Standard Error	Significance	Adjusted R^2
Islamic Political Culture	-.01	.03	no	
Equation			no	0

Entire Sample (N=92)

Islamic Political Culture	-.4	.41	no	
Equation			no	0

Multiple Regressions. Authoritarian government, as expected, is the factor that is negatively influencing human rights practices in predominately Muslim countries. The results in **Table 9.3** show that democracy is clearly associated with the protection of human rights in both the full sample and the sample of Islamic countries. Since strong evidence has been produced which shows that Islam is not repressing democracy in predominately Muslim countries and that Muslim developing countries are no less democratic than other developing countries, it can also be concluded that Islamic despots are no worse than non-Islamic despots (or secular oriented despots in predominately Muslim countries). Wealth, as predicted, was also positively associated with the protection of human rights in both samples[7]. This could mean that:

1. Citizens of more affluent societies have the time, means, and ability to monitor government abuses.

2. The autonomy of groups, which are valuable to the state (such as the middle class), has expanded to the point where repression no longer benefits the regime.

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[7] In this chapter, I used the GNP per capital variable and omitted the dummy variables representing the wealthiest and the poorest nations. The later were insignificant, meaning that the oil wealthy countries do not have a strongly negative relationship with poor human rights practice.

<div align="center">

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</div>

Table 9.3
Multivariate Regression Results: Islam and Human Rights

Predominately Muslim Countries Only (N=46)

Variable	B	Standard Error	Significance	Adjusted R²
Islamic PC	-.01	.04	no	
Ethnic Cleavage	-.24	.51	no	
Minority Religion	-.59	.52	no	
Democracy	.33	.14	.02	
GNP per capita	.02	.01	.06	
% Change in GNP	-.01	.01	no	
Literacy	.02	.02	no	
% change urban pop	.02	.12	no	
Equation			no	.07

Entire Sample (N=92)

Islamic PC	-.03	.03	no	
Ethnic Cleavage	-.30	.39	no	
Minority Religion	-.26	.40	no	
Democracy	.35	.11	.01	
GNP per capita	.01	.01	.03	
% Change in GNP	-.01	.01	no	
Literacy	.04	.02	no	
% change urban pop	-.02	.02	no	
Equation			.01	.14

Another interesting finding is the variance between the full sample and the sample of predominantly Muslim countries. First, the F statistic for the regression equation for the predominately Muslim sample is insignificant while the F statistic for the entire sample is significant at the .01 level. Second, the R^2 statistic (.07) for the sample of Islamic nations is half that (.14) of the full equation. This variance could be a result of the small number of cases in the sample of Islamic countries lowering the explanatory power of the model. Another cause of the difference between the two models is the variables relating to the modernization process, Literacy (social mobilization) and Change in Urban Population

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(Disruption). Both of these variables have positive relationships with human rights protection, but this relationship is significant in the full sample but not in the sample of Islamic countries. This suggests that modernization is leading to social and, perhaps, political mobilization in non-Muslim developing countries but not in the predominately Muslim developing countries. Here, I am following the logic that modernization leads individuals to believe that they can control their own destiny and, subsequently, to take an interest in what their government is doing.

A final finding of note is the overall low explanatory power of both models. This is not surprising, as I stated at the beginning of that chapter that it is unlikely that political culture would have an influence on human rights practices. It also seems logical that human rights practice are highly subject to random events and that they fluctuate from year to year. Sudan, for example, has an overall record of poor human rights protection but had a comparatively high score of four in 1990. Years when nations experience rebellion and turmoil are more likely to have more human rights violations than relatively calm years. It is unlikely that the model picked up trends in countries' human rights practices because observations are included only for 1980 and 1990. Democracy, on the other hand, is less susceptible to yearly fluctuations resulting from random events, which increases the probability that two observations for each country accurately capture its form of government. In short, human rights practices are highly influenced by current events while political systems are more enduring.

Islam and Civil Liberties

Alignment of Cases. A look at **Figure 9.2** shows that, contrary to theoretical expectations, there is no significant relationship between Islamic political culture and civil

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liberties protection as, once again, there is a random distribution of cases. As was the case

with human rights, levels of civil rights protection in predominately Muslim countries are

low. Only Bangladesh (with a score of four) has a civil rights score that is higher than

three. It is doubtful, however, that the influence of Islamic political culture is the factor

that is causing these low scores. It should now be apparent that it is authoritarian

government, as will be seen in the multiple regressions, that is the primary cause of this

trend. Here, there is no hint of a curvilinear relationship as countries with Islamic political

culture scores between six and thirteen are also randomly distributed.

Figure 9.2
Islam and Civil Liberties

y = 1.903-0.008*x+eps

Bivariate Regression. The bivariate regression results, however, tell a different

story. The Islamic Political Culture variable has a significant, negative influence on the

protection of civil liberties in both the full sample of predominately Muslin countries. It is

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of interest to note that the R^2 statistic is higher for the sample of predominately Muslim nations (.15) than it is for the full sample (.07). In contrast to what would be expected, the addition of the control group weakened--**very slightly**-- the influence of Islamic political culture. At any rate, it is unlikely that the significant relationship between Islamic political culture and the repressing of civil liberties will endure the adding of control variables in the multiple regressions, where will we discover the real cause of poor civil liberties practices in Islamic countries

Table 9.4
Bivariate Regression Results: Islam and Civil Liberties
Predominately Muslim Countries (N=46)

Variable	B	Standard Error	Significance	Adjusted R^2
Islamic Political Culture	-.09	.03	.01	
Equation			.01	.15

Entire Sample (N=92)

Islamic Political Culture	-.06	.02	.01	
Equation			.01	.07

Multiple Regression. The importance of controlling for other factors is evident, once again, as the addition of the independent variables representing democracy, economics, modernization, and cleavages caused the Islamic Political Culture variable to be insignificant in both the full sample and the sample of predominately Muslim countries. A look at the results in **Table 9.5** shows that, as expected, democracy is the most important determinant of levels of civil rights protection in both predominately Muslim and non-Muslim developing countries. In fact, democracy was the only significant variable in the full sample and one of two (the other being presence of a minority religion)

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significant variables in the sample of predominately Muslim countries. The comparatively

high Adjusted R^2 statistics (.38 for the sample of Muslim countries and .30 for the full

sample) attest to the extreme importance of democracy.

The only other finding of interest is the significant relationship between the

presence of a minority religious group and the protection of civil liberties in the sample of

predominately Muslim countries. This comes as a surprise because Islamic law relegates

Jews and Christians to second class citizens and denies rights to non-believers and

Table 9.5
Multivariate Regression Results: Islam and Civil Rights
Predominately Muslim Countries Only (N=46)

Variable	B	Standard Error	Significance	Adjusted R^2
Islamic PC	-.03	.03	no	
Ethnic Cleavage	-.33	.42	no	
Minority Religion	.88	.43	.05	
Democracy	.42	.12	.01	
GNP per capita	-.01	.01	no	
% Change in GNP	.08	.07	no	
Literacy	-.01	.01	no	
% change urban pop	-.03	.09	no	
Equation			.01	.38

Entire Sample (N=92)

Islamic PC	-.03	.02	no	
Ethnic Cleavage	.03	.30	no	
Minority Religion	.35	.31	no	
Democracy	.48	.89	.01	
GNP per capita	-.01	.01	no	
% Change in GNP	.01	.01	no	
Literacy	.01	.01	no	
% change urban pop	.01	.01	no	
Equation			.01	.30

polytheists. Consequently, it was expected that the presence of a minority religion in a

predominately Muslim country would lead to restrictions on their civil rights. It is

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important to note that expatriates are not included in the counting of religious minorities so countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE were coded as not having a religious minority. Also, the Religious Minority variable was not significant in the full sample, which means that minority religious groups in Islamic countries are treated no better or worse than those in other developing nations.

Conclusions

This chapter has provided the final piece of evidence supporting my argument that Islamic political culture does not facilitate abusive or authoritarian government. I found that that Islamic political culture does not have a significant relationship with human rights practices or the protection of civil liberties. In the case of human rights, Islamic political culture was found to be insignificant even before control variables were added to the model. The testing of the relationship between Islam political culture and civil liberties demonstrated, once again, the importance of considering alternative explanations when examining the relationship between Islam and politics. The Islamic Political Culture Variable was significant in the bivariate regressions but was insignificant when the control variables were added in the multiple regressions. The only factor that was consistently found to influence human rights practices and civil liberties was democracy, which replicates the findings of most other cross-national analyses of human rights and civil liberties practices.

The findings in this chapter provide evidence that culture is not a significant determinant of human rights practices. Despite all of the doctrinal and theoretical differences between Islamic law and international law regarding human rights, Islamic

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countries still uphold roughly the same standards (or lack of standards) as other developing countries. Again, it is very hard to use *Sharia* or Islamic political culture as a justification for torture or government sponsored violence against individuals. Regimes often do use Islam as a justification for censorship, persecution of religious minorities, and other violations of civil liberties. However, the findings in this chapter show that they do this because they are despots, not because they are following the dictates of Islamic political culture. Secular authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries have also not been generous in granting civil liberties to citizens. It is likely that the spread of democracy, not the secularization of politics, will sharply reduce these practices.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

Political Islam: A Dark Cloud or Partly Cloudy

The case of political Islam should have provided evidence in support of a relationship between shared values and attitudes and political systems. If Islam, as has been claimed, is a dark cloud that overwhelms societies and causes harsh and authoritarian government, Islamic political culture should repress democracy and facilitate the abuse of human rights and civil liberties. The evidence produced in the case studies and the statistical analysis in this dissertation has disconfirmed this hypothesis. At the same time, I did not find Islamic political culture to be associated with high levels of democracy and the protection of individuals rights. Thus, I have shown that Islam is not a monolithic political force that is the primary cause of political outcomes in predominately Muslim countries. However, in doing so, I have failed to provide any substantial proof that political culture is an important independent variable in the study of comparative politics. In this final chapter, I will summarize the results which produced these general conclusions, propose why the question of political culture and politics is so elusive, and suggest ways in which beliefs and values do influence politics.

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Statistical Analysis

Three important conclusions were drawn from the statistical tests of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and individual rights.

1. It is important to consider or control for other factors when examining the relationship between Islam and politics. This was seen in the tests of the relationships between Islam and democracy and Islam and Civil Rights. The Islamic Political Culture variable, by itself, had a negative and statistically significant relationship with both democracy and civil liberties. However, this relationship became insignificant after the control variables were added. In short, political Islam can adequately explain the politics of Muslim countries only when the analyst ignores everything else.

2. The use of cross-national analysis is necessary in the study of Islam and politics. A focus on individual countries, once again, leads to the conclusion that "Islam is Everything" because Islamic political resurgence is usually the most visible and attention grabbing political process in predominately Muslim countries. However, the comparison of causal factors and processes across a number of countries facilitates the identification of other important variables and the discovery of patterns. Cross-national analysis also destroys the image of political Islam as a monolithic force and leads to the discovery of great variance among the ideologies of Islamic political forces.

3. It is also essential to compare Muslim nations with other developing nations. Yes, most political systems in the Islamic world are authoritarian and have poor human

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rights records. These problems can be easily attributed to Islam when a researcher focuses exclusively on Muslim nations. However, when other developing nations are added to the analysis, it becomes clear that the countries in the Islamic world are experiencing the same problems as other countries which gained independence from colonial rule after World War II.

It is important to note the limitations of the statistical analysis in chapters eight and nine. A first concern is that the analysis ends with the year, 1990. Many important changes, which have affected levels of democracy and human rights in the Islamic world, have taken place since that time. As mentioned, democracy has taken root in Malaysia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Kuwait, Iran, and Jordan have become more democratic. There have, however, also been setbacks for democracy in Egypt and Algeria. In the area of individual rights, there has been a growing movement in several Muslim countries which has called for governments to improve their human rights practices. Another shortcoming of the research design that it is limited to two observations, 1980 and 1990, for each country. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is cause for caution in making generalizations about the relationship between Islam and the protection of human rights and civil liberties because, government practices in these areas are highly dependent on random events, which cause policies to fluctuate from year to year.

A final caution regarding the strength of the results is the validity of the measurement tools. Of greatest concern is the coding of the Islamic Political Culture variable for the predominately Muslim countries. Although I have consulted with experts and taken surveys to insure that the coding was accurate, there will always be variation,

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based on information and personal opinion, in how individuals view a phenomenon. In addition, I have spent more than a week in only one of the predominantly Muslim nations. As a result, the possibility always exists that the scores for the Islamic Political Culture variable simply do not represent reality. My coding, however, were largely replicated in the surveys sent to over 500 scholars of Islam and Islamic countries. A discussion of the coding process and the survey results is presented in **Appendix I.** The Freedom House political rights scores have also been criticized for representing that organization's conservative bias (See Bollen, 1993). Their democracy scores, however were the most comprehensive and readily available when I began the project in 1992.

Case Studies.

The case studies detailed a number of factors which influence the nature of political Islam in specific countries. Once again, evidence was presented contradicting the notion of political Islam as a "dark cloud" and the "Islam is everything" explanation of the politics of Muslim countries.

1. Political Islam was shown to be highly dependent on conditions which are unique to specific countries

2. Regimes were shown to play a crucial role in determining what form political Islam takes in their respective nations.

3. Islamic political groups represent a variety of ideologies. Often these groups have led the call for representative and humane government. Most have entered legitimate politics when the opportunity has been presented to them.

4. The major dilemmas facing predominately Muslim nations are rapid economic change, dislocation caused by modernization, and colonial rule or dependency on the West-- not political Islam

The case studies also demonstrated the importance of selecting countries that represent different relationships between Islam and politics. Many studies have only

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included countries or Islamic groups that represent radical or extremist political Islam (e.g., Wright, 1984 an Hiro, 1992). Consequently, it is not surprising that the authors conclude that political Islam is an extremist force that threatens the West and liberal democracy. The addition of cases representing secular-authoritarian regimes and moderate Islamic regimes in this dissertation led to a very different conclusion. An important project for the future is to complete rigorous case study analysis using non-Middle Eastern countries. As mentioned, most of the emerging Islamic democracies are located outside of that region. This phenomenon might be related to cultural and historical backgrounds which are associated with different geographical regions. Hence, it is necessary to end the Middle East/North Africa bias in the study of political Islam.

The Enduring Question of Culture and Politics

Political Islam

It is necessary to go back to the discussion of Islam's basic sources and contemporary Islamic political thought in Chapter Three to understand why political Islam is not a dark cloud and why it is difficult to produce substantial evidence supporting the argument that culture influences politics. The primary conclusion of Chapter Three was that Islamic doctrine is very amorphous and vague on matters relating to government and politics. Consequently, a number of political and economic programs have been offered over the years that are claimed to be Islamic. The diversity in these programs was illustrated in the works of Shariati, Qutb, Mawdudi, and Iqbal. In short, it is difficult for Islamic political culture to influence politics and government when so many political

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programs can be deemed Islamic. In addition, there are important divides within Islam, that are not directly related to politics, but which may influence political outcomes.

- **Sect** (*Sunni*, *Shia* and other Islamic sects)

- The four **legal traditions** within *Sunni* Islam

- **Styles of practice** such as the scriptural Islam of the *'ulama* and the *Sufi* mystic Islam

- **Region** (Middle East, North Africa, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa)

Israeli Judaism

Islamic political culture is not alone in being vague and subject to interpretation, as will be seen in a brief look at Jewish/Israeli and American political cultures. Israeli political culture is an interesting point for comparison because Islam and Judaism are so similar.[1]

- Both religions are legal based, and the following of religious law is essential to the development of the community of believers.

- Judaism also shares Islam's emphasis on the community over the individual.

- Religion and politics have also historically been intertwined in Jewish doctrine and tradition.

- Judaism, like Islam, requires a political entity for religion to be practiced properly.

It is no surprise that one sees the same diversity in Judaism and Israeli/Jewish political culture as has been seen in the Islam and Islamic political culture. Again, this is the result of amorphous basic texts with vague principles that are open to interpretation. Consequently, Israeli political culture includes Traditionalists, who have recreated a 19th century Jewish community in modern Israel: Messianic Nationalists, who hope to bring back the Messiah through territorial acquisition: Secularists, who call for the complete separation of religion and politics: and Modern Orthodox ,who emphasize the humanist

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[1] For in-depth comparisons of Islam and Judaism, see Rosenthal (1962), Verbit (1981), and Price (1990).

aspect of Judaism. All (even the secularists) can find justification for their positions in the *Torah*, *Halachah* and other Jewish sources. Each of these groups now participates in politics, influences the political system, and shapes Israel's political culture. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that Israeli democracy is a result of Israeli/Jewish political culture. Israel, at the present time, happens to based on a form of political Judaism that facilitates democracy. To find out why, one must look at the needs of political actors and the factors that were considered in the case studies in chapters four through seven.

American Liberalism

An analyst would have the same trouble in attributing America's political and economic systems to its political culture. According to Weber (1954), the Protestant ethic of the Puritans facilitated the development of modern capitalism in the United States. Critics have argued that this development was due to factors relating to geography, natural resources, freedom from international conflict, and a growing population (See the essays in Eisenstadt, 1968). In addition, Michael Walzer (1973) writes that the same Puritan ethic actually facilitated the authoritarian streak in American politics. Anthony King (1973) brilliantly connects the late development and small scale of social programs in the United States to a unique American political culture. This, however, leads one to ask what caused the ideas which make up this political culture to take root in America? Concurrently, one sees variance across time in the extent to which the ideas are held to be true and how they are interpreted. What caused American liberalism to shift from the extreme individualism of the 19th century to the welfare state of the twentieth century? It most likely was changing economic and social structures in combinations with the needs of politicians running for office.

The endurance of the question of the relationship between political culture and major political outcomes, given the preceding, is no accident. A political culture, be it liberalism, Islam, or Judaism, is based on a vague set of ideas and principle, which are subject to interpretation. American political culture supports both the Republicans and the Democrats. Iranian political culture supported both Khomeini and Shariatmadari. Israeli political cultures supports both Peace Now and the *Gush Emunim*. The popularity of the opposing interpretations of each of these country's political cultures is based on social and economic conditions, historical circumstances, and the needs of political actors. Political cultures, in short, can facilitate a variety of political systems and public policies. That is why it is impossible to label a political Islam a dark cloud which overwhelms societies. It also explains why the relationship between political culture and politics always appears to be partly cloudy.

Of What Importance is Political Culture?

Political Mobilization

The confirmation of the notion that that Islamic political culture does not have a significant affect on political systems and how governments treat their citizens does not mean that political culture does not have an important influence on politics. The case studies suggested that Islamic political culture plays a key role in several political processes. It was shown that Islam plays a crucial part in political mobilization as Islam is the most potent tool for organizing opposition to harsh, corrupt, ineffective, and authoritarian government in Muslim countries. At the same time, many regimes also use Islam as a means of mobilizing the citizenry on their behalf. The use of the symbols and

language of religion as a means of political mobilization is common to all societies. The Catholic church played a key role in liberation movements in Latin American and the Solidarity movement in Poland. Politicians attempting to demonstrate that they are in tunc with shared beliefs and values is a universally important aspect of political competition. This point is particularly relevant to American elections.

Discourse and Political Competition

Political culture is also a crucial element in political discourse and debate. Religion, most certainly, is the primary political language in the Islamic world (Lewis, 1988). Earlier, I showed that even secular leaders must make references to Islam and frame calls to action in an Islamic context. Debate on important political, social, and economic issues in Islamic countries almost always has a religious dimension, which can be seen in matters ranging from banking to relations with non-Muslim countries. If Islam plays such an important role in political discourse and debate, it should have some affect on government policies. Although it was found that Islamic political culture does not affect human rights and civil liberties practices, it is important to remember that this is only one of the many spheres in which governments make policy. It could be that Islam affects more mundane matters such as how governments allocate their resources and social policy. The connection between political culture and public policy is a topic for future research.

Public Policies

Two areas where political culture most definitely influences government polices are personal status and social conduct. Most matters relating to personal status, such as marriage, divorces, family law, and inheritance, are determined according to religious law in many Islamic countries, which contrasts with America and the West where these

matters are predominantly regulated by secular civil law. As illustrated in Chapter One, the regulation of social behavior is also influenced by political culture. Even in a moderate Muslim nation, such as Morocco, it is illegal for unmarried men and women to be seen together in public after dark. The major difference between Islamic and American conceptions of the role of women in society was considered in Chapter Nine. It appears that political culture, indeed, sets parameters for some government policies and for regimes. This harkens back to the discussion of Morocco in Chapter Seven where I concluded that the remarkable staying power of King Hassan II is partly due to his ability to keep his regime in tune with his country's political culture.

Setting Parameters

The notion of political culture as setting parameters on policies and political systems is logical because political culture is beliefs, attitudes, and values regarding politics that are shared by most members of a society. Elites and government officials are usually not representative of a country's entire population. The average member of the U.S. Senate and House or House of Representative is wealthier, better educated, and more interested in public affairs than most Americans. This divergence in the values of politicians and the values of citizens insures that policies will not always correspond to the shared attitudes of the people. Regular elections in the United States and other democracies guarantee that this gap remains narrow. The absence of elections and opportunities for citizens to express their preferences in authoritarian government means that regimes may take policies further away from the parameters of political culture, which suggests that political culture has a greater influence on political systems in democracies. The fact that few of the countries included in the sample used in the statistical analysis are

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democracies may explain why political culture had little affect on government and policies. Exploring this relationship is another project for the future.

Political Culture's importance is further validated by the fact that it is something that politicians, even in authoritarian political systems, cannot ignore, as was made evident in the discussion of the Shah. In democracies, governments that fail to pay heed to widely held core values and ideals or thath offer policies that contradict these values and ideals are voted out of office. Leaders of authoritarian regimes often pay for this mistake with their careers, or worse yet, their lives. It is important to note that force and repression, as was the case in Iran, Algeria, and Nasser's Egypt, was necessary to dealign political systems from their political cultures. The ultimate failure of the governments, in all of these countries, to repress political Islam is further evidence of the resiliency and enduring value of local political cultures. Also, authoritarian rulers, such as the monarchs in Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, who are in tune with their county's political culture have much better staying power.

Political Systems

The importance of political systems being in synch with political cultures can also be seen in variance in the political structures, institutional arrangements, and legal systems of democracies. One needs to look no further than our individualist political culture and our federalist and decentralized political system for proof. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that if democracy emerges in the Islamic world, it will take a different form than it does in the West and elsewhere. An Islamic democracy might have a state religion or place more restrictions on civil liberties than Western democracies. Here, it is important to separate liberalism, a political philosophy, from democracy, a form of government. This is

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not a problem as Asian countries, such as Japan, which do not maintain liberal based political cultures, do have democratic governments. As stated in Chapter One, if the ideological foundations of societies vary, so should their political systems.

Types of Political Culture

It is also a mistake to say that some political cultures, such as Islam, cannot support democracy because they are "traditional." As has been seen, Islam can facilitate a variety of ideologies and political programs that range from modern to traditional, and contemporary Muslim societies also span this traditional/modern spectrum. Consequently, tradition and modernity must have a stronger relationship with social development, economic modernization, and connection to the outside world than they do with religion. This dissertation is of value because it has considered some of the specific factors that influence whether Muslim nations are oriented towards traditional or modern interpretations of Islamic political culture. The foundations (*Sunna, Hadith,* and *Sharia*), principles and values of Islamic political culture are, for the most part, fixed. Tradition and modernity, however, are not permanent. It is likely that a modern and democratic political Islam will gain strength after the Muslim world recovers from the disruption of rapid change and deals with the West on more even terms.

The Role of the United States

A final consideration is what the United States can do to help facilitate the emergence of a moderate, and democratic political Islam. A first step would be to stop portraying political Islam as the next great threat to our security. Yes, various Muslim nations such as Iran and Iraq do threaten American interests. However, we have cordial

relations with a much larger number of countries in the Islamic world. Our publicly stated opposition to "Islamic Fundamentalism" has caused many moderate Muslims to feel that the U.S. is "against Islam." At the same time, the emphasizing of religion focuses attention on the historic conflict between Christianity and Islam beginning with the Crusades. This obsession with political Islam, taken in the context of the decline of Islamic civilization at the expense of Europe, colonialism, and U.S. cultural domination, gives Muslims reasons to believe that America is now the leader of a long-standing Western campaign against their religion.

A second step would be to increase contacts with moderate Islamic political groups. This would weaken the perception that the West is against all forms of political Islam and serve notice that there are tangible benefits for moderation. It would also counter the perception that we favor democracy except in Muslim countries. We should also encourage our Islamic allies to consider opening their political systems, as did King Hussein, to Islamic groups which accept democracy and pluralism. Again, the way to weaken radical Islam appears to be to give moderate Islam an independent political voice. However, after the Algerian tragedy, it is clear that the transition to democracy must be deliberate and guided. We should, however, be adamant in expressing our disapproval of human rights violations by friendly regimes in Islamic countries. As was discussed, many of these violations are committed against the members of Islamic political groups. Standing against such practices would, again, show that we do not make exceptions for authoritarianism when it comes Muslim countries.

A final but important policy area is economic development. Given that the ranks of radical Islamic political groups are usually filled with members of the disheartened and dispossessed classes, we need to encourage economic policies that minimize unemployment and underemployment. It is interesting that we panic when the unemployment rate in this country approaches eight percent yet we expect developing countries (Muslim and non-Muslim) to accept unemployment rates of 25 percent. The situation of the former Soviet Union, where the high levels of unemployment that have resulted from the transition to a market economy has left the Communist Party poised to regain control of the government, is relevant. In short, a balance must be struck between economic growth and providing for the basic needs of citizens. If not, radical Islamic groups are ready and willing to fill the void.

APPENDIX I

THE ISLAMIC POLITICAL CULTURE VARIABLE

The purpose of this discussion is to detail the process utilized in determining the reliability of the "Islamic Political Culture scores assigned to the predominantly Muslim countries. A discussion of the variable, how I went about assigning scores, and the sources consulted can be found in Chapter Eight, p.p. 207-210. After I completed my coding, I took the following two steps to insure that the scores assigned were representative of reality.

1. Direct consultation and discussion with citizens, government personnel and experts from the 23 predominately Muslim countries.

2. Surveying scholars of Islam and politics to see if my coding would be replicated by others.

Direct Consultation.

Embassies

My objective, here, was to gain the input of people who are experts or who are residents of the countries in the sample. The first source I consulted was the **embassies** of each country. This proved to be fruitful in terms of obtaining information (e.g., constitutions and statements of leaders) but of little help, for several reasons, in gaining assistance in evaluating the reliability of my coding.

- There was no one at the embassy qualified or permitted to comment on such matters.

- The person who I was told to contact did not think that a concept such as Islamic political culture could be quantified

- The information provided was obviously biased in a direction that favored the country in question

- The person who I was told to contact did not comprehend my definition of Islamic political culture or the dimensions of Islamic political culture being considered.

Citizens

The second group consulted was **citizens** of the countries included in the sample. Here, I was successful in gaining the insights of citizens of 20 of the 23 predominately Muslim countries.[1] These conversations were of tremendous value and led to the fine tuning of many scores. A particularly important discovery, which resulted from these discussion, was that constitutions and stated government policies do not always represent the extent to which *Sharia* is utilized and enforced. Citizens told me that, in many cases, Islamic law regarding religious practice and personal status was enforced by government officials in the absence of national laws. Without the means to visit each of the 23 nations, the input of people who are familiar with daily life in these countries proved to be invaluable.

Experts

I also sought the insights of a third group, **experts.** This was done through conversations at conferences and other academic meetings, as well as contact by telephone and E-Mail. In total, I was able to talk to at least one person who claimed to have an in-depth knowledge of each of the predominately Muslim countries. Once again, a great deal

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[1] I was unable to consult with anyone from Afganistan, Senegal, or Bahrain

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of useful input, which resulted in the modification of scores, was gained. Many experts, however, refused to participate because of their opposition to the quantification of Islamic political culture. It is important to note that I did not ask either the citizens or the experts to provide me with numerical scores for the countries as I wanted the final codlings to be my complete responsibility. As stated, the input and comments of the experts and citizens were used to fine tune the coding which I had already completed.

Survey

The second method of improving the reliability of the coding was the construction and administration of a survey to determine the extent to which my scoring was replicated by others. A copy of the letter, coding instructions, and survey has been replicated in **Figure AI.1** on pages 270-273. I sent out 218 surveys to members of the Middle East Studies Association who listed Islamic studies, political science, or one of the countries in the survey as one of their specialties. Names and addresses were taken from the *1993 MESA Directory* and the surveys were sent out during April of 1994.[2] A breakdown of the responses is presented in **Table AI.1**.

Table AI.1
Breakdown of Survey Participation

Response Type	N	%
Completed	39	17
Refusal	21	10
Returned Unfilled	23	11
No Response	135	62
Total	**218**	**100**

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An interesting result of the survey was that 21 people took the time to explain why they were opposed to the construction of a quantitative indicator of Islamic political culture. In addition, seven of the scholars who completed the survey expressed reservations regarding my methodology. One scholar was outraged to the point where he called me a "fraud" and labeled my work as "garbage." Most simply expressed doubts regarding the reliability of the codlings and as to whether an abstract concept such as Islamic political culture can be measured. The latter issue has been discussed in the body of the dissertation and, none of the dissenters responded to my challenge to label other dimensions of Islamic political culture which should have been included in the indicator or to suggest alternative coding schemes The former issue, reliability, was shown not to be a problem by the results of the survey.

The first statistical procedure was to determine the extent to which my codlings were replicated by the other scholars. I used **Spearman's Rho** which provides a **rho** statistic representing rank-order correlation. In other words, the extent to which my ranking of countries from the one most influenced by Islamic political culture to the one least influenced by Islamic political culture corresponded to the rankings of the survey respondents. The results of these tests, which compared my rankings against those of each of the survey respondents, are presented in **Table AI.2**. The results show high

Table AI.2
Rank Order Correlation's

rho statistic between	#	%
.9 and 1.0	1	03
.8 and .9	18	46
.7 and .8	13	33
.6 and .7	7	18
Total	**39**	**100**

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rank order correlation between my coding and those of the respondents as all of the
relationships are statistically significant and 32 out of 39 have correlations above .7. In
short, there is agreement as to the general extent to which the countries in the sample are
influenced by Islamic political culture.

A second set of tests was necessary to see if there was agreement on the Islamic
Political Culture scores of the individual countries in the sample. Here, I tabulated the
mean score for each of the countries from the survey responses and compared it to my
score for each country. For most countries, the difference between the mean score of the
survey respondents and my score was less than two. The major exceptions being Algeria
and Afghanistan in 1990. Once again, there was a high level of agreement between my
coding and those of the scholars who completed the survey. A comparison of the mean
survey scores and my score for each country is presented in **Table AI. 3**

Table AI.3
Comparison of Individual Country Scores

Country/year	My Score	Mean Survey Score	Difference
Bangladesh 90	22	20.8	1.2
Bangladesh 80	18	20.9	-2.9
Bahrain 90	6	6.8	-.8
Bahrain 80	6	6.8	-.8
Egypt 90	8	7.1	.9
Egypt 80	6	6.7	-.7
Indonesia 90	2	1.6	.4
Indonesia 80	2	1.3	.7
Iran 90	23	24	-1
Iran 80	25	25.9	-.9
Iraq 90	4	3.8	.2
Iraq 80	3	2.6	.4
Jordan 90	7	7.4	-.4
Jordan 80	6	6.8	-.8
Kuwait 90	19	20	-1
Kuwait 80	19	19.5	-.5

Malaysia 90	2	2.4	-.4
Malaysia 80	2	2.4	-.4
Morocco 90	10	8.5	1.5
Morocco 80	9	8.8	.2
Oman 90	16	14.6	1.4
Oman 80	16	14.6	1.4
Pakistan 90	16	18.3	-2.3
Pakistan 80	19	18.8	.2
Senegal 90	3	2.1	.9
Senegal 80	3	2.1	.9
Sudan 90	22	20.7	1.3
Sudan 80	13	16.9	-3.9
Syria 90	3	2.2	.8
Syria 80	3	2.5	.5
Turkey 90	2	1.3	.7
Turkey 80	2	1.6	.4
Tunisia 90	3	2	1
Tunisia 80	2	2.7	-.7
UAE 90	10	11.3	-1.3
UAE 80	10	11.8	-1.8
Yemen 90	13	14.3	-1.
Yemen 80	13	14.7	-1.7
Algeria 90	2	2.4	-2.4
Algeria 80	2	7	-5
Saudi Arabia 90	23	24.5	-1.5
Saudi Arabia 80	22	24.8	-2.8
Libya 90	7	6	1
Libya 80	6	6	0
Afghanistan 90	1	1.5	-1.5
Afghanistan 80	1	7.3	-6.3

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April, 1994

Dear Scholar:

I am writing to request your assistance in a survey that is part of my dissertation on Islam and democracy, and human rights. I am trying to create an index of the extent to which the political systems of predominantly Muslim countries are influenced by Islamic ideology. It is based on the typology presented by William Shepard in "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19 (August, 1987), p. 307-225.

Shepard's two realms of Islamic ideology are the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and how Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are accepted. In the article Shepard places the ideologies of various Islamic political groups and regimes on a two dimensional graph. I am going a step further and assigning numerical scores from 1-15 for 23 regimes on these two dimensions.

I realize that assigning numbers to religious ideologies is controversial and the validity of the indicators of Islamic ideology being offered may be questioned. However, quantification and the use of statistical analysis is necessary to look at the relationship between Islam and politics across a large number of countries. In short, what is lost in detail will be compensated by an increase in generalizabilty.

In order to insure that my scoring is reliable, I would be most appreciative if you would take the time to fill out the enclosed survey based on your expert knowledge in the field. Your assistance will be invaluable to the success and scholarly value of my dissertation. If you have any questions please contact me.

Sincerely,

Daniel Price

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Coding Instructions

Please give each of the following regimes a score between 1 and 15 on the following two dimensions. Please consider only the regime or ruling party and not opposition groups or parties. In other words, to what extent do you feel that government policy decisions are influenced by:

1. Authenticity. The extent to which, and how, Western institutions, ideologies, and technologies are accepted. You might want to use the following guide:

A. Give nations that largely reject Western ideas etc. a score between 13-15.

B. Give nations that utilize Western ideas etc. but claim that they have Islamic sources a score between 10-12

C. Give nations that utilize Western ideas etc. but claim they are improved by Islam's spiritual components a score between 7-9.

D. Give nations that largely accept Western ideas etc. but claim that they are compatible with Islam a score between 4-6.

E. Give nations that largely accept Western ideas etc. without reference to Islam a score between 0-3.

I have included three possible scores in each category because, of course, these are ideal types and no regime will fit a category perfectly. Thus, the scale can accommodate nations which lean towards higher or lower authenticity within each category.

2. Totality. The extent to which "Sharia," Islamic law is utilized. You might want to consider the following areas of Islamic law:,
   1. guide for governance
   2. economic practice (i.e. banking)
   3. personal status (marriage, divorce, and other family matters)
   4. enforced religious practice (women's dress, banning of alcohol),
   5. criminal punishment.

Please give each nation a score ranging from 0-15. A zero would mean that the nation does not utilize Islamic law at all. A 15 means that the nation uses Islamic law exclusively. A seven or eight means that a nation equally utilizes or mixes both Islamic and secular legal codes.

-- Please only score the countries which you consider yourself familiar with.
-- If possible, please provide scores for both 1990 and 1980.

Figure AI.1, continued

Coding Sheet

		TOTALISM	AUTHENTICITY
1. Algeria	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
2. Bangladesh	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
3. Bahrain	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
4. Egypt	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
5. Indonesia	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
6. Iran	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
7. Iraq	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
8. Jordan	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
9. Kuwait	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
10. Libya	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
11. Malaysia	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
12. Afghanistan	90	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
13. Morocco	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
14. Oman	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
15. Pakistan	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
16. Turkey	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
17. Senegal	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
18. Saudi Arabia	90	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
19. UAE	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
20. Sudan	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____

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21. Syria	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
22. Tunisia	1990	_____	_____
	1980	_____	_____
23. Yemen	1990	_____	_____
	* 1980	_____	_____

* Use Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)

Once again, thank you for your invaluable assistance.

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APPENDIX II

COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS AND ISLAMIC PC SCORES

Country/ Year	Abbreviation	Comprehensive	Authenticity	ISLAMIC PC
Afghanistan 90	afg	0	1	1
Afghanistan 80	afg	0	0	0
Algeria 90	alg	1	2	3
Algeria 80	alg	1	1	2
Bahrain 90	bah	3	3	6
Bahrain 80	bah	3	3	6
Bangladesh 90	ban	13	9	22
Bangladesh 80	ban	9	9	18
Egypt 90	egy	4	4	8
Egypt 80	egy	3	3	6
Indonesia 90	ind	1	1	2
Indonesia	ind	1	1	2
Iran 90	ira	12	11	23
Iran 80	ira	13	12	25
Iraq 90	irq	2	2	4
Iraq 80	irq	2	1	3
Jordan 90	jor	3	4	7
Jordan 80	jor	2	4	6
Kuwait 90	kuw	12	7	19
Kuwait 80	kuw	11	8	19
Libya 90	lib	2	4	6
Libya	lib	3	4	7
Malaysia 90	mal	1	1	2
Malaysia 80	mal	1	1	2
Morocco 90	mor	4	5	9
Morocco 80	mor	4	6	10
Oman 90	oma	10	6	16
Oman 80	oma	10	6	16
Pakistan 90	pak	8	8	16
Pakistan 80	pak	9	10	19
Saudi Arabia 90	sau	13	10	23
Saudi Arabia 80	sau	12	10	22
Senegal 90	sen	1	2	3
Senegal 80	sen	1	2	3
Sudan 90	sud	13	10	23
Sudan 80	sud	9	6	15
Syria 90	syr	1	2	3
Syria 90	syr	1	2	3

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Appendix II Continued

Country/ Year	Abbreviation	Comprehensive	Authenticity	ISLAMIC PC
Tunisia 90	Tun	1	2	3
Tunisia 90	Tun	1	1	2
Turkey 90	Tur	1	1	2
Turkey 80	Tur	1	1	2
Unit. Ar. Em. 90	UAE	5	5	10
Unit. Ar. Em. 80	UAE	5	5	10
Yemen (So) 90	Yem	6	7	13
Yemen (So) 80	Yem	6	8	14

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APPENDIX III

ISLAMIC IDEOLOGIES

The following is a brief summary of the types of Islamic political ideologies discussed by William Shepard (1986).

Secularism calls for the following of ideas other than those of Islam in most areas of society. Therefore, religion and state are separate and government is based on "Western" concepts and institutions. Of course, modern science and technology are considered essential to society's development. Religion is relegated to the area of personal observance and the state dominates and regulates religious institutions.

Modernism occupies an intermediate position between radicalism and secularism in both "authenticity" and "comprehensiveness." Modernists claim that Islam was intended to be flexible and is congruous to modern Western ideologies. They call for the opening of the gates of *ijtihad* and go to great lengths to show that the original sources, the *Koran* and *Sunna*, are capable of being adapted to modern conditions. However, modernists claim that Islam goes a step further by adding a moral and spiritual dimension that is missing in the Godless secular ideologies. Finally, modernist explanations are liberal in controversial areas such as when the use of *jihad* is appropriate, the feasibility of polygamy, and the implementation of religious punishments.

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Radicalism is centered around the fusion of religion and state and religious doctrine and law serves as guides of action in all areas of both public and private life. However, there is some room for flexibility if no established text can serve as an authority. Science and technology from the West is utilized, although it is separated from its Western sources or traced to Islamic roots. Radicals do not compromise on the complete implementation of Sharia or feel the need to demonstrate its similarities with Western legal systems. Shepard (1986) writes that radicals do not see themselves as attempting to turn back the clock but, rather, moving towards a new golden age. Radicalism differs from modernism in its complete adherence to Islamic law and lower acceptance of Western ideas, technology, and institutions.

The **Neo-Traditionalist** orientation stresses gradual change. Modern technology is carefully accepted but is not given any symbolic value, as it is in modernism and radicalism. The Neo-Traditionalist does not favor the rapid transition to Islamic law that radicals do because this may result in mistaken practice or interpretation. Neo-Traditionalism does call for complete and traditional adherence to Islamic practice in some areas rather than moving towards a modernist interpretation. Followers of this strain of ideology also hold to local tradition and respect "the value, past depth, and complexity of the Islamic world as represented by the learning of the *'ulama* " (Shepard, 1986). Neo- Traditionalists may act violently when they feel the secular world is infringing on their adherence to the traditional lifestyle.

Traditionalism "embodies an attitude that has not yet internalized the impact Western penetration has had on their society" (Shepard, 1986). Traditionalists attempt to shut out all things foreign and hold to tradition and superstition. Colonial rulers and secular rulers are

tolerated because their presence is a reprimand from Allah. However, in the end, Allah will also punish the forces of evil. As is the case with Neo-traditionalists, traditionalists would rather compromise on the full implementation of *sharia* than see it altered in any fashion. Therefore, traditionalism ranks lowest of the ideologies on the modernity scale and at mid-point, in terms of totalism. None of the political groups or regimes to be discussed in this report fall into the traditional category.

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